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  • Date:

    U.S. Dep’t of Education Guidance Pointers for Implementation of Title IX Regulations (July 24, 2024)

    U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights Guidance 2024 Title IX Regulations: Pointers for Implementation – July 2024. The document contains a list of “key components of the 2024 Title IX Regulations” for schools to consider in anticipation of the regulations taking effect on August 1, 2024. The document also contains a header noting the effect of federal court orders enjoining the Department from enforcing the 2024 Final Rule.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    U.S. Dep’t of Education New & Updated FAQs re: FVT/GE Regulations (July 23, 2024)

    U.S. Department of Education, Office of Federal Student Aid New and Updated Financial Value Transparence (FVT) and Gainful Employment (GE) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). The Updated FVT/GE FAQs feature new guidance on the general topic of qualifying graduate programs and multiple issues related to specific reporting requirements.   

    Topics:

    Accreditation, Authorizations, & Higher Education Act | Financial Aid, Scholarships, & Student Loans | Higher Education Act (HEA) | Students

  • Date:

    Kansas v. U.S. Dep’t of Education (D. Kan. July 19, 2024)

    Memorandum and Order denying Defendants’ Motion for Partial Stay. Plaintiffs, the states of Kansas, Alaska, Utah, and Wyoming, three organizations with student members in the plaintiff states and beyond, and one female middle school student from Oklahoma, sought to enjoin the Title IX Final Rule, alleging that the Department impermissibly defined “sex discrimination” to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity. The court enjoined the entire rule as to the plaintiff States, the individual plaintiff, and all schools attended by individual members of the plaintiff organizations or their minor children. On July 15, 2024, the court released a 26-page Notice of List of Colleges & Universities by Young America’s Foundation and Female Athletes United listing institutions that are now subject to the injunction, including hundreds in states where the final regulations are not otherwise enjoined. Defendants moved for partial stay to limit the scope of the injunction to the members of the organizations as of the date the injunction was entered and to apply only to certain provisions concerning discrimination on the basis of gender identity.  In denying the motion, though the court originally “did not specifically identify whether it applied to prospective members of the Plaintiff Organization,” it concluded “that all of the Plaintiff Organizations’ members, current and prospective, are entitled to the relief ordered.” It noted that “[s]upplements to the original notice may be appropriate as the case progresses.” In declining to limit the injunction only to the provisions regarding gender identity, the court cited Defendants’ interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit. 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Doe v. Univ. of N. Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. (5th Cir. July 16, 2024)

    Opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff, a former medical student at the Texas College of Osteopathic Medicine at the University of North Texas Health Science Center who was permitted to take a medical leave of absence, brought due process and equal protection claims against multiple officials in their individual capacities after he was dismissed from the program for failure to meet the conditions of his return. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University. In affirming on his due process claim, the Fifth Circuit held that three separate emails were constitutionally sufficient notice of his academic dismissal, notwithstanding plaintiff’s assertion that the University should have known that he was not checking his email. In affirming summary judgment on his equal protection claim, it held that because he failed to identify a similarly situated student who was treated differently, he was unable to show that the officials discriminated against him based on a perception of a mental disability.   

    Topics:

    Academic Performance and Misconduct | Constitutional Issues | Due Process | Students

  • Date:

    Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (W.D. Tex. July 15, 2024)

    Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Mootness. Plaintiffs, Students for Fair Admissions, sued the University of Texas at Austin in July 2020, alleging that the University’s admissions policies impermissibly consider race in violation of Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause. After the Supreme Court’s decision in SFFA v. Harvard-UNC, the University revised its admissions process to eliminate consideration of race and ethnicity as factors in admissions decisions and “created new processes to train and supervise its admissions officers and employees to ensure that they do not consider race or ethnicity as a factor in the admissions process.” In granting dismissal for mootness, the court held that this policy is lawful. It further held that because the policy change was compelled by law, the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply and the assertion that the “requested injunctive relief impedes mootness is unavailing.” It also held that because “nothing in the record indicates that UT Austin has any intention of reverting to its prior admissions practices,” issuing an injunction barring them from doing so “would be nonsensical.”    

    Topics:

    Admissions | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Students

  • Date:

    Doe v. Univ. of S. Ind. (S.D. Ind. July 11, 2024)

    Order overruling Plaintiff’s Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order on Plaintiff’s Use of Pseudonym. Plaintiff, a student at the University of Southern Indiana, brought Title IX claims against the University after he was suspended for sexual harassment. Though the court had previously granted plaintiff’s unopposed motion to proceed under pseudonym, “in the wake of recent Seventh Circuit caselaw,” it “ordered the parties to show cause as to why this case should or should not proceed under pseudonym,” and the magistrate judge found plaintiff failed to demonstrate the required “special circumstances.” In overruling plaintiff’s objection, the court held plaintiff’s assertion of previous social media threats and an online petition that seemed to urge the University to hold him accountable were insufficient to warrant anonymity because they indicated that his identity was already known. It held that the magistrate judge did not err in finding that his relocation to a different state mitigated against anonymity, noting plaintiff “has designated no evidence that his location is unknown to the public or that anyone has harmed him physically when he resided on [the University’s] campus or at his new place of residence. It similarly noted that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has clearly held that the confidentiality of an underlying Title IX proceeding is immaterial to the question of whether a Title IX private right of action can proceed under pseudonym in federal court.”

    Topics:

    Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    ACE Issue Brief on the College Student Athletics Policy Landscape (July 16, 2024)

    American Council on Education Issue Brief on the College Student Athletics Policy Landscape in 2024. This Issue Brief discusses the traditional role of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in shaping the relationship between student athletes and their institutions of higher education and the impact of recent legal and legislative developments on that relationship. It discusses, among others, issues related to name, image, and likeness (NIL) compensation; questions about whether athletes might be categorized as employees; and efforts related to collective bargaining and unionization.   

    Topics:

    Athletics & Sports | Athletics Compliance & NCAA Rules | Student Athlete Issues | Students

  • Date:

    Johnson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, et al. (3rd Cir. July 11, 2024)

    Opinion on interlocutory appeal affirming-in-part denial of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.  Plaintiffs, student-athletes at several NCAA Division I member schools, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, brought FLSA and unjust enrichment claims against the NCAA and multiple member schools, seeking unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees. The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting the assertion that as amateurs the athletes could not as a matter of law be classified as employees. It held that plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts under the multifactor balancing test from Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. (2nd Cir. 2016), which considered when unpaid interns may be entitled to compensation under the FLSA, to proceed with their claim. On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss but vacated the application of the Glatt test in favor of a common-law economic realities analysis. In distinguishing the instant question from the internship context in Glatt, the court noted that “interscholastic athletics are not part of any academic curriculum” and “the educational and vocational benefits of college athletics cited by Appellants as alternative forms of remuneration (increased discipline, a stronger work ethic, improved strategic thinking, time management, leadership, and goal setting skills, and a greater ability to work collaboratively) are all exactly the kinds of skills one would typically acquire in a work environment.” 

    Topics:

    Athletics & Sports | Faculty & Staff | Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) & Categorization of Employees | Student Athlete Issues | Students

  • Date:

    Texas v. United States (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting-in-part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  Plaintiffs, the state of Texas and two professors, challenged the Department of Education’s new Title IX Final Rule and sought preliminary injunction, alleging that it exceeds the statutory authority of Title IX, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates the First Amendment. In granting the injunction, the court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that (1) the Department’s extension of the definition of sex-based discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity exceeds statutory authority under Title IX and is arbitrary and capricious; (2) the Final Rule’s ambiguity as to whether “misgendering” creates a hostile environment or is sex-based harassment would chill the professors’ protected speech in violation of the First Amendment; (3) the requirement that Texas provide insurance coverage for abortions in violation of its own law is arbitrary and capricious; and (4) several provisions on grievance procedures are arbitrary and capricious in their departure from due process, including permitting a single-investigator model, ambiguity as to whether schools must give parties access to evidence, and making live hearings and questioning optional.  The injunction is limited to the state of Texas and the two individual plaintiffs.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Kansas v. U.S. Dep’t of Education (D. Kan. July 2, 2024)

    Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs, the states of Kansas, Alaska, Utah, and Wyoming, three organizations with student members in the plaintiff states and beyond, and one female middle school student from Oklahoma, sought to enjoin the Title IX Final Rule, alleging that the Department impermissibly defined “sex discrimination” to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity. The court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their claims that (1) the definition is inconsistent with the meaning of “sex” in the statute; (2) the Department violated the major questions doctrine by attempting to regulate on an issue of vast economic and political significance without clear statutory authority; (3) it violated the Spending Clause because Congress had not put recipients on notice that sex discrimination includes gender identity; (4) the Final Rule is impermissibly vague and overboard because it subjects the plaintiff organizations’ members to potential investigation and discipline for expressing their beliefs about gender identity and transgender issues, thereby likely chilling their speech; and (5) the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious.  The court enjoined the entire rule as to the plaintiff States, the individual plaintiff, and all schools attended by individual members of the plaintiff organizations or their minor children. The plaintiff organizations have until July 15, 2024, to file notice in the record of the schools their members attend.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct