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  • Date:

    Johnson v. Georgetown University (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, the former Assistant Director at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, sued the university and 12 other defendants alleging Title VII discrimination, retaliation and other claims, after she was hired and terminated a month later after social media posts she made eight years prior describing her “‘hat[red]’ for Zionists” went viral. The court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the university finding that plaintiff had failed to plausibly allege discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin and that her tort claims could not proceed due to procedural and substantive defects. While plaintiff argued the university had deviated from its probation policy in terminating her so swiftly, the court disagreed finding the policy “clearly afford[ed] the university the right to fire an employee for behavior that her department deem[ed] ‘unacceptable’.” The court also dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s claims against the other defendants with the exception of her claims against Canary Mission. Because Canary Mission refused to appear in the case, and did not move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, the court permitted plaintiff to consider whether to seek a default judgment against it.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Religious Discrimination & Accommodation | Retaliation | Social Media | Technology

  • Date:

    United States v. Minnesota (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, the United States, sued the state of Minnesota and the Minnesota Office of Higher Education, alleging that Minnesota’s in-state tuition law violates section 1623 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which prohibits in-state tuition benefits for individuals who are not “lawfully present” in the United States, “on the basis of residence within a State,” unless a citizen is eligible for the same benefit without regard to state residency. The court held that, because Minnesota’s law allows a student to qualify for in-state tuition even if “their principal actual dwelling place is outside of Minnesota,” the law “[did] not determine eligibility . . . on the basis of residence,” and therefore was not preempted by IIRIRA. The court dismissed the government’s claims with prejudice.

    Topics:

    Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) | Employment of Foreign Nationals | Faculty & Staff | Immigration | International Students

  • Date:

    Hansen v. The Lutheran Univ. Ass’n. (N.D. Ind. Mar. 19, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, the former Assistant Director of Building Services at Valparaiso University, sued the university alleging violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) after his position was eliminated while he was on medical leave. The court granted summary judgment for the university, finding the university had presented unrebutted evidence that it had eliminated plaintiff’s position as part of a “planned restructuring” prior to his request for FMLA leave while noting plaintiff failed to provide evidence this rationale was pretextual. In reaching its decision, the court explained that the FMLA does not guarantee reinstatement when an employee would have been terminated regardless of leave and cautioned that suspicious timing alone is insufficient to establish retaliation.

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) | Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) | Privacy & Transparency | Retaliation

  • Date:

    AAUP New Report: Academic Freedom and Collective Bargaining (Mar. 18, 2026) 

    The American Association of University Professors’ Center for the Defense of Academic Freedom and the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions at Hunter College published a new report analyzing and comparing academic freedom provisions included in collective bargaining agreements from 45 higher education institutions. The report calls for the development of a nationwide training program for higher education on the principles of academic freedom set forth in the 1940 Statement and on incorporating those principles into collective bargaining agreements.  

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Collective Bargaining | Faculty & Staff

  • Date:

    Stokes v. Boyce (N.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2026)

    Opinion Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, the former Executive Assistant to the Vice Chancellor for Development at the University of Mississippi, sued the university chancellor in both his official and individual capacities alleging First Amendment retaliation and seeking reinstatement of her employment after she reposted a controversial statement regarding the killing of Charlie Kirk and was subsequently terminated. The court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding ample evidence that plaintiff’s post resulted in significant, actual disruptions to campus operations, including the cancelling of a student event, the need for increased campus police patrols outside plaintiff’s office, and increased work for a senior administrator tasked with responding to hate mail.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation | Social Media | Technology

  • Date:

    Kershnar v. Kolison, Jr., et al. (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a philosophy professor at the State University of New York at Fredonia (SUNY), sued the university’s president and provost, alleging retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, and prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment, after he was barred from teaching and banned from campus following controversial remarks he made about age-of-consent laws during a podcast appearance. The court found that, despite the offensive nature of his speech, plaintiff plausibly alleged that his statements addressed a matter of public concern and therefore were entitled to First Amendment protection. The court further found that plaintiff had plausibly alleged that the university’s order prohibiting plaintiff from contacting members of the campus community functioned as a prior restraint on his speech. Finally, the court also found that although plaintiff continued to receive his salary during the campus ban, he had sufficiently alleged retaliation, concluding that the close timing between the podcast going viral, the university president’s public condemnation of the remarks, and campus ban plausibly suggested a retaliatory motive.  

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Brake v. Liberty University (W.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2026)

    Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former Title IX investigator at Liberty University, sued the university under Title IX; the Uniformed Services Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA); the Virginia Whistleblower Protection Act (VWPA); and the Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA), after he returned from a three–year military leave, reported alleged Title IX misconduct, and was terminated for “compliance issues.” The court denied the university’s motion for summary judgment on most of the plaintiff’s Title IX claims, finding a reasonable jury could conclude his internal complaints and participation in an internal investigation constituted protected activity, even if a part of his job duties, and were a motivating factor in his termination. However, the court granted summary judgment on the portion of plaintiff’s Title IX claims that were based on other protected activity that was unknown to the university decisionmaker. The court also denied summary judgment on plaintiff’s USERRA discrimination claim, finding a jury could conclude he was denied a benefit when his cell phone stipend was not immediately restored upon his return. But it granted summary judgment on his USERRA retaliation claim, finding that plaintiff failed to show the required causation. Finally, the court denied summary judgment on plaintiff’s state law claims under VWPA and VHRA.  

    Topics:

    Faculty & Staff | Retaliation | Veterans & Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)

  • Date:

    Akoju v. University of New Hampshire (D. N.H. Feb. 26, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiff, a former graduate student at the University of New Hampshire proceeding pro se, sued the university alleging violations of Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment after the school terminated her enrollment, ended her SEVIS status, and evicted her from her dorm following her failure to pay more than $14,000 in outstanding charges on her student account. The court denied plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO), finding that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her claims because she received adequate notice of both the registration deadline and the consequences of failing to pay her balance. The court also found that the university’s actions were based on legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons that were consistent with institutional policies and not a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Although the court acknowledged that plaintiff could suffer significant harm without injunctive relief, including the loss of her F-1 visa status, it found that this harm did not outweigh the deficiencies in her claims.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Immigration | International Students | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation | Student Housing | Students

  • Date:

    Department of Labor Proposes Rule Clarifying Employee and Independent Contractor Classification (Feb. 26, 2026)

    The Department of Labor announced a proposed rule which would rescind the Department’s 2024 final rule addressing the classification of independent contractors and replace it with an analysis for employee classification similar to one adopted by the Department in 2021. If implemented, the rule would apply an “economic reality” test to determine whether a worker is in business as an independent contractor or as an employee economically dependent on an employer for work. Comments on the proposed rule are due April 28, 2026.  

    Topics:

    Faculty & Staff | Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) & Categorization of Employees

  • Date:

    Johnson v. Fliger, et al. (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026)

    Order Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, a history professor at Bakersfield Community College, brought First Amendment facial and as-applied challenges to Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) regulations governing the California Community College system, as well as a California Education Code provision permitting discipline for violations of those regulations. While the court rejected plaintiff’s facial challenge to the DEIA regulations, it found that plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of his as-applied viewpoint discrimination and compelled speech claims. In granting plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the court found that defendants’ general interest in enforcing the DEIA regulations did not outweigh plaintiff’s First Amendment right not to be sanctioned for expressing a contrary viewpoint on DEIA matters and not to be compelled to speak in support of the DEIA principles. The court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and enjoined defendants from investigating, disciplining, or terminating plaintiff based on his social or political speech in his teaching or scholarship, or in his capacity as a private citizen. However, the court clarified that the injunction would not extend to plaintiff’s speech in his official capacity on college committees or to the requirement that he complete DEIA training as a condition of serving on faculty screening committees.  

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Constitutional Issues | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech

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