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  • Date:

    Johnson v. Georgetown University (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, the former Assistant Director at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, sued the university and 12 other defendants alleging Title VII discrimination, retaliation and other claims, after she was hired and terminated a month later after social media posts she made eight years prior describing her “‘hat[red]’ for Zionists” went viral. The court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the university finding that plaintiff had failed to plausibly allege discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin and that her tort claims could not proceed due to procedural and substantive defects. While plaintiff argued the university had deviated from its probation policy in terminating her so swiftly, the court disagreed finding the policy “clearly afford[ed] the university the right to fire an employee for behavior that her department deem[ed] ‘unacceptable’.” The court also dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s claims against the other defendants with the exception of her claims against Canary Mission. Because Canary Mission refused to appear in the case, and did not move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, the court permitted plaintiff to consider whether to seek a default judgment against it.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Religious Discrimination & Accommodation | Retaliation | Social Media | Technology

  • Date:

    Stokes v. Boyce (N.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2026)

    Opinion Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, the former Executive Assistant to the Vice Chancellor for Development at the University of Mississippi, sued the university chancellor in both his official and individual capacities alleging First Amendment retaliation and seeking reinstatement of her employment after she reposted a controversial statement regarding the killing of Charlie Kirk and was subsequently terminated. The court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding ample evidence that plaintiff’s post resulted in significant, actual disruptions to campus operations, including the cancelling of a student event, the need for increased campus police patrols outside plaintiff’s office, and increased work for a senior administrator tasked with responding to hate mail.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation | Social Media | Technology

  • Date:

    Christensen v. Carter (S.D. Oh. Jan. 14, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, a student at Ohio State University, sued the president of the university and several senior administrators alleging violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, after the university disenrolled him based on controversial social media videos he posted on his personal TikTok account. The court held that plaintiff demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on his First Amendment retaliation claim, reasoning that while plaintiff’s speech was controversial, it did not “explicitly encourage violence or lawlessness and [was] unlikely to be an implicit endorsement of such action.” Further, the court determined that the facts “[did] not support the conclusion that [d]efendants’ forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable” given the lack of evidence that plaintiff’s speech disrupted any classwork and the fact that the semester was over and plaintiff was not on campus, let alone in the state of Ohio. The court also held that plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of his Fourteenth Amendment claim because he did not receive notice and the university failed to show that emergency circumstances justified its failure to hold a hearing prior to disenrolling him. Finally, the court determined that the disenrollment notation on plaintiff’s transcript constituted ongoing irreparable harm and ordered the university to expunge the notation.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Due Process | First Amendment & Free Speech | Social Media | Student Speech & Campus Unrest

  • Date:

    Damsky v. Summerlin (11th Cir. Jan. 8, 2026)

    Opinion Granting Stay of a Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, a law student at the University of Florida, sued the university for violating his First Amendment rights when it expelled him based on his concerning behavior on campus and social media posts, including a post that stated, “Jews must be abolished by any means necessary.” After the district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the university to reinstate the plaintiff, the university appealed.  The Eleventh Circuit stayed the district court’s injunction, holding that the university is likely to succeed on the merits because the plaintiff’s speech “was likely not protected by the First Amendment” and constituted a true threat. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s statements were reasonably interpreted as calling for extralegal violence and that, despite occurring off campus, the speech was sufficiently connected to the university through the plaintiff’s awareness of a campus audience and his engagement with a UF law professor. When read within the context of plaintiff’s other posts and behavior, as well as reports of concern and fear from students and faculty, the court found there to be evidence of serious disruption that justified intervention from the university to maintain a safe educational environment. The court concluded that “absent a stay, [the university] will need to take immediate and substantial security precautions to protect its students, faculty, and others on campus, burdens which weigh heavily in favor of granting a stay.”

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech | Social Media

  • Date:

    Damsky v. Summerlin (N.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2025)

    Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, a law student at the University of Florida with a history of making provocative statements, sued the university for violating his First Amendment rights when it expelled him for posting on social media that “Jews must be abolished by any means necessary.” The court granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and reinstated him at the law school, finding he was likely to prevail on his First Amendment claims and had established irreparable harm in being denied the ability to attend school because of his protected speech. While the university claimed that plaintiff’s speech constituted a “true threat” and thus was unprotected, the court rejected this argument, concluding instead that plaintiff was “stating a view, even if a hateful and offensive one,” and had not conveyed any serious expression of an intent to harm or commit violence. The court also rejected the university’s claim that plaintiff’s speech “created a material and substantial disruption” to the operation of the law school, reasoning plaintiff’s post “bear[ed] no connection with the school at all” as the post occurred outside the university and did not mention the university, administrators, other students, or professors.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech | Social Media | Student Speech & Campus Unrest

  • Date:

    Hook v. Rav, et al., (D.S.D. Sep. 24, 2025)

    Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiff, a tenured professor at the University of South Dakota, brought a First Amendment retaliation claim against the President of the Board of Regents and other individual defendants after he received notice of an intent to terminate his contract following his online comments about the death of Charlie Kirk. The court found that because plaintiff was at home, off work, and on his private Facebook page, he “spoke as a citizen and his speech was on a matter of public concern.” Additionally, the court found that “defendants [] failed to put on evidence that [plaintiff’s] speech had an adverse impact on the efficiency of the [university’s] operations.” In granting a temporary restraining order, the court held that plaintiff had a fair chance of prevailing on his claim, because “the change in his employment status would ‘chill a person of ordinary fitness’ from continuing to engage in First Amendment activity.” The court ordered the university to reinstate plaintiff’s position retroactive to the date he received the notice and required plaintiff’s position to remain in effect until the preliminary injunction hearing. 

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Constitutional Issues | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Social Media

  • Date:

    Krasno v. Mnookin (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025)

    Opinion Reversing and Remanding. Plaintiff, a former student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison brought First Amendment claims against the University after it had hidden several of her comments online. Plaintiff, while a student at the University, worked as a primate caretaker through the University’s research center and went on to become an animal rights advocate, using social media to highlight her experiences as a researcher. In 2020, plaintiff began commenting on the University’s social media posts, writing things such as “stop exploiting animals. Get with the future and the future is consistent anti-oppression. Shut down the labs and eat plants!” Plaintiff also responded to other comments, explaining that she used to work in one of the University’s labs. The University restricted plaintiff’s Instagram account, which hid all of her comments on the University’s posts and explained that it had noticed “a consistent pattern of off-topic comments.” The restriction was later removed, though her hidden comments were never unhidden. In 2021, the district court denied summary judgment for plaintiff and found in favor of the University, “finding nonpublic and limited public forums substantively equivalent . . . [and] the comment threads attached to the University’s posts were nonpublic forums, such that any restrictions to speech were required to be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the interactive comment threads attached to the University’s posts are limited public forums but disagreed that the University’s reasoning for hiding plaintiff’s comments was reasonable. The Court concluded that the comments made by plaintiff were private speech and “the University’s minimal involvement in shaping the comments on its comment threads weighs against finding that the comments constitute the University’s speech.” Further, the Court found that “the University’s ill-defined off-topic comment rule is neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral” and found it to be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech | Social Media

  • Date:

    Williams v. Pa. State Univ. (3rd Cir. Apr. 1, 2025) (unpub.)

    Order and Opinion affirming Grant of Summary Judgment for Defendants. Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brought claims against Pennsylvania State University (Penn State) alleging Title VI retaliation and discrimination based on issues with her professors, due process violations regarding her suspension hearing, and First Amendment retaliation based on her suspension and denial of her Title IX claim. Plaintiffs’ claims stem from three separate incidents: (1) a Title IX investigation where the alleged perpetrator was found not responsible; (2) plaintiff’s allegation that her professor retaliated against her by giving her a failing grade after she filed a complaint of racism against him; and (3) her suspension from Penn State following allegations of harassment against her former roommate and a Lyft driver. Turning first to plaintiff’s claims of Title VI discrimination and retaliation, the Court found that plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation as no casual connection was shown between her complaint and the failing grade she received. The Court also found that plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated as she was given sufficient written notice of the charges and proposed sanctions against her prior to the hearing, had an advisor present at the hearing, and declined breaks to speak with her advisor present at the hearing, or privately. Although neither witness was present at the hearing, plaintiff was able to testify about her experience and provide her own evidence. Finally, the Court found plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim must also fail because she could not establish a causal link between her posts on Twitter about the Title IX investigation and the outcome of her Title IX claim.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Social Media | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Ohio Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission (6th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025)

    Opinion granting petitions for review and setting aside Safeguarding Order. Plaintiff, a statewide trade association that represents the common interests of telecommunication companies in Ohio, challenged the Federal Communications Commission’s
    (FCC) statutory authority under Title II of the Communications Act to impose net-neutrality principles via its issuance of the Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet Order (the Order). The Order defined mobile broadband and private mobile
    services as telecommunications services, which are subject to Title II common carrier restrictions, rather than as information services. Relying on Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Sixth Circuit overruled prior decisions granting Chevron
    deference to FCC opinions and found that “mobile broadband does not qualify as ‘commercial mobile service’ … and therefore may not be regulated as a common carrier.
    In issuing its decision to set aside the Order – which effectively ends the FCC’s authority to impose net neutrality restrictions on internet service providers – the Sixth Circuit reasoned that “[f]or almost 20 years after
    Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act, the FCC’s position was that companies providing access to the Internet offered information—not telecommunications—services.”  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech | Social Media | Technology | Technology Accessibility

  • Date:

    Jill Hines v. Alex Stamos (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2024)

    Memorandum Order denying without prejudice Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, social media users with significant followings, brought a putative class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, alleging the Aspen Institute, the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, the Leland Stanford Junior University, the Stanford Internet Observatory, the Atlantic Counsel, the Atlantic Counsel’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, and several individuals (the Defendants) caused plaintiffs’ “disfavored” viewpoints (namely, their speech concerning COVID-19 and elections) to be censored, and remain engaged in ongoing censorship. Plaintiffs allege Defendants were “active participants, if not architects, of a vast censorship scheme, and—in collaboration with government officials—actively monitored, targeted, and ultimately induced social media platforms to censor [their] speech (among many others).” The District Court initially decided the issue of arbitrability in a manner adverse to Defendants, Defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court must first determine personal and subject matter jurisdiction before considering arbitrability. On remand, the District declined to grant dismissal finding that plaintiffs were entitled to limited discovery pertaining to both jurisdiction and standing. First, the Court reasoned that plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants’ engaged in censorship in Louisiana by “assigning analyst[s] specifically to Louisiana, determining whether speech originated in Louisiana, tracking the speech’s spread from Louisiana, and communicating with state officials in Louisiana about supposed disinformation” was a sufficient preliminary showing of jurisdiction suggestive of “the possible existence of the requisite [minimum] contacts” with the State to oblige Defendants to bear the burdens of jurisdictional discovery, and thus, denied the motion to dismiss. Next, as to standing, it distinguished Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 1972 (2024), reasoning that absent a request for preliminary injunction and its corresponding heighted burden plaintiffs need not aver “that a particular defendant pressured a particular platform to censor a particular topic before that platform suppressed a particular plaintiff’s speech on that topic,” therefore, plaintiffs’ mere allegation that Defendants, “participation in the Election Integrity Project and Virality Project, caused plaintiffs to be censored on social media platforms” was adequate to access preliminary discovery.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Social Media

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