Cases & Developments

Opinion denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former undergraduate student at Rutgers University brought Title IX claims against the University alleging it selectively enforced its Title IX policies against plaintiff and failed to investigate allegations that he made. Plaintiff also alleged that the University reached an erroneous decision when it found him responsible for violating University policy, due to his presumed innocence. While a student, plaintiff was in a relationship with Jane Doe. Following a breakup between the two, plaintiff learned that Doe was telling professors and peers that plaintiff allegedly sexually assaulted and harassed her. Plaintiff took a leave of absence, but prior to his return, he purportedly began receiving threats from other students who had learned of Doe’s allegations. After a live hearing, a third-party decisionmaker (TPD) found plaintiff not responsible for the original charge of domestic violence under any University policy but responsible for dating violence and stalking in violation of the University’s Title IX Policy and suspended him for two years. Plaintiff alleged that the University failed to follow its Title IX Policy when during its investigation he disclosed that Doe assaulted him at a party, but the Title IX coordinator failed to file a formal complaint. Plaintiff also alleged that he informed two professors that the “rumors” Doe shared were false and that he received threats of physical violence, but neither reported the conduct. Further, the chair of the University’s theater department purportedly warned plaintiff that it may not be safe for him to return to campus due to the threats, but similarly, failed to report them to the Title IX coordinator. In denying the University’s motion and permitting plaintiff’s claims to proceed, the court reasoned that plaintiff’s choice to forgo filing a formal complaint did not justify differential treatment of the cross-complaints between the two students under the Third Circuit’s Princeton decision, and that “though anti-male bias is not the only plausible explanation for the university’s conduct, or even the most plausible[,] … alternative explanations are not fatal to [the] ability to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss” (internal cites omitted). Finally, the court found that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the TPD was influenced by anti-male bias citing rulings barring him from asking a witness about their romantic relationship with the plaintiff, allowing witnesses to provide supplemental written statements, and permitting Doe to introduce evidence regarding plaintiff’s mental health and medical history in violation of University Policy.  

Memorandum denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a current student at East Stroudsburg University, brought claims against the University and its Student Misconduct Official, alleging that the University failed to take meaningful action following her report of inappropriate conduct by another student. In addition to her deliberate indifference claims, plaintiff brought equal protections claims, failure to train, and Policy, Practice, or Custom of “One Free Title IX Violation.” Plaintiff alleged that as a result of the University’s actions and inactions: (1) plaintiff was sexually harassed by another student; (2) University personnel had “actual knowledge” of harassment due to her visits to the Title IX office and her attempts to report the incidents to resident assistants, Title IX coordinators, and student misconduct officials; (3) the University and personnel were “deliberately indifferent” to the harassment; and (4) the harassment deprived plaintiff of access to educational opportunities and benefits. According to her allegations, plaintiff experienced multiple harassing encounters with another student and reported the onset of the harassment to the Student Misconduct Official, who took no action in response. Thereafter, plaintiff obtained a no-contact order and met with the University’s Title IX coordinator who purportedly failed to explain plaintiff’s rights, despite her request to submit a formal complaint. Then, she asserts that while her complaint regarding the initial incident was delayed for multiple months, plaintiff experienced additional harassment, which she reported to police but the University neither reprimanded the student for violating the no-contact order, nor informed plaintiff of her right to file another Title IX complaint. Subsequently, plaintiff moved out of her dorm for fear of her safety since the University declined to relocate the other student. Finally, plaintiff alleged that the Student Misconduct Official questioned the truthfulness of her allegations. The court found that plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true at this stage of litigation, constituted sufficient evidence of official University policy that is at least partly responsible for plaintiff’s second assault, including her claim that another student had also made sexual harassment reports against the student who allegedly harassed plaintiff, to which the University also allegedly failed to respond.  

Opinion affirming the district court’s judgment to deny Defendant’s Motion to Proceed Anonymously. Plaintiff, a student at Florida Gulf Coast University (FGCU), brought due process, breach of contract, and a Title IX erroneous outcome claim against the University after he was found responsible for alleged sexual misconduct from 2019. Plaintiff claimed that FGCU should have applied its policy as amended by the 2020 Regs, which would have afforded him the right to receive a copy of the investigative report and to cross examine complainant, to its investigation. Because his allegations against FGCU included information about his underage drinking and drug use, as well as pertaining to potential exposure to a sexual infection, plaintiff sought to proceed anonymously. The district court denied his request for anonymity, and plaintiff sought appellate review under the collateral orders doctrine. Relying on Doe v. Frank for the proposition that “courts have often denied the protection of anonymity in cases where plaintiffs allege sexual assault, even when revealing the plaintiff’s identity may cause her to ‘suffer some personal embarrassment,’” the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that neither the inclusion of medical information regarding potential exposure to sexual infection nor underage drug and alcohol use, and attendant risks of either social stigma or potential prosecution, respectively, outweighs the presumption that parties ought to proceed publicly. The Court also found that although plaintiff’s suit is against a public entity, the “government-activity factor” did not weigh in his favor, since FGCU was not acting as the government “in the traditional sense.”