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  • Date:

    Boyages v. The University of Vermont and State Agricultural College (D. Vt. Nov. 4, 2025)

    Opinion and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former administrative assistant in the athletics department at the University of Vermont, sued the university for copyright infringement based on a front-facing “V-Cat” logo that she designed while employed by the university and participating as a member of an internal branding working group. The court granted summary judgment for the university finding that the university held the copyright to the design under the “work for hire” and alternatively, “derivative work” exceptions. In analyzing the “work for hire” exception, the court determined plaintiff’s efforts in creating the design (1) were the kind of work that plaintiff was employed to perform; (2) occurred substantially within the authorized time and space limits of her job; and (3) were actuated, in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. The court reasoned that just because “no one specifically told [plaintiff] to come up with the Design herself does not take her work outside the ‘ultimate objective’ of [the university].” Further, while plaintiff used her personal Adobe Photoshop account outside of work hours to create the design, she did so based off of conversations from branding working group meetings held during work hours and requested feedback from colleagues on her design. The court also held that plaintiff’s design was a derivative work of the university’s own copyrighted V-Cat logo, noting the similarities in the features of the cat design, “such as ears, eyes, and whiskers” and the “expression of those features” and concluding the “aesthetic appeal” of the two images was the same.

    Topics:

    Copyright & Fair Use | Intellectual Property

  • Date:

    Copyright Office Releases Part 2 of Artificial Intelligence Report (Jan. 29, 2025)

    Part 2 of the U.S. Copyright Office Report of the legal and policy issues related to copyright and artificial intelligence (AI). The Report addresses the copyrightability of outputs created using generative AI and affirms the existing principles of copyright law are flexible enough to apply to new technology. The Report includes situations where a human-authored work is perceptible in an AI output and confirms that the use of AI to assist in the process of creation or the inclusion of AI-generated material in a larger human-generated work does not bar copyrightability. The Report follows Part 1 which was published in July of 2024, and Part 3 will be released at a later time, and plans to address the legal implications of training AI models on copyrighted works, including licensing considerations and the allocation of any potential liability. 

    Topics:

    Copyright & Fair Use | Intellectual Property

  • Date:

    The Pa. State Univ. v. Vintage Brand, LLC (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiff, a public state institution, brought trademark infringement claims against Vintage Brand LLC (Vintage) over the use of the University’s marks on Vintage’s apparel; a litigation matter that has been ongoing for over three years. In addition to Vintage’s website, the company uses Sportswear, another defendant, as a manufacturer for their products. Following a multi-day jury trial on the matter, Sportswear moved for a judgment as a matter of law regarding a direct trademark infringement claim. The court initially granted the motion, reasoning that at the time, it was understood Sportswear was a manufacturer of the products and thus had no role in designing, marketing, or selling the products. While it may have been liable under a contributory infringement theory, the court previously held it was not liable for direct trademark infringement. The University disputed this conclusion and contended that Sportswear’s distribution of goods infringes its marks and should be held liable for direct trademark infringement, regardless of their manufacturer status. In granting the University’s motion for reconsideration, the court found that regardless of whether a defendant’s manufacture or shipment of goods featuring a protected mark could support direct trademark infringement in isolation, a reasonable juror could find that they can do so together (emphasis added). Specifically, the court determined that contributing to design, or manufacturing and affixing a label displaying the mark, or manufacturing and affixing the label along with shipping the goods, suffices to show a use in commerce that misleads consumers, therefore fulfilling the third prong of trademark infringement. While acknowledging that it is unclear whether or when mere manufacturers or distributors can be liable for direct infringement, the court noted that in this unique circumstances where Sportswear manufactures the goods, affixes the marks, and ships them directly to customers, their commercial use of the mark is in direct connection with its distribution of the infringed goods through shipping them to customers, “Sportswear’s use of the marking manufacturing may be likely to cause consumer confusion such that it can be liable for direct infringement.” 

    Topics:

    Intellectual Property | Trademarks

  • Date:

    Vidal v. Elster (U.S. June 13, 2024)

    Opinion reversing the judgment of the Federal Circuit. Steve Elster sought trademark registration for the phrase “Trump too small.” The Patent and Trademark Office refused, citing the prohibition of the names clause at Section 2(c) of the Lanham Act against registering a trademark that “consists of or comprises a name … identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.” The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the content-based restriction requires at least intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment and that the names clause does not advance a substantial government interest. In a narrow decision, the Supreme Court reversed, finding upon review of the history and tradition that “[b]ecause of the uniquely content-based nature of trademark regulation and the longstanding coexistence of trademark regulation with the First Amendment, we need not evaluate a solely content-based restriction on trademark registration under heightened scrutiny.” After reviewing multiple considerations cited historically in limiting use of the name of another in trademarks, the Court found “no reason to disturb this longstanding tradition, which supports the restriction of the use of another’s name in trademark.” 

    Topics:

    Intellectual Property | Trademarks

  • Date:

    Warner Chappell Music, LLC v. Nealy (U.S. May 9, 2024)

    Opinion affirming the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. The underlying dispute concerns songs recorded and released by Sherman Nealy and Tony Butler through Music Specialist, Inc., which they formed in 1983. Nealy later served prison terms from 1989 to 2008 and 2012 to 2015. In the interim, Butler entered an agreement with Warner Chappell Music, LLC to license songs from the Music Specialist catalogue, including for projects that proved commercially successful. In 2018, within three years of when he discovered the infringement, Nealy and Music Specialist, Inc. sued Warner Chappell for the infringement that had begun more than ten years earlier. The district court permitted Nealy to proceed on the infringement claims, but it limited recovery of monetary damages to the three years immediately prior to filing the action. On interlocutory appeal limited to the question of the limitation on recovery, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, assuming without deciding that Nealy’s claims were otherwise timely under the discovery rule. The U.S. Supreme Court, also assuming without deciding that the discovery rule permitted Nealy’s infringement claims to proceed, affirmed, finding that the Copyright Act provides only a single limitation for a plaintiff to file suit “within three years after the claim accrued” and “contains no separate time-based limit on monetary recovery.”  

    Topics:

    Copyright & Fair Use | Intellectual Property

  • Date:

    The Pa. State Univ. v. Vintage Brand, LLC (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion granting-in-part and denying-in-part the Parties’ cross Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, The Pennsylvania State University, brought infringement and related claims against Vintage Brand, LLC and its three members, for producing goods featuring historical images that contain Penn State’s trademarks. Vintage Brand counterclaimed to cancel Penn State’s Seal Marks for incorporating the Coat of Arms of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its PENN STATE Marks as merely ornamental. Though the court granted summary judgment to Vintage Brands on the University’s counterfeiting, false advertising, false endorsement, and dilution claims, it permitted the University to proceed on its infringement claims, finding factual disputes for a jury to resolve as to whether Vintage Brand’s use of Penn State’s marks causes a likelihood of confusion. The court also permitted Vintage Brand to proceed in its counterclaims seeking cancellation of certain of the University’s marks.  

    Topics:

    Intellectual Property | Trademarks

  • Date:

    The Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. v. Vintage Brand, LLC (N.D. Ill. Sep. 29, 2023)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. In 2007, following a change in NCAA policy on the use of imagery deemed hostile to Native American cultures, plaintiff, the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, adopted a resolution to end the use of its “Chief Logo” as a symbol of the University and its intercollegiate athletics. The University announced that it would maintain ownership of the trademark and has licensed the mark through the College Vault program, which permits online purchases of merchandise featuring legacy marks that no longer represent university athletic programs. In the present action, the University sued two sportswear manufacturers for trademark infringement for use of the Chief Logo. Defendant Vintage Brands moved for partial summary judgment, asserting the affirmative defense and counterclaim of abandonment. In denying the motion, the court ruled, first, that prior to discovery genuine disputes remain as to whether the Chief Logo is source-identifying in the eyes of consumers and the effect of the University’s disavowal of the logon on whether it is source-identifying. The court similarly found that genuine disputes exist as to whether (1) the College Vault’s trademark maintenance program constitutes bona fide use and (2) sales of merchandise featuring the logo under the program are de minimis.  

    Topics:

    Intellectual Property | Trademarks

  • Date:

    U.S. Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry on Artificial Intelligence and Copyright (Aug. 30, 2023)

    Library of Congress, Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry and Request for Comments.  As part of a study of copyright law and policy issues raised by artificial intelligence (AI), the U.S. Copyright Office seeks comments on numerous questions concerning AI systems, “including those involved in the use of copyrighted works to train AI models, the appropriate levels of transparency and disclosure with respect to the use of copyrighted works, and the legal status of AI-generated outputs.”  Written comments are due on or before November 15, 2023.  

    Topics:

    Copyright & Fair Use | Intellectual Property

  • Date:

    Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc. v. VIP Prods., LLC (U.S. June 8, 2023)

    Opinion vacating and remanding for further proceedings. VIP Products makes a line of dog toys called “Silly Squeakers” that resemble various well-known beverages. When it made one called “Bad Spaniels” with the phrase “The Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet” that resembled a bottle of Jack Daniel’s Old No. 7 Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey, Jack Daniel’s demanded VIP stop selling it. VIP sought a declaratory judgment, and Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed for infringement and dilution by tarnishment. The district court held in favor of Jack Daniel’s, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that because Bad Spaniels is an expressive work (1) the infringement claim may proceed only if the challenged use satisfies a higher threshold test under the First Amendment of either having no artistic relevance to the underlying work or explicitly misleading as to the source or contents of the work, and (2) the dilution claim failed because as a parody, Bad Spaniels was a statutorily exempt noncommercial use of Jack Daniel’s marks. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On the infringement issue, the Court held that the threshold question does not apply when a challenged use is a source designation, though its expressive character might still inform whether the use is likely to cause confusion. On the dilution issue, the Court similarly held that the statutory noncommercial exclusion does not shield parody when the challenged use is as a source designation.  

    Topics:

    Intellectual Property | Trademarks

  • Date:

    Bethune-Cookman Univ. v. Dr. Mary McLeod Bethune Nat’l Alumni Ass’n (11th Cir. May 30, 2023)

    Opinion affirming denial of a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff, Bethune-Cookman University, Inc., brought trademark infringement, false designation of origin, dilution, and unlawful trade practices claims against the Dr. Mary McLeod Bethune National Alumni Association, formerly known as the National Alumni Association of Bethune-Cookman University, Inc., after the University ended its cooperative relationship with the Alumni Association and sent a cease-and-desist demand. The district court denied the University’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, because nearly 6 months had elapsed from the time the University filed the complaint until the University moved for preliminary injunctive relief. Though the University argued it was entitled to the presumption of irreparable harm based on the likelihood of success on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error in the conclusion that the filing delay undermined the University’s assertion of imminent irreparable harm.  

    Topics:

    Foundations & Affiliated Entities | Governance | Intellectual Property | Trademarks