Cases & Developments

Opinion vacating summary judgment in favor of the University and remanding. Plaintiff, a former medical student at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) brought Title IX and due process claims against the University and individual defendants after the University initially suspended him for dating violence, but then expelled him for misrepresenting his disciplinary status in an application the University’s School of Business. As relevant here, when the medical school dean learned plaintiff had withheld pertinent information in his application to the business school, he him as unfit to practice medicine. In granting summary judgment to the University on his due process claim, the district court found that the medical school dean’s decision was an academic decision based on the requirement of honesty and integrity for admission to the medical profession and that the dean’s letter informing plaintiff of his dismissal was sufficient notice. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that plaintiff had a property interest in remaining a student and that he was, accordingly, entitled also to “some kind of hearing” on his expulsion.  

The court also held that “[t]he district judge abused his discretion when permitting ‘John Doe’ to conceal his name without finding that he is a minor, is at risk of physical harm, or faces improper retaliation,” noting “Title IX litigation is not an exception to the norm that adult litigants are identified by name.”  Accordingly, it ordered that “[i]f Doe elects to continue with the suit, his true name must be disclosed to the public.”

Decision and Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former student at Hamilton College, brought Title IX and contract claims against the College after he was expelled for sexual misconduct. In denying summary judgment on his Title IX erroneous outcome claim, the court noted plaintiff’s assertions of (1) a possible conflict of interest for the hearing officer in his case based in her role as an investigator in a previous sexual misconduct case in which plaintiff was a witness and (2) potential external pressures arising from an open OCR investigation and an on-campus rally two years earlier “promoting solidarity with survivors of sexual violence.” Turning to his contract claim, the court found plaintiff’s assertions that (1) the hearing officer did not cite extraordinary circumstances when she permitted a new witness to testify against him at the hearing and (2) the hearing panel departed from the preponderance of the evidence standard sufficient to defeat summary judgment. The court dismissed his promissory estoppel claim, noting the parties agreed there was an implied contract for the College to conduct its proceedings according to its policies.