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Date:
2/21/2025
National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education v. Donald J. Trump (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2025)
Order and Opinion granting in part Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs, the National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education, the American Association of University Professors, Restaurant Opportunities Centers United, and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Maryland seek preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining defendants from enforcing Executive Orders 14151, “Ending Radical Government DEI Programs and Preferences” (J20) and 14173, “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity” (J21) and a declaration that the Orders are unlawful and unconstitutional. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants Donald J. Trump; the Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, Labor, Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, Transportation, and Justice; the National Science Foundation; and the Office of Management and Budget violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, as well as Separation of Powers and that both Orders are (1) unreasonably vague as they fail to define the key terms “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” (“DEI”), “Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility” (“DEIA”), “environmental justice,” “equity-related,” and “illegal discrimination or preferences,” and (2) suppress free speech on DEI and DEIA principles. Plaintiffs further alleged that the J21 Order is designed to chill free speech on matters of substantial political importance, and the lack of clear definitions leave plaintiffs as potential targets with no guidance as to what speech or which actions the Order includes. The preliminary injunction prohibits defendants other than the President from: (1) pausing, freezing, impeding, blocking, cancelling, or terminating any awards, contracts or obligations (“Current Obligations”); (2) “changing the terms of any Current Obligation, on the basis of the Termination Provision; (3) requir[ing] any grantee or contractor to make any ‘certification’ or other representation pursuant to the Certification Provision;” or (4) “bring[ing] any False Claims Act enforcement action, or other enforcement action, pursuant to the Enforcement Threat Provision, including but not limited to any False Claims Act enforcement action premised on any certification made pursuant to the Certification Provision.”
Topics:
Diversity in Employment | Faculty & Staff
Date:
2/21/2025
Zinski v. Liberty Univ. (W.D. Va. Feb. 21, 2025)
Memorandum Opinion denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a transgender female and former Liberty University information technology services employee, sued the University alleging sex-based employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. when she was terminated after her male to female transition. The University moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint based on: (1) Sections 702 and 703 of Title VII; (2) the Religion Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”); (3) the ministerial exception; (4) the First Amendment freedom of expressive association; and (5) the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. First, the court found that the University’s termination of Plaintiff did not qualify as an employment decision made on the basis “of a particular religion” that is exempted from Title VII under Sections 702 and 703 and concluded that alleged discrimination on the basis of transgender status is sex discrimination, even if religiously motivated. Second, the court adopted the majority rule that the plain language of RFRA applies to conduct by a governmental authority, and the EEOC’s issuance of a right to sue letter to Plaintiff does not otherwise convert a private party lawsuit into government action. Third, the court reasoned that although religious employers enjoy wide latitude as to “employees who[] hold a spiritual role and whose religious beliefs may press upon the faithful” the evidence at this stage of litigation did not support that Plaintiff’s role as an IT professional qualified for application of the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense. Fourth, the court agreed that “Liberty engages in protected First Amendment activity,” but found “any burden imposed by Title VII on Liberty’s expressive interest is minimal, such that rational basis review is satisfied, … Title VII stands constitutionally sound … [and] at this stage of litigation, Liberty cannot claim any expressive association defense to Title VII liability.” Finally, the court found the ecclesiastical doctrine inapplicable, rejecting the University’s position that Plaintiff’s complaint raises questions “concerning Liberty University’s interpretation and application of Scripture,” reasoning that the court was narrowly tasked with considering if Title VII “prohibits a religious institution from firing a transgender person, not whether a religious institution … has properly interpreted its religious doctrine when determining that a transgender person violates religious law.”
Topics:
Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Sex Discrimination
Date:
2/20/2025
Open Letter to General Counsel of Colleges and Universities re the U.S. Dep’t of Education, Office for Civil Rights’ Feb. 14 Dear Colleague Letter titled “DEI Programs Are Lawful Under Federal Civil Rights Laws and Supreme Court Precedent” (Feb. 20, 2025)
Memorandum from postsecondary legal professors and scholars. The Memo, which is authored by an ad hoc consortium of two dozen academics from various law schools, is styled as an open letter to college and university leadership, in particular offices of general counsel, and analyzes Executive Order “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity” and the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights’ February 14 Dear Colleague Letter. Relying in part on Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) and the denial of cert in TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 218 L. Ed. 2d 71 (U.S. 2024), the Memo concludes that “DEI initiatives that do not employ racial classifications or otherwise limit opportunity to individuals from certain racial groups remain legally secure,” and sets forth 13 examples of campus initiatives directed at “undo[ing] the effects of past discrimination” that “do not ‘involve classification by race.’”
Topics:
Diversity in Employment | Faculty & Staff | Governance | Government Relations & Community Affairs
Date:
2/20/2025
Gray v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ga. Military Coll. (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2025) (unpub.)
Order affirming grants of Summary Judgment in favor of the Georgia Military College. Plaintiff, an African American woman and former administrative assistant in the human resources department of the Georgia Military College (the “College”) sued alleging Title VII discrimination and retaliation after her position was terminated during a reduction in force (“RIF”). Prior to her termination, plaintiff – who was the only African American employee in her department – was employed with the College for five years. Upon return from COVID-19 related remote work in June of 2020, employees were encouraged but not required to mask and social distance on campus; Plaintiff, who has heart disease expressed concern for her health when colleagues declined to do so. She also complained about another employee’s personal social media post urging law enforcement to “[b]ring back the hoses and release the dogs,” which was made on the heels of the death of George Floyd. On or about June 30, 2020, plaintiff was informed that she was one of ten College employees whose positions were eliminated pursuant to a RIF that obliged each department to eliminate at least one position. Plaintiff was the only person RIF’d in her department. All other RIF’d personnel were white. She applied but was not selected for two other positions with the College, one of which was filled by an African American applicant, and the other of which remained unfilled for more than a year. Thereafter, she filed a pro se EEOC charge challenging her termination as age and race-based discrimination. Subsequently, she retained counsel who filed a second charge of discrimination based on alleged disability discrimination and retaliation, and upon receipt of right to sue letters, filed litigation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dual grants of summary judgment in favor of the College, reasoning that (1) plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim failed due to her failure to exhaust that claim prior to filing suit, and (2) she failed to adduce sufficient evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that her termination was either race-based or retaliatory, in light of the College’s evidence that the decision to undertake a RIF due to budgetary shortfalls predated her complaints, and that plaintiff’s position was the easiest to absorb within her department.
Topics:
Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation
Date:
2/20/2025
Roland v. Donnelly Coll. (D. Kan. Feb. 20, 2025)
Order granting in part and denying in part Donnelly College’s (“the College”) partial motion to dismiss. Plaintiff is a former nursing student at the College who asserts claims for alleged violations of Title IX, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, equal protection, and due process, as well as a state law claim for tortious interference with a contract against an individually named College professor. Plaintiff alleges that an unnamed professor referred to her test anxiety as “dumb” and sues the second professor who she claims “grabbed, [] squeezed, … and rubbed his hand up and down her leg” and “placed his hand on her thigh” on one occasion and rubbed his body against hers on another. She also alleges the second professor made threatening remarks in class, including that “if anyone wanted to report him, it would not go well because of his status” with the College, that he could make complaints against him “go away,” and that “[i]f anyone wants to do anything to me, I have guns,” as well as disparaging remarks, such as“[w]omen don’t learn well, and learn better if I piss them off.” She asserts that she tried to meet with the College’s Director of Nursing to discuss her concerns but was rebuffed. Then, during final exams, the second professor allegedly sat behind Plaintiff, “leaned forward, and whispered, ‘You gonna wish you gave me some of that pussy,’” and then, failed her on the exam, which she asserts she would have otherwise passed had it been graded fairly. Subsequently, the College placed Plaintiff on academic probation and suspension, which delayed her graduation and required that she attend an extra semester during which she was once more placed into the second professor’s class and subjected to additional alleged harassment, including commenting on her hair, nearly grazing her breast, and repeatedly touching her leg. Ultimately, she withdrew from the nursing program. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims except her §1983 claims. The court declined to dismiss the Title IX sex discrimination claim, reasoning Plaintiff had provided sufficient allegations to maintain a claim that she was subject to sex-based harassment, including by receiving lowered grades based on her refusal of a professor’s advances. It rejected as irrelevant the College’s concern that Plaintiff failed to identify a male student who was treated more favorably, “particularly when it is not at all clear that plaintiff intends to pursue a ‘selective enforcement’ theory of liability.” However, it granted the motion to dismiss her sexual harassment and retaliation claims against the College since beyond seeking an unspecified meeting with the Director of Nursing, Plaintiff failed to allege that she “engaged in protected activity or, even assuming that she did, that any College official had knowledge that plaintiff had engaged in protected activity” and correspondingly, College officials lacked knowledge regarding the professor’s alleged harassment. Finally, the court granted dismissal of the disability discrimination claim reasoning that her allegations supported that her exam grades were altered “not based on any perceived disability but in retribution for [her] response to defendant[’s] alleged sexual advance,” and because the sole comment regarding her test anxiety was made after she was advised that she was not meeting academic standards.
Topics:
Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Sex Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct
Date:
2/20/2025
Rogers v. W. Governors Univ. (S.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2025)
Order granting summary judgment in favor of Western Governors University (“WGU”). Plaintiff, a White veteran, who suffers from service-connected disabilities, brings Title VI race discrimination, Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”) Act claims, and related state law claims against WGU. Shortly after beginning his studies, Plaintiff suffered a heart attack, which prompted him to request accommodations from his “mentor,” including taking courses with more reading requirements than his active courses, taking a larger semester courseload than the maximum limit, obtaining syllabi from courses for which he was not enrolled, and extending the semester by one month, some of which were granted. He neither responded to nor took any action on communications from the Student Accessibility Services office, which provided official accommodations forms to begin the formal process outlined in WGU’s policy for securing disability accommodations. Plaintiff experienced additional medical and mental health challenges before filing litigation. In granting the motion for summary judgment on the ADA claims, the Court found no evidence that WGU engaged in disparate treatment of Plaintiff because of his disability and further found that WGU did not fail to provide reasonable accommodations. In ruling for WGU on the Title VI claim, the court reasoned that Plaintiff’s conclusory claim that he was harmed by general “‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ (“DEI”) activities, [which] created … a hostile educational environment” through a “‘subculture’ of treating students differently-based on race,” was unsupported by facts since he did not otherwise allege that he was treated differently because of his race and failed to adduce “evidence that [he] was so harassed by any person, by DEI activities or materials, or by anti-White messages that he could not access educational benefits like any other student.” Finally, the court exercised supplemental jurisdiction to grant summary judgment in favor of WGU on Plaintiff’s related state law claims.
Topics:
Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity
Date:
2/20/2025
Arbolida v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (D. Kan. Feb. 21, 2025)
Order denying in part and taking under advisement in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, a college baseball player and Kansas State University student, sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) to obtain eligibility to participate in the Spring 2025 baseball season at the University. Prior to transferring to Kansas State, plaintiff played several seasons of baseball at Orange Coast Junior College and the University of Houston, respectively. Turning first to Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, the court ruled that Plaintiff was unable to demonstrate a “likelihood of success on the merits of his antitrust claim, nor ha[d] he shown an irreparable harm….” In disagreeing with Plaintiff’s argument that the NCAA bylaws violate the rule of reason test, the court found that the factual record did not indicate that the NCAA’s intercollegiate and five-year rules were anticompetitive. Finally, while it concluded Plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing a substantial anticompetitive effect, the court also found that he would not have been able to prove irreparable harm. The court noted that any alleged irreparable harm is due, in part, to Plaintiff’s “own actions in waiting to file the present suit.” Ultimately, however, the court wrote that other federal courts have found a likelihood of success in similar cases, and that with the benefit of a more complete record, Plaintiff may yet succeed in obtaining a preliminary injunction.
Topics:
Athletics & Sports | Athletics Compliance & NCAA Rules
Date:
2/20/2025
Thiry v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich. (E.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2025)
Opinion & Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Awarding Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, an employee at the University of Michigan filed suit against the University and three of its employees alleging discrimination and retaliation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well as First Amendment violations under §1983. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and denied summary judgment on claims seeking monetary relief. Defendants then sought partial reconsideration of the order. In granting Defendants’ motion, the court found that it erred in previously ruling that “official-capacity claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment where a plaintiff seeks only prospective equitable relief.” The court concluded that “the University and its governing Board of Regents are constitutionally-created instrumentalities of the State of Michigan and are not ‘persons’ for purposes of Section 1983.” Finally, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief because the Defendants could not be sued under §1983.
Topics:
Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Retaliation
Date:
2/19/2025
Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions Act Amendment (Feb. 19, 2025)
The U.S. House Committee on Education and Workforce advanced an amendment (the “Bill”) to the Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rouge Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions Act (“DETERRENT Act”). The Bill, which would require colleges and universities to report gifts and contracts from most foreign countries moved forward on February 19. It is intended to mitigate foreign influence in higher education would reduce the current threshold of $250,000 to $50,000 or greater. The Bill would also lower the reporting threshold to $0 for “countries of concern” as determined by the U.S. Code or the U.S. Secretary of Education, including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and would prohibit postsecondary institutions from contracting with those countries unless the Secretary issues them an annual waiver.
Topics:
Contracts | Endowments & Gifts | Grants, Contracts, & Sponsored Research | International Activities | Taxes & Finances
Date:
2/19/2025
Szeto v. Univ. of Colo. (D. Colo. Feb 19, 2025)
Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a student in the University of Colorado’s (“University”) Medical Scientist Training Program (“MSTP”), alleged Title IX retaliation based on her dismissal from the Graduate school, Title IX retaliation based on her dismissal from the Medical school and referral to the Colorado Physicians Health Program (“CPHP”), and violation of Title II of the ADA. Plaintiff also alleged a §1983 claim against her lab professor for violation of her First Amendment rights. Plaintiff’s claims are centered around her failure to complete certain standards and examinations for the MSTP program. The court concluded that the University was entitled to summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. For Plaintiff’s retaliation claim centered around her dismissal from the Graduate School, the court found that Plaintiff “failed to demonstrate a causal connection between protected activity and her dismissal from the Graduate School.” Additionally, the court found that Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim based on the CPHP referral and subsequent dismissal from the Medical School must also fail because Plaintiff failed to show that the CPHP referral was a materially adverse action. The court noted that even if Plaintiff had been able to show a materially adverse action, she was unable to demonstrate a causal connection between “her protected activity and her dismissal from the Medical School.” Turning to Plaintiff’s ADA claim, the court found that she was unable to demonstrate a “triable issue as to whether the University regarded her as disabled or referred her to the CPHP because of a perceived disability….” Finally, the court found that Plaintiff’s lab professor was also entitled to summary judgment on her §1983 claim. The court further noted that at no point did Plaintiff demonstrate an issue of material fact as to whether her professor was “substantially motivated” to resign as Plaintiff’s thesis advisor and subsequently remove her from the lab because of Plaintiff’s allegations against the MSTP director or Plaintiff’s complaints about the professor’s authorship practices.
Topics:
Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination

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