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  • Date:

    Johnson v. Georgetown University (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, the former Assistant Director at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, sued the university and 12 other defendants alleging Title VII discrimination, retaliation and other claims, after she was hired and terminated a month later after social media posts she made eight years prior describing her “‘hat[red]’ for Zionists” went viral. The court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the university finding that plaintiff had failed to plausibly allege discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin and that her tort claims could not proceed due to procedural and substantive defects. While plaintiff argued the university had deviated from its probation policy in terminating her so swiftly, the court disagreed finding the policy “clearly afford[ed] the university the right to fire an employee for behavior that her department deem[ed] ‘unacceptable’.” The court also dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s claims against the other defendants with the exception of her claims against Canary Mission. Because Canary Mission refused to appear in the case, and did not move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, the court permitted plaintiff to consider whether to seek a default judgment against it.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Religious Discrimination & Accommodation | Retaliation | Social Media | Technology

  • Date:

    Stokes v. Boyce (N.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2026)

    Opinion Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, the former Executive Assistant to the Vice Chancellor for Development at the University of Mississippi, sued the university chancellor in both his official and individual capacities alleging First Amendment retaliation and seeking reinstatement of her employment after she reposted a controversial statement regarding the killing of Charlie Kirk and was subsequently terminated. The court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding ample evidence that plaintiff’s post resulted in significant, actual disruptions to campus operations, including the cancelling of a student event, the need for increased campus police patrols outside plaintiff’s office, and increased work for a senior administrator tasked with responding to hate mail.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation | Social Media | Technology

  • Date:

    Kershnar v. Kolison, Jr., et al. (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a philosophy professor at the State University of New York at Fredonia (SUNY), sued the university’s president and provost, alleging retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, and prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment, after he was barred from teaching and banned from campus following controversial remarks he made about age-of-consent laws during a podcast appearance. The court found that, despite the offensive nature of his speech, plaintiff plausibly alleged that his statements addressed a matter of public concern and therefore were entitled to First Amendment protection. The court further found that plaintiff had plausibly alleged that the university’s order prohibiting plaintiff from contacting members of the campus community functioned as a prior restraint on his speech. Finally, the court also found that although plaintiff continued to receive his salary during the campus ban, he had sufficiently alleged retaliationconcluding that the close timing between the podcast going viral, the university president’s public condemnation of the remarks, and campus ban plausibly suggested a retaliatory motive.  

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Doe v. The Trustees of Columbia University (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 2026) (unpub.)

    Opinion and Order Denying Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and Vacating University’s Sanctions. Plaintiffs, 22 students who attend Columbia University, challenged the sanctions imposed on them by the university following the April 2024 occupation of Hamilton Hall, alleging that the disciplinary determinations against them were arbitrary and capricious and in violation of New York law. The court denied the university’s motion to dismiss, finding that the university (1) improperly inferred guilt from mere presence at  the occupation when it needed evidence of each student’s individual conduct; and (2) improperly relied on information contained in the students’ arrest records, which was placed under seal, and therefore, under New York Law, required to be treated as a legal nullity and could not be used to impose adverse consequences. The court found that because the arrest information was the only evidence placing the students inside Hamilton Hall, and the university was unable to produce any other proof of their individual conduct, the disciplinary findings were unsupported by admissible evidence. Accordinglythe court vacated the disciplinary sanctions and remanded the matter to the university, while clarifying that the university may initiate new disciplinary actions based on permissible evidence.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech | Student Conduct | Student Speech & Campus Unrest | Students

  • Date:

    Akoju v. University of New Hampshire (D. N.H. Feb. 26, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiff, a former graduate student at the University of New Hampshire proceeding pro se, sued the university alleging violations of Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment after the school terminated her enrollment, ended her SEVIS status, and evicted her from her dorm following her failure to pay more than $14,000 in outstanding charges on her student account. The court denied plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO), finding that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her claims because she received adequate notice of both the registration deadline and the consequences of failing to pay her balance. The court also found that the university’s actions were based on legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons that were consistent with institutional policies and not a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Although the court acknowledged that plaintiff could suffer significant harm without injunctive relief, including the loss of her F-1 visa status, it found that this harm did not outweigh the deficiencies in her claims.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Immigration | International Students | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation | Student Housing | Students

  • Date:

    Johnson v. Fliger, et al. (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026)

    Order Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, a history professor at Bakersfield Community College, brought First Amendment facial and as-applied challenges to Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) regulations governing the California Community College system, as well as a California Education Code provision permitting discipline for violations of those regulations. While the court rejected plaintiff’s facial challenge to the DEIA regulations, it found that plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of his as-applied viewpoint discrimination and compelled speech claims. In granting plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the court found that defendants’ general interest in enforcing the DEIA regulations did not outweigh plaintiff’s First Amendment right not to be sanctioned for expressing a contrary viewpoint on DEIA matters and not to be compelled to speak in support of the DEIA principles. The court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and enjoined defendants from investigating, disciplining, or terminating plaintiff based on his social or political speech in his teaching or scholarship, or in his capacity as a private citizenHowever, the court clarified that the injunction would not extend to plaintiff’s speech in his official capacity on college committees or to the requirement that he complete DEIA training as a condition of serving on faculty screening committees.  

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Constitutional Issues | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech

  • Date:

    Young Americans for Freedom, et al. v. Department of Education (8th Cir. Feb. 17, 2026)  

    Plaintiffs’ Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal. Plaintiffs, the Young Americans for Freedom, sought an injunction prohibiting the Department of Education from utilizing race eligibility criteria to award grants for the Ronald E. McNair Postbaccalaureate Achievement Program. The district court denied the motion, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to include the relevant higher education institutionswhich control applicant selection, not the Department. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their request for an injunction to the Eighth Circuit but before the court could render a decision, the parties agreed to drop the lawsuit. In requesting the court to dismiss the case, the motion highlights (1) the Department’s determination that the program’s race eligibility criteria is unconstitutional and (2) it’s commitment to rescinding the race criteria in an upcoming rulemaking.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Equal Protection | Financial Aid, Scholarships, & Student Loans | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Students

  • Date:

    Kilborn v. Amiridis, et al. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2026)

    Opinion Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a tenured professor at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Law, sued several university officials bringing First Amendment retaliation, Fourteenth Amendment due process, and state law defamation claims after an internal investigation concluded that he violated the school’s nondiscrimination policy based on an exam hypothetical referencing racial slurs, racially insensitive classroom remarks, and intimidating comments he made in response to student criticismThe court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, holding that it fell within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity because plaintiff sought prospective relief in the form of expungement of the investigation findings from his employment record. However, the court dismissed plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, finding that he had no entitlement to the 2% merit raise he claimed was withheld and that reputational harm alone did not establish a constitutional liberty interest. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s defamation claims based on an internal investigation findings letter that stated plaintiff had used racial slurs, denounced minorities participation in civil rights, and had referred to minorities as “cockroaches. The court concluded that those statements were “non-actionable” because a transcript confirmed plaintiff had, in fact, made those statements – and truth was a defense to defamationBut the court allowed the plaintiff’s other defamation claims to proceed, finding statements that plaintiff had engaged in race-based harassment, intimidated or threatened students, created fears of physical safety or retaliation, and made inappropriate comments in class coulreasonably be construed as objectively verifiable. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Kessinger v. West Virginia State University (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 6, 2026) 

    Opinion Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former music instructor for West Virginia University, sued the university alleging violation of procedural due process, Title IX retaliation, and state law claims after she was placed on administrative leave based on allegations of her making sexually explicit comments to students during class, rehearsal, office hours, and allegations of unprofessional behavior during a choir trip. The court found that the university was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and further held that the individual defendants within their official capacities did not violate procedural due process because plaintiff received notice of the allegations, a written investigation letter outlining her rights, and an opportunity to respond before being suspended. The court also dismissed her Title IX retaliation claims, finding that she had not engaged in protected activity under Title IX, as she was the subject, not the complainant, of the investigationAfter dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Due Process | Employee Sexual Misconduct | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    McCoul v. The Texas A&M University System, et al., (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2026)

    Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages. Plaintiff, a former senior lecturer in English Literature for Texas A&M University, sued the university and several campus officials alleging violation of her First Amendment and Due Process rights after the university terminated her for “failing to modify her course content” to exclude content related to gender identity. Plaintiff claims that the university’s purported reason for her termination was pretextual because she was never told she was required to modify her course content and was, in fact, due to political backlash that followed a classroom video recording of a student objecting to the course content, which went viral. Plaintiff further claims that the university violated her due process rights when it failed to follow its own policies for dismissal, which required the university to provide notice of the charges, an opportunity to respond, and a hearing. She also alleges her rights were violated when the university ignored findings of the university’s Academic Freedom Council, which determined she “was fired for the content of her class,” and findings of its faculty appeals hearing body, which held the university had not demonstrated her dismal was for good cause.

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Constitutional Issues | Due Process | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech