Login
Home  |  Legal Resources  |  Publications

Cases & Developments

FILTERS

Find by DATE
Reset

Latest Cases & Developments

  • Date:

    Clary v. Pennsylvania State Univ., et al. (M.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2025)

    Opinion Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former student-athlete and member of the men’s basketball team at Pennsylvania State University, brought defamation claims against the university and its head basketball coach based on a series of statements allegedly made by the coach concerning plaintiff’s departure from the team. The court held that plaintiff had sufficiently stated a defamation claim against the coach based on the coach’s statements that (1) plaintiff had refused to return to the university because his father was “after more money”; and (2) plaintiff “decided himself” that he was going to leave the university. In both instances, the court found it “reasonable to infer . . . that [the coach’s] statements caused financial harm to [plaintiff] by harming his reputation and forcing him to attend a less prestigious university.” However, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claims regarding other statements made by the coach, finding the allegations lacked necessary details as to the content, audience, and timing of the statements. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s defamation claims against the university, finding no basis to impose vicarious liability since plaintiff had failed to show the coach’s statements were made within the scope of his employment or with the purpose of serving the university.

    Topics:

    Compliance & Risk Management | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Student Athlete Issues | Students | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Weiss v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (Mass. Oct. 6, 2025)

    Opinion Affirming in Part and Reversing in Part. Appellants-Plaintiffs, close relatives of a group of deceased individuals who had donated their bodies to Harvard Medical School, brought tort, contract, and other claims against Harvard following the indictment of a former Harvard morgue employee for conspiring to steal and sell cadaver parts and a subsequent report from a panel of external experts identifying shortcomings in university protocols for handling donor remains.  The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, finding that plaintiffs had failed to counter the defendants’ assertion of an affirmative “good faith” defense under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA). However, on appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, finding that plaintiffs’ allegations amounted to “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” with the UAGA warranting an inference that the university did not act in good faith. The court noted, in particular, the lack of sufficient controls and procedures at the morgue to prevent these harms from occurring, despite the university’s knowledge that “similar misconduct had previously occurred in a strikingly similar fashion in another medical school morgue,” and that several “red flags” about the morgue employee were also “ignored or tolerated.” The court concluded that the trial court had erred in granting the university’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings.   

    Topics:

    Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Murray v. Conn. Coll. (D. Conn. Sep. 23, 2025)

    Opinion Granting in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former student at Connecticut College, in a putative class action, brought negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment claims against the college seeking damages and injunctive relief after a data-security breach which, according to plaintiff, allowed unauthorized third-party cybercriminals to gain access to his personal identifying information (PII) and personal health information (PHI)  The court rejected the college’s argument that plaintiff lacked Article III standing to sue, finding that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an injury from potential misuse of his data that was “sufficiently concrete, particularized, actual or imminent.” The court allowed plaintiff’s breach of contract claim to proceed, finding plaintiff made a plausible argument that, because he was required to provide PII and PIH as a condition of enrollment, it was fair to assume the college made an implicit promise to responsibly maintain his data. However, the court dismissed plaintiff’s negligence claim, finding he had failed to offer any analysis of the duty question under Connecticut law.

    Topics:

    Cybersecurity | Data Privacy | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Privacy & Transparency | Technology | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Florio v. Gallaudet Univ. (D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 2024)

    Opinion disagreeing in part and affirming the judgment of the district court. Plaintiffs, four alumni of a Gallaudet University fraternity sued the University, its Board, the President, and The Washington Post for defamation after the University President referred to the fraternity as “the face of systemic racism.” The comment followed the fraternity’s reintroduction of hooded robes resembling those worn by hate groups and a resurfaced photo of members performing the Bellamy salute, wherein participants extend their right arm at an upward angle. The district court found that since the plaintiffs were not directly mentioned in the President’s statement, the comment was a non-actionable opinion, and further reasoned that the similarity between the Bellamy and Nazi salutes also made the claim substantially true and thus, non-actionable. In conducting a de novo review, the Circuit Court agreed that the statements were protected opinions, but disagreed regarding the photograph, reasoning that “each of the individuals in the photo is readily identifiable because all of their faces are visible” and the statement was made in reference to them. Notwithstanding, the Court still found the disputed statements were not actionable and affirmed the lower court’s ruling.  

    Topics:

    Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Doe v. Syracuse Univ. (N.D. N.Y. Aug. 2, 2024)

    Decision and Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former student and lacrosse player at Syracuse University, brought Title IX retaliation, contract, and negligence claims against the University, alleging inadequate responses to violence in her “on-again-off-again relationship” with a male lacrosse player, particularly following an incident in April 2021 for which the male lacrosse player was eventually arrested. In dismissing her negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims, the court found plaintiff failed to allege either that (1) the University did not “maintain or keep its student housing safe from intruders” or that her assailant, whom she let into her room, was an intruder, or (2) that the University was aware of any ongoing criminal conduct against her or other students that it failed to curb. In permitting her contract claim to proceed, the court found plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the University breached (1) provisions of its student handbook regarding No Contact Orders (NCOs) when it removed the NCO between plaintiff and her assailant even though she had reported a past incident of domestic violence, and (2) the terms of its MOU between its Public Safety Department (Safety) and the Syracuse Police Department (Police) when Safety reported an alleged on-campus incident between plaintiff and her assailant to Police a week later rather than immediately as provided in the MOU.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Retaliation | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Butler v. Collins (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024)

    Opinion certifying a question to the Supreme Court of Texas. Plaintiff, a former law professor at Southern Methodist University sued the University and several individual administrators claiming negligent supervision, fraud, defamation, conspiracy-to-defame, as well as Texas common-law claims for breach of contract, and several statutory claims after being denied tenure in 2016. The District Court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the District Court’s judgment that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) preempts her fraud, defamation, and conspiracy-to-defame claims. In light of inconsistent precedent and unsure of whether tort claims asserted against employers can extend to harmful workplace conduct, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Texas: “Does the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act [], Texas Labor Code § 21.001, et seq., preempt a plaintiff-employee’s common law defamation and/or fraud claims against another employee to the extent that the claims are based on the same course of conduct as discrimination and/or retaliation claims asserted against the plaintiff’s employer?” The Fifth Circuit otherwise retained the appeal, held in abeyance pending response from the Supreme Court of Texas. 

    Topics:

    Faculty & Staff | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Tenure | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Weinik v. Temple Univ. (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion granting Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former clinician at Temple University Hospital and clinical professor at the University’s School of Medicine, brought due process, contract, and defamation claims against the University and two former residents after he was terminated for alleged sexual and other misconduct. Following investigations of alleged inappropriate conduct with a resident and patients, the Hospital terminated his medical privileges. After alleged threatening behavior while his appeal was pending, the Hospital issued a Security Alert to security staff and potentially threatened individuals. When the appeal was denied, the University terminated his academic employment, and the Hospital notified the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) of the revocation of his privileges. In granting summary judgment to the defendants on his defamation claims, the court held that (1) statements made by a medical resident complainant in the Hospital’s peer review process were protected by quasi-judicial immunity, (2) other statements made in the context of this process were protected by statutory immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA), (3) the security alert was conditionally privileged and no facts suggested it was disseminated with malice or negligence, and (4) there was a statutory duty to report the loss of privileges to the NPDB. It found that his contract claim was barred by HCQIA immunity and that the Hospital’s procedures satisfied the procedural requirements of the HCQIA and, accordingly, provided him with sufficient due process. 

    Topics:

    Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Nelson v. St. Catherine Univ. (D. Minn. May 21, 2024)

    Order denying Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former student at St. Catherine University, brought Bankruptcy Code automatic stay violation and common law intrusion upon seclusion claims against both the University and its outside counsel (the Firm), and alleged that the Firm violated multiple provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). In May 2023, as a “Collection Action” brought by the Firm on behalf of the University was ramping up before a district “Collection Court,” plaintiff filed for bankruptcy before a federal “Bankruptcy Court.” Following the Bankruptcy Court issuing notice of the “Bankruptcy Matter” Plaintiff was arrested on a bench warrant from the Collection Court. Then, after plaintiff’s counsel emailed the Firm and University additional information and the Firm was added to the Bankruptcy Matter, the Firm did not notify plaintiff’s counsel of a rescheduled hearing in the Collection Action. Once plaintiff’s counsel notified the Collection Court of the Bankruptcy Matter, the Collection Action was stayed. Subsequently, Plaintiff initiated a tertiary civil action against the Firm and University related to these alleged actions. Upon finding no irreconcilable conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA that would repeal the FDCPA provisions by implication, the court found plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to proceed on her FDCPA improper communication, false or misleading representations, threat to take action, and unfair practices claims. Noting that the FDCPA claims were largely predicated on the same underlying facts, the court declined to refer the Bankruptcy Code violation claims to the Bankruptcy Court. It likewise retained jurisdiction over her tort claims. 

    Topics:

    Bankruptcy & Student Debt | External Counsel | General Counsel | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Taxes & Finances | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Monge v. Univ. of Pa. (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2024)

    Memorandum denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former anthropology professor and museum curator at the University of Pennsylvania, brought defamation, false light, defamation by implication, and civil aiding and abetting claims against, among others, the University and its former president and provost in the wake of a public controversy surrounding her work with human remains from the 1985 police bombing of the MOVE house in Philadelphia. Plaintiff alleged that a former student, whom she had accused of “unlawful and disturbing” conduct, tried to “cancel” her by falsely reporting to University officials and the media that she had mishandled the remains. After media and professional associations condemned her, the University demoted her and issued a statement describing her actions as “insensitive, unprofessional, and unacceptable.” In permitting her defamation and false light claims to proceed, the court held, first, that plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure, noting her use of the remains in a Coursera course. It then found she had sufficiently pled actual malice, noting her assertions that defendants (1) had previously not acted when she reported the student’s conduct and (2) published the statement without an investigation by the Institutional Review Board. In permitting her defamation by implication claim to proceed, the court found it plausible that the defendants would have known that their statements would hurt her professional reputation. In permitting her civil aiding and abetting claim to proceed, it found her assertions sufficient to allege that the University defendants had acted in concert with the former student.  

    Topics:

    Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Research | Research Misconduct | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Puentes v. Union Coll. (N.D. N.Y. Mar. 28, 2024)

    Memorandum-Decision and Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former student at Union College, brought discrimination, contract, and multiple tort claims against the College after she was unenrolled for noncompliance with its policy that all students must receive a booster dose of a COVID-19 vaccination. Plaintiff requested an exemption, citing her “biblical beliefs,” an alleged severe reaction to her second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, and immunity from a prior infection. When local media reported that plaintiff had been expelled, the College denied it was an expulsion and declined to discuss more than its general policy. Plaintiff alleged, however, that members of the Board of Trustees questioned the truthfulness of her account. The court dismissed her discrimination claims, finding only broad and cursory allegations. It dismissed her contract and promissory estoppel claims as time-barred under New York’s four-month statute of limitations for challenging determinations of public bodies and administrative agencies. In dismissing her negligence claim, the court declined to find that the College assumed a special duty not to subject her to a risk of a reaction to a vaccine by virtue of its supervision of her health through her visits to the College health clinic, citing the limited scope of duties for universities and New York’s prior rejection of the in loco parentis doctrine. It dismissed her libel and slander claims, finding no allegation of special damages or per se actionability. Finally, although dismissal of the breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and negligence per se claims was with prejudice as defendants sought, the court – while expressing skepticism re the likelihood of success – allowed that plaintiff might replead her other claims.  

    Topics:

    Contracts | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Tort Litigation

NACUA Annual Conference

Join us in the Music City June 29 – July 2 to connect, learn, and lead alongside higher education attorneys shaping policy, practice, and impact nationwide together.

Register