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  • Date:

    Johnson v. Georgetown University (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, the former Assistant Director at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, sued the university and 12 other defendants alleging Title VII discrimination, retaliation and other claims, after she was hired and terminated a month later after social media posts she made eight years prior describing her “‘hat[red]’ for Zionists” went viral. The court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the university finding that plaintiff had failed to plausibly allege discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin and that her tort claims could not proceed due to procedural and substantive defects. While plaintiff argued the university had deviated from its probation policy in terminating her so swiftly, the court disagreed finding the policy “clearly afford[ed] the university the right to fire an employee for behavior that her department deem[ed] ‘unacceptable’.” The court also dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s claims against the other defendants with the exception of her claims against Canary Mission. Because Canary Mission refused to appear in the case, and did not move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, the court permitted plaintiff to consider whether to seek a default judgment against it.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Religious Discrimination & Accommodation | Retaliation | Social Media | Technology

  • Date:

    Hansen v. The Lutheran Univ. Ass’n. (N.D. Ind. Mar. 19, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, the former Assistant Director of Building Services at Valparaiso University, sued the university alleging violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) after his position was eliminated while he was on medical leave. The court granted summary judgment for the university, finding the university had presented unrebutted evidence that it had eliminated plaintiff’s position as part of a “planned restructuring” prior to his request for FMLA leave while noting plaintiff failed to provide evidence this rationale was pretextual. In reaching its decision, the court explained that the FMLA does not guarantee reinstatement when an employee would have been terminated regardless of leave and cautioned that suspicious timing alone is insufficient to establish retaliation.

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) | Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) | Privacy & Transparency | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Stokes v. Boyce (N.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2026)

    Opinion Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, the former Executive Assistant to the Vice Chancellor for Development at the University of Mississippi, sued the university chancellor in both his official and individual capacities alleging First Amendment retaliation and seeking reinstatement of her employment after she reposted a controversial statement regarding the killing of Charlie Kirk and was subsequently terminated. The court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding ample evidence that plaintiff’s post resulted in significant, actual disruptions to campus operations, including the cancelling of a student event, the need for increased campus police patrols outside plaintiff’s office, and increased work for a senior administrator tasked with responding to hate mail.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation | Social Media | Technology

  • Date:

    Kershnar v. Kolison, Jr., et al. (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a philosophy professor at the State University of New York at Fredonia (SUNY), sued the university’s president and provost, alleging retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, and prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment, after he was barred from teaching and banned from campus following controversial remarks he made about age-of-consent laws during a podcast appearance. The court found that, despite the offensive nature of his speech, plaintiff plausibly alleged that his statements addressed a matter of public concern and therefore were entitled to First Amendment protection. The court further found that plaintiff had plausibly alleged that the university’s order prohibiting plaintiff from contacting members of the campus community functioned as a prior restraint on his speech. Finally, the court also found that although plaintiff continued to receive his salary during the campus ban, he had sufficiently alleged retaliationconcluding that the close timing between the podcast going viral, the university president’s public condemnation of the remarks, and campus ban plausibly suggested a retaliatory motive.  

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Sheets v. Greenville Univ. (S.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2026)

    Opinion Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, the former head softball coach at Greenville University, brought claims against the university alleging sex-discrimination under Title VII and retaliation under Title IX after she objected to the university’s failure to provide her with an assistant coach, voiced opposition to a sports complex that did not provide comparable facilities for each sex, and was terminated and replaced with a less-qualified male coach. The court allowed plaintiff’s Title VII claim to proceed, finding she had adequately pled that she had been terminated on the basis of her sex. The court also allowed plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim based on her opposition to the sports complex to proceed, finding that plaintiff’s objections were raised “on behalf of female student athletes” and were known to the university decisionmakers responsible for her termination. However, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim based on her objections to the assistant coaching policy. The court found that because her claim rested on objections to employment discrimination that she herself was experiencing, and not on discrimination experienced by female student athletes, her Title IX claim was preempted by her Title VII claim.

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Hougham v. Trs. of Ithaca Coll. (N.D. N.Y. Feb. 27, 2026)

    Opinion Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a tenured professor at Ithaca College, brought Title IX employment discrimination claims against the college alleging university administrators discriminated against him based on sexual orientation, subjected him to harassment, and retaliated after he reported the conduct by declining to renew his associate provost appointment. The court allowed plaintiff’s Title IX discrimination claim to proceed, rejecting the college’s argument that plaintiff’s claims were precluded by Title VII. Relying on the Second Circuit precedent, the court reasoned that when Title IX allows a private right of action for a university’s intentional gender-based discrimination against a faculty member, that Title IX claim should not be dismissed on the ground that plaintiff complained of such discrimination with respect to his employment. Finally, the court dismissed plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim, finding that because the elements of the claim were identical to his hostile environment claim, the claim was duplicative.

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Akoju v. University of New Hampshire (D. N.H. Feb. 26, 2026)

    Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiff, a former graduate student at the University of New Hampshire proceeding pro se, sued the university alleging violations of Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment after the school terminated her enrollment, ended her SEVIS status, and evicted her from her dorm following her failure to pay more than $14,000 in outstanding charges on her student account. The court denied plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO), finding that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her claims because she received adequate notice of both the registration deadline and the consequences of failing to pay her balance. The court also found that the university’s actions were based on legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons that were consistent with institutional policies and not a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Although the court acknowledged that plaintiff could suffer significant harm without injunctive relief, including the loss of her F-1 visa status, it found that this harm did not outweigh the deficiencies in her claims.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Immigration | International Students | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation | Student Housing | Students

  • Date:

    Kilborn v. Amiridis, et al. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2026)

    Opinion Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a tenured professor at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Law, sued several university officials bringing First Amendment retaliation, Fourteenth Amendment due process, and state law defamation claims after an internal investigation concluded that he violated the school’s nondiscrimination policy based on an exam hypothetical referencing racial slurs, racially insensitive classroom remarks, and intimidating comments he made in response to student criticismThe court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, holding that it fell within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity because plaintiff sought prospective relief in the form of expungement of the investigation findings from his employment record. However, the court dismissed plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, finding that he had no entitlement to the 2% merit raise he claimed was withheld and that reputational harm alone did not establish a constitutional liberty interest. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s defamation claims based on an internal investigation findings letter that stated plaintiff had used racial slurs, denounced minorities participation in civil rights, and had referred to minorities as “cockroaches. The court concluded that those statements were “non-actionable” because a transcript confirmed plaintiff had, in fact, made those statements – and truth was a defense to defamationBut the court allowed the plaintiff’s other defamation claims to proceed, finding statements that plaintiff had engaged in race-based harassment, intimidated or threatened students, created fears of physical safety or retaliation, and made inappropriate comments in class coulreasonably be construed as objectively verifiable. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Kessinger v. West Virginia State University (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 6, 2026) 

    Opinion Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former music instructor for West Virginia University, sued the university alleging violation of procedural due process, Title IX retaliation, and state law claims after she was placed on administrative leave based on allegations of her making sexually explicit comments to students during class, rehearsal, office hours, and allegations of unprofessional behavior during a choir trip. The court found that the university was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and further held that the individual defendants within their official capacities did not violate procedural due process because plaintiff received notice of the allegations, a written investigation letter outlining her rights, and an opportunity to respond before being suspended. The court also dismissed her Title IX retaliation claims, finding that she had not engaged in protected activity under Title IX, as she was the subject, not the complainant, of the investigationAfter dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Due Process | Employee Sexual Misconduct | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Gross v. Univ. of Toledo (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2026)

    Opinion Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former faculty member and DEI Officer for the University of Toledo, brought Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims against the universityalleging the university failed to address his complaints of discriminatory conduct from his coworkersand that he resigned in “utter frustration” after receiving a letter terminating his contractIn denying the university’s motion to dismiss, the court held that plaintiff was timely in exhausting his administrative remedies, finding that the university’s January 2024 termination letter did not constitute a final adverse employment action for purposes of triggering the 300-day EEOC filing period because (1) the letter stated that plaintiff’s Department Chair could reverse the decision, and (2the termination was contingent on whether plaintiff “modified his behavior.” Instead, the court found that thoperative adverse action occurred at the time of plaintiff’s resignationwhich the court determined to be a constructive discharge based on the allegations in his complaint, including that (1) his complaints of discrimination were ignored; (2) he was discouraged from complaining further; and (3) the discriminatory conduct kept him from performing his assigned duties.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation