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Latest Cases & Developments
Date:
Sanchez v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 3, 2025)
Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff, a current collegiate baseball player at the University of Tennessee who previously played for two years at Walters State Junior College and three years at UNC Chapel Hill, alleged that the NCAA’s eligibility bylaws violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The court noted that a recent court decision providing a blanket waiver for former junior college athletes did not apply to plaintiff because he would use his extra year of eligibility in the 2024-2025 academic year, not the 2025-2026 academic year. Noting that the court must review these types of claims under a “Rule of Reason” analysis, the court concluded that the record does not “establish that the JUCO Rule has substantial anticompetitive effects” and thus plaintiff cannot “demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on his Sherman Act claim….” The court also assumed that the JUCO Rule was commercial for the purposes of this claim. Applying the rule of reason analysis, the court disagreed with plaintiff’s contentions that the JUCO rule (1) “dissuades athletes from attending junior colleges,” (2) “provides competitive advantages to Division 1 schools vis-à-vis junior colleges when the institutions are recruiting prospective athletes [b]ecause athletes’ time at junior colleges counts against their Division 1 eligibility,” and (3) harms consumers because in preventing former JUCO athletes from playing four full seasons at the Division 1 level, Division 1 teams are less competitive which harms consumers of collegiate athletics. The court found defendant’s reasoning that the JUCO rule “restricts the supply of athletes, which increases competition among [all institutions] and drives up compensation for all athletes” more compelling. Because the court found plaintiff did not satisfy the first step of the rule of reason analysis, it did not address steps two and three. The court did note that “[n]one of this is to say Plaintiff cannot ultimately succeed on the merits.” The court also concluded that plaintiff did not establish a strong likelihood of success on the merits for his state law claims.
Topics:
Athletics & Sports | Athletics Compliance & NCAA RulesDate:
Wells v. Tex. Tech Univ. (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2025) (unpub.)
Order affirming the District Court’s Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Lawsuit. Plaintiff, an unpaid mentor who was removed from the Texas Tech University (“TTU”) Innovation Hub, filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on sex. After receiving a Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC, plaintiff sued TTU and two university employees under Title VII, Title IX, and state law. Focusing first on plaintiff’s Title VII claims, the court found that plaintiff’s Title VII claims were untimely because she was not an “employee” for Title VII purposes while serving as a mentor for the TTU Innovation Hub. The court also concluded that plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim failed because “retaliatory conduct that occurred in January 2022, or later, [was] too attenuated from her last employment in 2017.” Turning to plaintiff’s Title IX claims, the court affirmed the district court’s findings that plaintiff’s pre-2019 Title IX claims were untimely because her “2017 graduation from TTU and the 2019 dissolution of her first company that had ties with TTU [were] sufficient intervening actions….” Additionally, plaintiff did not allege a plausible Title IX claim for relief because she failed to establish sufficient facts to satisfy the two-prong test: “(1) a person authorized to address the harassment had actual notice of the behavior; and (2) even with this notice, the program’s response to the harassment amounted to ‘deliberate indifference.’” At no point did plaintiff allege facts to show that “the dean was a person who could address the harassment.” Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s holding related to plaintiff’s state law claims and also noted that it properly denied her request to amend her complaint.
Topics:
Discrimination, Accommodation, & DiversityDate:
Nat’l Assoc. of Diversity Officers in Higher Ed. v. Trump, et al. (D. Md. Mar. 3, 2025)
Order denying Motion to Stay Injunction Pending Appeal. Plaintiffs, the National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education, the American Association of University Professors, Restaurant Opportunities Centers United, and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Maryland sought preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining defendants from enforcing Executive Orders 14151, “Ending Radical Government DEI Programs and Preferences” (J20) and 14173, “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity” (J21) and a declaration that the Orders are unlawful and unconstitutional. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants Donald J. Trump; the Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, Labor, Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, Transportation, and Justice; the National Science Foundation; and the Office of Management and Budget violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, as well as Separation of Powers and that both Orders are (1) unreasonably vague as they fail to define the key terms “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” (“DEI”), “Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility” (“DEIA”), “environmental justice,” “equity-related,” and “illegal discrimination or preferences,” and (2) suppress free speech on DEI and DEIA principles. Plaintiffs further alleged that the J21 Order is designed to chill free speech on matters of substantial political importance, and the lack of clear definitions leave plaintiffs as potential targets with no guidance as to what speech or which actions the Order includes. The preliminary injunction prohibits defendants other than the President from: (1) pausing, freezing, impeding, blocking, cancelling, or terminating any awards, contracts or obligations (“Current Obligations”); (2) “changing the terms of any Current Obligation, on the basis of the Termination Provision; (3) “requir[ing] any grantee or contractor to make any ‘certification’ or other representation pursuant to the Certification Provision;” or (4) “bring[ing] any False Claims Act enforcement action, or other enforcement action, pursuant to the Enforcement Threat Provision, including but not limited to any False Claims Act enforcement action premised on any certification made pursuant to the Certification Provision.” On February 21, 2025, the court granted a preliminary injunction. Defendants then sought to stay the injunction pending an interlocutory appeal, which the court denied.
Topics:
Diversity in Employment | Faculty & StaffDate:
National Education Association v. U.S. Department of Education (D.N.H. Mar. 3, 2025)
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. Plaintiffs, the National Education Association and the National Education Association–New Hampshire, challenge the Dear Colleague Letter (Feb. 14, 2025) (DCL) and request that the Court declare that the DCL violates the First and Fifth Amendments; that it is in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, contrary to constitutional right, in excess of statutory jurisdiction, and without observance of procedure required by law; hold it to be unlawful, vacate, and set aside the “End DEI” portal and the FAQ; and restrain the U.S. Department of Education (the Department) from enforcing the DCL. Plaintiffs allege that the DCL radically resets the Department’s longstanding positions on civil rights laws, which guarantee equality and inclusion and impermissibly infringes on the authority of states and school districts over public education, as well as the First Amendment rights of educators and students. Due to the DCL’s allegedly vague and viewpoint-discriminatory prohibitions, Plaintiffs further contend that “the [DCL’s] fundamental contradiction of Title VI in prohibiting equity and inclusion programs, its violations of due process in failing to set clear standards and in opening educators to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, as well as its chill to First Amendment protected speech and expression could not stand no matter the process followed.” Plaintiffs also allege that the open-ended and subjective nature of the DCL’s prohibitions allow for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the uncertainty in what educators can teach, how they can teach, and what educational programs may or may not operate moving forward has an immediate impact on their ability to do their jobs and as such, causes substantial and irreparable harm.
Topics:
Admissions | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Diversity in Employment | Faculty & Staff | Financial Aid, Scholarships, & Student Loans | Race and National Origin Discrimination | StudentsDate:
American Federation of Teachers et al v. Bessent (S.D. Md. Feb. 24, 2025)
Order granting in-part and denying in-part Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. On February 10, 2025, three non-profit and labor organizations and six current or retired Federal workers filed suit against the U.S. Department of the Treasury and its Secretary, and U.S. Office of Personnel Management and its Acting Director, and the U.S. Department of Education and its Acting Secretary. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants willfully and intentionally permitted their personal information to be accessed by Department of Government Efficiency (“DOGE”) affiliates outside of the U.S. government without legal justification and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin such access. The court found that DOGE had been granted access to “plaintiffs’ most sensitive data—Social Security numbers, dates of birth, home addresses, income and assets, citizenship status, and disability status” and would be irreparably harmed absent an interim remedy, and therefore, enjoined the U.S. Department of Education and the Office of Personnel Management, their respective Acting Secretary and Director, “and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys … from disclosing the personally identifiable information of the plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff organizations to any DOGE affiliates … until March 10, 2025[,] at 8 a.m.” However, it denied the request to enjoin the Treasury and Secretary Bessent, reasoning that Plaintiffs had already received the requested relief through the grant of a preliminary injunction in New York v. Trump, 1:25-cv-01144 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2025) (Vargas, J.), and thus would not be irreparably harmed by denial of the same in this matter.
Topics:
Privacy & Transparency
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