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  • Date:

    Brunson v. Benedict Coll. (D. S.C. Sep. 24, 2024)

    Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former faculty member at Benedict College who is African American, brought Title VII and §1981 retaliation claims, as well as state law claims for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and defamation against the College. Following student complaints regarding plaintiff’s course instruction, including that the instruction relied almost exclusively on peer teaching, plaintiff was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) and eventually terminated. Plaintiff avers that his placement on a PIP, termination, and other negative actions by supervisory personnel within the College were motivated by his complaints regarding purportedly problematic treatment by his White supervisor. Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliatory actions beyond his termination included alleged harassment, disrespect, supervisor demands for daily emails, refusal to fund any activity or effort associated with plaintiff’s requests for teaching materials, choir needs, and attendance at conferences, as well as “baiting his students to make false accusations against [plaintiff],” and denying his requests for leave of absence. Since the Court found that the College did not address these allegations insofar as they formed the basis for pro se plaintiff’s §1981 retaliation claim “on acts in addition to his termination,” the Court partially sustained plaintiff’s objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation and permitted this narrow claim to proceed, but granted summary judgment in favor of the College on all other claims.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Josephson v. Ganzel (6th Cir. Sep. 10, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former professor of psychiatry and Division Chief at the University of Louisville School of Medicine (the Medical School) brought claims alleging retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights against multiple administrators at the Medical School. In 2017, after plaintiff shared his thoughts on treating childhood gender dysphoria during a panel discussion sponsored by a conservative think tank, which led to dissention amongst faculty, the Medical School first demoted him and then, did not renew his employment contract. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the Medical School’s immunity defenses, finding that Plaintiff’s request for reinstatement as a faculty member and expungement of any reference to nonrenewal from him personnel file, are prospective in nature, and thus, not barred by Eleventh Amendment. The Circuit also found the Medical School was not entitled to qualified immunity since protections for Plaintiff’s speech were clearly established at the relevant time, and that a reasonable jury could find retaliation occurred where (1) Plaintiff participated in the off campus, privately funded panel in his individual rather than official capacity, which a moderator specifically advised attendees about prior to Plaintiff voicing his own views regarding treatment of children with gender dysphoria, which is a matter of public concern; (2) limited evidence supported that Plaintiff’s remarks yielded disharmony amongst his colleagues, including when he stormed out of a contentious faculty meeting, but that the Medical School produced no evidence that the remarks otherwise impacted either patient care or recruitment of other personnel and thus no “significant disruption” occurred; and (3) genuine factual disputes remained regarding whether Plaintiff’s demotion and subsequent termination was due to poor performance or his protected speech.  

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Santa Maria v. Loyola Univ. of Chi. Stritch Sch. of Med. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 9, 2024)

    Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former medical student at Loyola University of Chicago Stritch School of Medicine, who suffers from depression, anxiety, and ADHD brought claims of disability discrimination, retaliation, breach of implied contract, IIED, and negligence against the University and The National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME), after she failed a required exam three times, and was dismissed from the program. After a successful administrative appeal, Plaintiff was reinstated at the University with conditions to ensure she passed the exam during a subsequent attempt. Prior to retaking the exam, Plaintiff sought and received accommodations from NBME, about which she notified the University. Plaintiff alleges that as part of her reinstatement the University agreed to set up an eight-week study period and monthly meetings with the Dean to help her prepare to retake the exam, but that these supports were either only partially provided or were not provided in a timely manner, which meant that she could not utilize the NBME’s accommodation allowing her to space the two modules of the exam out by 14 days, causing her to fail the exam, and leading to a second dismissal for failure to complete the terms of her readmission. The court declined to dismiss the discrimination claims, reasoning that based upon the language of the reenrollment letter, the University recognized Plaintiff as a well-performing student except for when her disabilities presented challenges, and that if Plaintiff had no disability, she would not have failed her exams, and the University would not have offered reenrollment on specified terms. The court permitted Plaintiff’s contract claim to proceed, stating that the University “cannot use [the provision requiring plaintiff to pass the exam on her first attempt] to argue that [plaintiff] failed to perform an obligation it could not require her to fulfill.” The court dismissed Plaintiff’s negligence claim as duplicative of her claim for breach of contract, and her IIED claim reasoning that she failed to demonstrate that the University’s actions were “extreme and outrageous.” 

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Garcia v. AMTC-1, Inc. (M.D. Pa. Sep. 9, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former phlebotomy student at Fortis Institute (the Institute), which is a for-profit institution, brought Title VI claims of race-based harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract, as well as claims for nonpayment of wages against both the Institute and her former externship placement site. After completing her coursework, Plaintiff was assigned to an externship, where she claims she experienced racially discriminatory harassment from one of the site’s paid employees, which she reported to the externship site’s coordinator. Subsequently, Plaintiff allegedly received a threatening message from the employee via social media, and then, the next day the Institute’s program director notified Plaintiff that the site had dismissed her from her externship placement. The court permitted her Title VI claim to proceed reasoning that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a prima facie case via both direct and indirect evidence by asserting that she is a Person of Color, who met the qualifications to be enrolled in the Institute’s phlebotomy program and was dismissed from her externship after reporting experiencing discrimination at the site placement, and that although the Institute “had the authority to take remedial measures … [it] choose not to do so.” The court found that discovery was required to parse the nuance of the relationships between the Plaintiff on the one hand, and the Institute and site placement on the other, to evaluate her claims that she enjoyed employee status and was entitled to wages for her externship hours under the FLSA, and therefore, declined to dismiss those claims. 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Peters-Clark v. Angelina Coll. (E.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2024)

    Report and Recommendation to grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former Angelina College employee who is an African American woman brought Section 1981 and Title VII claims against the College alleging race discrimination and unlawful retaliation. In recommending plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim be permitted to move forward, the court found that plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts that satisfied her discrimination claim by stating that she was not selected for a position based on her race; the person selected for the position was less qualified than her and white; and that the College has not hired a woman of color for an executive position in over six years. The court recommended dismissal of the Section 1981 claim with prejudice as such claims cannot lie against a public employer. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was not subject to the College’s motion, and proceeds. 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Huang v. The Ohio State Univ. (6th Cir. Aug 28, 2024)

    Opinion vacating the trial verdict and remanding. Plaintiff, a former Ph.D. engineering student at the Ohio State University brought claims of Title VII quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation, and a claim for unwanted sexual touching in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to bodily integrity against the University and her former advisor. Plaintiff alleged the former advisor sexually harassed and assaulted her throughout her Ph.D. candidacy and retaliated against her by failing her candidacy exam. The Sixth Circuit found that the district court “mishandled” plaintiff’s claims against both the University and her former advisor and abused its discretion. Initially, the Circuit held that (1) plaintiff’s status as a student and as an employee are not mutually exclusive, (2) application of the 13-factor common law agency test showed a dispute of material fact as to if plaintiff was an “employee” of the University for Title VII purposes, and (3) a jury must resolve the factual discrepancies over “where and when” plaintiff worked before the district could decide as a matter of law whether she was an employee when subjected to alleged harassment. Next, the Court adopted the majority view that plaintiff pushing her former advisor away to resist his alleged advances is a form of opposition to improper touching (even if she did not vocalize her objection), which meets the “protected activity” prong of a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim, and thus, on remand the district must proceed with the “nondiscriminatory reason” and “pretext” steps of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Finally, the Circuit found that the district erred and violated plaintiff’s “substantial rights” by applying an overly narrow view of relevancy to exclude multiple categories of evidence at trial including circumstantial evidence of harassment, entitling plaintiff to a new trial.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employee Sexual Misconduct | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Zhang v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. (M.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2024)

    Order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former tenured faculty member at the University of Georgia, who identifies her race as Asian and her national origin as Chinese, brought discrimination and retaliation claims against the University based on race, national origin, and disability. Plaintiff alleged she received biased treatment based on her race and national origin and was frequently dismissed after reporting a discriminatory work environment. Plaintiff further alleged she was denied reasonable accommodations and was terminated after her accommodation requests were denied. In dismissing the University’s Motion to Dismiss, the court found plaintiff’s allegations that University officials treated her less favorably than her white instructor counterparts and replaced her with a white man who was unqualified for the position were sufficient to support an inference of intentional race or national origin discrimination. Additionally, the court found that plaintiff’s continued complaints about alleged bias treatment (disparate discipline, denial of a teaching assistant, and denial of the opportunity to vote on a tenure candidate) from 2020 until her termination in 2023 were sufficient to support an inference of intentional retaliation from her department superiors.  

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Reddy v. Univ. of Pa. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a South Asian woman and former student at the University of Pennsylvania, brought retaliation and contract claims against the University after she was suspended for violation of academic integrity when her Lab Report seemed substantially similar to that of another student. Plaintiff alleged that she previously emailed her professor raising concerns of racial bias against her, but such concerns were not addressed. After receiving notice that she was accused of violating the Code of Academic Integrity, plaintiff filed a formal bias report against the professor and met with the University’s Vice Provost. Plaintiff alleged the cheating accusation was retaliation for her pointing out the discrimination in her professor’s classroom. Plaintiff further alleged that throughout the hearing process for her academic violation, the University mishandled the hearing by failing to provide adequate time to review evidence; denying her request to present a forensic expert; and denying her appeal request. In permitting her Title VI retaliation claim to proceed, the court found plaintiff’s discussion with the Vice Provost about the alleged discrimination and differential treatment was enough to constitute protected activity. Turning to her contract claims under the Student Disciplinary System Charter (the Charter), the court found that plaintiff plausibly alleged that the University violated its duty to exchange evidence when it allowed only 48 hours for plaintiff to review new exhibits. Further, the University’s purported refusal to postpone the hearing and denial of plaintiff’s opportunity to present a forensic expert was sufficient to constitute a breach of contract of the Charter. On the other hand, the court found that the Human Resources Policy Manual exclusively applies to employees, not students, and dismissed the breach claims flowing from that document. 

    Topics:

    Academic Performance and Misconduct | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Retaliation | Students

  • Date:

    Crawford v. Bronx Cmty. Coll. (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 21, 2024)

    Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former office assistant at Bronx Community College of the City University of New York brought Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) interference and retaliation claims and claims of disability discrimination against the College after she took extended leave for a broken ankle. Plaintiff alleged she communicated to her superiors that she was unable to work and worked with the College’s HR department to apply for FMLA, however, she was informed that her absence from work was “unauthorized.” In denying the College’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim, the court found that plaintiff sufficiently alleged she was denied benefits to which she was entitled under the FMLA. Further, the court found that plaintiff made “diligent, good faith efforts” to timely submit her necessary FMLA forms. The court dismissed plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims because she was unable to demonstrate how a broken ankle qualified as a disability under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, and further, did not demonstrate her injury to be “sufficiently severe” to warrant protection. Finally, in denying the College’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the court found that plaintiff’s termination shortly after her request for FMLA leave was sufficient to support an inference of retaliatory intent.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Manco v. St. Joseph’s Univ. Et, al. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2024).

    Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former St. Joseph’s University professor sued the University and several students under multiple theories following termination his of employment. The University placed Plaintiff on administrative leave, investigated, and ultimately removed from his visiting faculty role for “violations of University policies” after screenshots of his anonymous tweets circulated online, were sent to the University’s Title IX Coordinator, and a student tweeted at the University “are you gonna fire [Plaintiff] who has done nothing but contribute to a hostile learning environment with his racism, sexism, and transphobia??????” Various defendant groups filed motions to dismiss, including the student who posted the tweet who argued that she was entitled to absolute privilege “as she conveyed information that commenced an investigation pursuant to federal statute or regulations.” The court declined to dismiss claims of defamation, false light, and tortious interference, reasoning that although the student’s emails and direct correspondence with the University during the pendency of the investigation were entitled to immunity, her “general tweet” towards a private institution lacked intent to commence an investigation. The court also found that her tweet was potentially defamatory as it may be read to imply that the professor is “a racist, sexist and/or is transphobic.” The Court granted the student’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation | Social Media

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