FILTERS



Find by DATE
Reset

Latest Cases & Developments


  • Date:

    Levy v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & A&M Coll. (La. App. Nov. 7, 2025)

    Opinion Vacating Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, a tenured professor at Louisiana State University School of Law, sued the university seeking reinstatement to his teaching duties and an injunction blocking the university from infringing on his free speech or due process rights, after he was placed on paid administrative leave following vulgar and inappropriate classroom statements regarding the Governor of Louisiana and President of the United States. After the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the university appealed arguing that plaintiff’s claims were premature. Finding that plaintiff’s removal from the classroom was an “interim decision” that did not “disturb [his] tenure rights, employment, or pay,” the court concluded there was “no deprivation to be enjoined.” Accordingly, the court vacated the preliminary injunction and dismissed plaintiff’s claims without prejudice.

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Tenure

  • Date:

    Dukes v. Cent. Conn. State Univ. (Conn. Super. Nov. 7, 2025)

    Opinion Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, the former Director of Student Conduct at Central Connecticut State University, sued the university alleging he was wrongfully discharged following his arrest for domestic violence and three felony charges. Plaintiff claimed that his termination was based on concerns he raised with the university president regarding the university’s handling of Title IX cases from over a decade ago, which he expressed just five days before he was placed on leave, and asserted that his speech was protected from employer discipline. The court found that plaintiff’s leave of absence and subsequent termination were not related to the speech he expressed during his meeting with the president, but rather, based on his pending criminal charges. The court also found that plaintiff’s speech was not protected speech under the Connecticut State Constitution and further, that plaintiff’s speech was not a matter of public concern as plaintiff relied “entirely on his conclusory perception of mismanagement” and thus no genuine issue of material fact was present. 

    Topics:

    Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff

  • Date:

    Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Cal. App. Sep. 17, 2025) (unpub.)

    Opinion Affirming Denial of Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Mandate. Appellant, a tenured professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the court to require the university to set aside sanctions against him after he was terminated following a disciplinary hearing for abuse of power and violations of intellectual honesty.  Appellant alleged that the decision to terminate him was arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, and that the university breached confidentiality by relying on a former settlement agreement that was allegedly time-barred. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the writ, noting that a university has “broad discretion” in determining disciplinary decisions and is “entitled to deference,” and reasoning that because “[t]he sanction imposed on appellant was well within those permitted by [u]niversity policy,” there was no abuse of discretion. 

    Topics:

    Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff

  • Date:

    Porter v. F. Tyler Sergent (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2024) (unpub.).

    Opinion affirming-in-part and reversing-in-part Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiff, a former tenured professor of psychology at Berea College, brought discrimination, retaliation, and contract claims against the College after it terminated him for publishing a survey about a series of “hypothetical” scenarios mirroring a recent Title IX investigation that found his department chair responsible for creating a hostile work environment for three female colleagues. Plaintiff also brought defamation, false light, and retaliation claims against the faculty advisor to the Student Government Association (SGA), after the advisor warned student leaders to stay out of the controversy and to forego awarding plaintiff a student service award. The district court granted summary judgment to the College on all claims, and specific to the defamation claim, held that the advisor was shielded by qualified common interest privilege in his role as an SGA advisor who provided relevant information to student leaders. The Sixth Circuit conducted a de novo review and affirmed the district court’s judgment on all claims except the defamation claim. In reaching a different conclusion on the latter claim, the Circuit found the district court erred as the claimed privilege is “not an absolute defense” and may be negated if the speaker either “abused” the privilege or acted with “malevolence or ill will,” which are questions for a jury to consider. It also noted that the alleged statements could be viewed as abusive and that the comments might be animated by interests beyond the role as an advisor, insofar as one of the three female colleagues in the underlying Title IX conflict was allegedly the advisor’s wife. Accordingly, the Court remanded for further proceedings on the defamation claim. 

    Topics:

    Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff

  • Date:

    Manco v. St. Joseph’s Univ. Et, al. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2024).

    Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former St. Joseph’s University professor sued the University and several students under multiple theories following termination his of employment. The University placed Plaintiff on administrative leave, investigated, and ultimately removed from his visiting faculty role for “violations of University policies” after screenshots of his anonymous tweets circulated online, were sent to the University’s Title IX Coordinator, and a student tweeted at the University “are you gonna fire [Plaintiff] who has done nothing but contribute to a hostile learning environment with his racism, sexism, and transphobia??????” Various defendant groups filed motions to dismiss, including the student who posted the tweet who argued that she was entitled to absolute privilege “as she conveyed information that commenced an investigation pursuant to federal statute or regulations.” The court declined to dismiss claims of defamation, false light, and tortious interference, reasoning that although the student’s emails and direct correspondence with the University during the pendency of the investigation were entitled to immunity, her “general tweet” towards a private institution lacked intent to commence an investigation. The court also found that her tweet was potentially defamatory as it may be read to imply that the professor is “a racist, sexist and/or is transphobic.” The Court granted the student’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation | Social Media

  • Date:

    State v. Conn. State Univ. Org. of Admin. Faculty. (Conn. June 4, 2024)

    Opinion reversing vacatur of the arbitration award.  In 2018, the former director of student conduct at Central Connecticut State University was arrested following an alleged domestic violence incident at his home.  The University terminated him after its internal investigation, based largely on the police incident report, found his off-duty behavior made him unsuitable to discharge his on-campus responsibilities.  Criminal charges were later dismissed, and a finding of neglect was reversed.  The Union contested the termination, and an arbitrator found that the University’s investigation did not establish the grievant’s guilt by clear and convincing evidence and ordered his reinstatement and other remedies.  The trial court denied the Union’s motion to confirm the award and granted the University’s motion to vacate.  Applying its own precedent for evaluating when “an arbitration award reinstating a terminated employee violates public policy,” the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, finding that (1) no explicit public policy prohibits grievant’s reinstatement; (2) though his position was one of public trust, other University employees had been arrested and not terminated; (3) the arbitrator’s factual findings did not establish that the off-duty conduct was so egregious as to require termination; and (4) the arbitrator’s findings similarly did not indicate a substantial risk that the grievant would engage in the same behavior in the future.   

    Topics:

    Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration

  • Date:

    Weinik v. Temple Univ. (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion granting Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former clinician at Temple University Hospital and clinical professor at the University’s School of Medicine, brought due process, contract, and defamation claims against the University and two former residents after he was terminated for alleged sexual and other misconduct. Following investigations of alleged inappropriate conduct with a resident and patients, the Hospital terminated his medical privileges. After alleged threatening behavior while his appeal was pending, the Hospital issued a Security Alert to security staff and potentially threatened individuals. When the appeal was denied, the University terminated his academic employment, and the Hospital notified the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) of the revocation of his privileges. In granting summary judgment to the defendants on his defamation claims, the court held that (1) statements made by a medical resident complainant in the Hospital’s peer review process were protected by quasi-judicial immunity, (2) other statements made in the context of this process were protected by statutory immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA), (3) the security alert was conditionally privileged and no facts suggested it was disseminated with malice or negligence, and (4) there was a statutory duty to report the loss of privileges to the NPDB. It found that his contract claim was barred by HCQIA immunity and that the Hospital’s procedures satisfied the procedural requirements of the HCQIA and, accordingly, provided him with sufficient due process. 

    Topics:

    Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Bishop v. Univ. of Scranton (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2024)

    Memorandum granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former tenured professor at the University of Scranton, brought contract claims against the University and a breach of duty of fair representation claim against his union after he was terminated in 2022 for refusing to sign a COVID-19 vaccination attestation as required by the University’s return-to-campus policy. The court dismissed as time-barred his contract claims against the University, finding plaintiff’s attempt to reassert his allegation of lack of due process in a second complaint filed with the union after it had previously informed him it would not pursue his grievance did not toll the statute of limitations. It dismissed his breach of fair representation claim against the union, finding insufficient factual allegations that its actions were arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. It dismissed his claim that his termination violated the University’s Faculty Handbook, noting (1) that because the Faculty Handbook also contained the union’s complaint and grievance process the claim is a “hybrid” claim under the Labor Management Relations Act and (2) his fair representation claim against the Union had failed to state a nonconclusory claim.  

    Topics:

    Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | Collective Bargaining | Coronavirus | Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff

  • Date:

    Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ. Officers Ass’n (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 1, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion vacating arbitration award. In 2021, Kutztown University suspended and then terminated one of its patrol officers after a group of student activists called attention to a number of his politically charged public social media posts in which he identified himself as a University police officer, expressed disparaging views of minorities, and appeared to valorize excessive use of force by police. An arbitrator sustained the Officers Association’s grievance, finding that because the University did not have a social media policy the grievant officer had not been put on notice that his off-duty social media posts could result in discipline, and directed the University to reinstate him with full back pay, benefits, and seniority. In vacating the arbitration award, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania invoked the public policy exception to the courts’ traditional deference to arbitration awards, noting that the award violated “the well-defined and dominant public policy against discrimination,” which is established in federal and state law and reflected in the University Police Department’s disciplinary policy prohibiting discrimination.  

    Topics:

    Collective Bargaining | Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration

  • Date:

    Underwood v. Cuyahoga Community College (Ohio App. Nov. 20, 2023)

    Opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the College. Plaintiff, a former manager of plant operations at Cuyahoga Community College, brought contract and wrongful termination claims against the College after he was terminated for engaging in multiple inappropriate deals with College vendors, including for a $50,000 personal loan and the installation of cabinetry in his vacation home in the U.S. Virgin Islands, in violation of Ohio Ethics Laws and the College’s Code of Conduct. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the College on plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, the Court of Appeals of Ohio found that plaintiff’s letter of appointment made clear that he was an at-will employee and that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact as to whether he was terminated for good cause or whether the college had paid him all sums due in his final paycheck. The court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of the College on plaintiff’s claim that he was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy in retaliation for his 2018 report of theft from the College’s metal recycling program, noting that his contract was renewed again in 2019 before his termination in 2020.   

    Topics:

    Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff