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  • Date:

    Brassette v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2025)

    Opinion Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former Paint Supervisor at Tulane University, brought Title VII reverse race discrimination and retaliation claims and claims under the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA) after he was terminated following an internal investigation which concluded he had discriminated against Black employees by “harassing, screaming at, excessively monitoring, and unreasonably disciplining them.” In granting summary judgment for the university on plaintiff’s race and age discrimination claims, the court held plaintiff could not demonstrate that his firing was pretextual, finding instead that the university “reasonably believed” that he discriminated against Black painters working for him, and was terminated on that basis alone. Regarding plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the court found that although he had engaged in protected activity when he complained that his write-ups were not taken seriously because of his race, he failed to make a causal connection between this activity and his termination four months later.

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Matlock v. The Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2025)

    Opinion and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a black female who was hired as Director of Purchasing and Contract Management at the University of Illinois alleged that the University discriminated and retaliated against her based on her age, subjected her to a hostile work environment based on race and gender, and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Plaintiff alleged that while employed by the University, she was scolded, told that she needed to be “less sensitive,” and was labeled as aggressive and hostile, specifically being told that she needs to “display more civil behavior.” Additionally, plaintiff alleged that she was informed she would be promoted and receive a pay raise, however, shortly after being told of her promotion, her supervisor informed her that they had missed the deadline to present the promotion to the Board of Trustees for approval. Plaintiff’s title was changed, but she did not receive a salary increase because there was purportedly “no money in the budget for the raise.” Plaintiff maintains that during this same timeframe, other non-Black employees with less experience were promoted and received salary increases without needing Board approval. Finally, plaintiff alleged pressure from supervisors to retire, telling her she needed to provide a firm retirement date by the end of the week, and subsequent continued attempts were made to coerce her into setting a date and developing a separation plan. Plaintiff allegedly complained about her supervisor’s discriminatory conduct by writing letters to defendant in June 2021, August 2021, and March 2022, though no response from defendant was noted. While plaintiff maintains that her hostile work environment claim constitutes a continuing violation, the court found that she was only able to provide three examples, noting several years without any described hostile experience in between, and thus, such conduct was not continuous. Because the alleged conduct was neither continuous or continuing and occurred in 2018 and 2020, the Court dismissed the hostile work environment claim as time barred insofar as it related to comments about her conduct and demeanor. Finding that plaintiff plausibly alleged a hostile work environment based on age, the Court reasoned that depending on how frequent, pointed, and offensive the retirement comments were (which plaintiff need not detail in her complaint) such conduct could conceivably rise to the level of a hostile work environment. However, it found no “connection” between the 2018 and 2020 events and those which allegedly took place in September of 2022, and absent a connection in time, type of hostility, and protected characteristics, dismissed both the conduct and demeanor, and age-based hostile work environment claims. Finally, the court found that plaintiff adequately stated a claim for relief based on her hostile work environment claim based on race, dependent upon how frequent, pointed, and offensive the comments about plaintiff’s demeanor were. Plaintiff’s denial of a raise can constitute a materially adverse employment action in support of her claim for retaliation. While plaintiff conceded that the comments about her behavior did not rise to the level of severe abuse, they may have been pervasive, and at this stage, plaintiff is not required to allege every instance of abuse to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination

  • Date:

    Sabic-El-Rayess v. Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ. (S.D. N.Y. Dec. 5, 2024)

    Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a Muslim migrant from Bosnia who is over the age of 40 and a non-tenure track faculty member at Teachers College, Columbia University, brought claims against the College for religious discrimination under Title VII and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and NYCHRL, and retaliation under Title VII, the ADEA, and NYCHRL alleging the College rejected her efforts to obtain tenure due to her religion and age, and because of her prior complaints of discrimination on those bases. Plaintiff contends she has been employed by the College for over a decade, published on numerous issues, and obtained multi-million-dollar grants for the College. She claims that although the College’s president and other leaders agreed that she is qualified for a tenure-track role, her applications have repeatedly been rejected, and that she unsuccessfully applied for a tenure-track position in 2012, 2013, and twice in 2024. She claims she communicated with colleagues about applying for positions in 2021 and 2022 but was discouraged from applying after hearing disparaging remarks about her age. Plaintiff alleges that while her 2012 application was pending, her supervisor asked around about her Muslim faith, and the position was ultimately awarded to a candidate who is not Muslim. She avers that the Department Chair told her that her Muslim background “doomed” her chances of ever obtaining tenure, and that overall, the College has a culture of anti-Muslim bias. Plaintiff alleges that after she filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the College retaliated against her by (1) disinviting her from a symposium at which she was scheduled to speak, (2) lowering her wages, and (3) denying her tenure-track request. The court found plaintiff’s allegation that her supervisor said she was “not a spring chicken” and her subjective belief that the supervisor “preferred to hire someone ‘young’ who had ‘youth’ and ‘energy’” were insufficient to maintain claims for age discrimination since plaintiff did not actually apply for the position. On the other hand, it allowed the religious discrimination claims to proceed, reasoning that being disinvited and excluded from a prominent speaking role at a symposium was a materially adverse employment action when paired with plaintiff’s allegations that College leaders made anti-Muslim remarks. The court permitted the retaliation claims to move forward based on plaintiff’s allegations that (1) mere months elapsed between her religious discrimination complaint and the rejection of her dual requests for tenure-track and tenured positions, (2) although she was eligible for a salary increase, her wages were reduced, and (3) her invitation to speak at the symposium was revoked a week after she filed litigation.  

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Religious Discrimination & Accommodation | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Kuligowski v. Univ. of Toledo (N.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part individual human resources Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, who is white, over the age of forty, and a former football coach for the University of Toledo, brought procedural due process and equal protection claims under Title VII, Title VI, and the Age Discrimination Employment Act against the University following termination of his employment. Plaintiff alleges the University discriminated against him when it replaced him with a younger, Black employee. Plaintiff asserts that prior to his termination, the University’s Athletic Director announced an intention to hire more coaches who were “representative” of current student-athletes, “meaning younger and black.” A few months later, plaintiff was accused of sexual harassment, which he contends was frivolous, false, and uncorroborated by an investigation. Subsequently, plaintiff told the proponent of the sexual harassment claim that “if my wife knew you were near me, she’d kill you” which led the coworker to file a claim of retaliation. When he was interviewed by human resources personnel, plaintiff asserted that his comment was a “joke” rather than a real threat. Notwithstanding his view that the remark did not constitute retaliation under the University’s policy and purported assurances by other University personnel that he was “definitely not getting fired or anything,” plaintiff was found responsible and terminated from his role. Plaintiff alleged that his termination by human resources staff was in service of “the University’s practice of replacing older, white employees with younger, black employees.” Plaintiff also averred that the failure to conduct a hearing prior to firing him violated the University’s Title IX policy. The court found that plaintiff plausibly pled a §1983 race discrimination claim based upon his allegations that the AD wanted to hire more representative coaching staff, and the University had replaced older, white males with younger, black employees in the AD, assistant AD, and General Counsel roles. The court also permitted his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief to proceed under Ex parte Young, reasoning that a newspaper article attributing a quote to plaintiff’s letter of separation that he “‘committed a significant and/or intentional violation’ of [the University’s] non-retaliation and standards of conduct policies” served as potential pretext for the alleged discrimination. But the court dismissed plaintiff’s due process claims, finding that he failed to plead a promise of continued employment, and noting that the Sixth Circuit has held that “repeated contract renewals do not, by themselves, create a reasonable expectation of permanent employment.” 

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination

  • Date:

    Cooper v. Yale Univ. (D. Conn. Feb. 29, 2024)

    Ruling granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former administrator in the Department of Laboratory Medicine at Yale University who is African American, brought discrimination and retaliation claims against the University after a series of negative audit findings and performance issues led successively to a demotion, a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), which she failed, a phased retirement agreement, and her termination when her attorney wrote the University claiming the agreement was void. In granting summary judgment in favor of the University on her discrimination claims, the court held that plaintiff failed to raise a question as to pretext, noting that of the five comparators she suggested only one had the same title, supervisor, and similar functions, but that comparator lacked plaintiff’s extensive history of unfavorable audits and unsatisfactory performance evaluations. Turning to her retaliation claim, the court found that even though plaintiff’s PIP was implemented a month after she expressed that she felt increased oversight of her work was discriminatory, she was unable to demonstrate pretext given that the long-standing concerns about her performance predated this complaint.   

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Edrich v. Dall. Coll. (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2023)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  Plaintiff, a former Executive Director of Human Resources at Brookhaven College, which was consolidated into Dallas College along with several other separately accredited colleges, brought discrimination and contract claims against Dallas College after she was reassigned to a new role during a transitional phase and then not hired for any of the new positions in the final phase of the consolidation.  In granting summary judgment to the College on her contract claims, the court held that plaintiff’s assertion that she had been demoted when the College reassigned her failed because her month-to-month employment contract referred to her only as an administrator and she continued to receive the same salary after her the reassignment.  In granting summary judgment to the College on her race and age discrimination claims, the court found that plaintiff failed to point to any evidence showing that the College’s assertion that it sought to hire the most qualified candidates was pretextual.   

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Contracts | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination

  • Date:

    Khlafa v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ. (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2023)

    Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.  Plaintiff, a former information specialist at the Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU), proceeding pro se, brought age and other discrimination claims against OHSU after he signed a Separation Agreement, which included a broad Mutual Release of All Claims, ending his employment the following day.  The court permitted plaintiff to proceed in his age discrimination claim because the Separation Agreement did not provide plaintiff with a 21-day period to consider the agreement or a 7-day period to revoke after execution as required for a knowing and voluntary release under the ADEA as amended by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA).  It granted summary judgment to OHSU on his other discrimination claims because he provided no evidence to support his claim that he signed the Separation Agreement under duress, noting, in particular, that he was represented by counsel at the time.   

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employment Separation, RIFs, ERIPs & Retrenchment | Faculty & Staff

  • Date:

    Dennison v. Ind. Univ. of Pa. (3rd Cir. Dec. 12, 2023)

    Opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the University.  Plaintiff, a former Executive Director of Housing, Residential Living and Dining at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, brought discrimination and First Amendment retaliation claims against the University and University officials after she was first demoted to Director of Residence Life and then had her position eliminated with staff reductions at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic.  Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated for unilaterally implementing a contactless checkout process when the University closed its residential facilities in March 2020.  In affirming summary judgment in favor of the University on her First Amendment retaliation claim, the Third Circuit held that plaintiff’s speech defending her decision to implement the checkout process was not protected because it was pursuant to her duties as a University employee.  Her sex discrimination claim failed because she should not show that the University’s decision in favor of flatter, streamlined organization in her demotion was pretextual and because her responsibilities were given to another woman.  Her age discrimination claim similarly failed because she was unable to show that the University’s preference for efficiency or her supervisor’s ultimate loss of confidence in her leadership were pretextual.   

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employment Separation, RIFs, ERIPs & Retrenchment | Faculty & Staff | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination | Sex Discrimination in Employment

  • Date:

    Mitchell v. Univ. of Pittsburgh (3rd Cir. Dec. 12, 2023)

    Opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the University.  Plaintiff, a former campus police officer at the University of Pittsburgh, brought an age discrimination claim against the University after demoted him from senior sergeant and shift supervisor to patrolman.  In affirming summary judgment in favor of the University, the Third Circuit held that plaintiff’s assertion that his supervisor provided him with a copy of the collective bargaining agreement and said he could “take advantage of retirement” was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the provision in the agreement on retirement had changed since plaintiff was last covered by it.  It also held that plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination failed because his assertion of his personal understanding that he was replaced by a younger employee was insufficient to create a presumption of discrimination because it was insufficient to overcome the University’s evidence that the younger employee was only promoted to sergeant and did not otherwise take on his prior duties.   

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity

  • Date:

    Tennin v. Coll. of Lake Cnty. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 18, 2023)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.  Plaintiff, a former Director of Student Activities at the College of Lake County who is African American, brought race and age discrimination claims against the College and, under §1983, against his former supervisor, the Dean of Student Affairs, and one of his former subordinates, a Coordinator of Student Organizations and Programs.  Plaintiff alleged that the Dean undermined his work and then disciplined him for the failures and that the Coordinator, whom the Dean hired after working with her at a different university and who babysat his children, provided the Dean with information about Plaintiff’s activities and even directed aspects of the alleged sabotage.  The court dismissed plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims as time-barred.  It permitted his §1983 claims against both the Dean and the Coordinator to proceed, finding he had sufficiently alleged the personal involvement of both in the alleged Constitutional deprivation.  

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination