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  • Date:

    Harvey v. Mass. Inst. of Tech. (D. Mass. Dec. 6, 2024)

    Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a Black woman who is over the age of 60 and a former nurse for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) brought claims against MIT, alleging racial discrimination and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). She contends her white female supervisor targeted and bullied her and treated her differently than her white colleagues. Plaintiff alleges the supervisor used racial tropes and described Black employees as “rough and tough.” Plaintiff also claims she was denied benefits and opportunities such as conference attendance and that she was removed from a working group without explanation. Plaintiff also avers that her supervisor retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave by sending a negative job performance email with numerous fabrications and assigned work for completion during leave, which ultimately resulted in plaintiff’s inability to return to her position at MIT. In allowing her claims of racial discrimination to proceed, the court found that plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to demonstrate a possible hostile work environment. It dismissed the disparate treatment claims, reasoning that plaintiff’s allegation of being denied conference attendance was insufficient to materially alter her conditions of employment. Finally, although the court found plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim was misplead since she was not denied leave, it reasoned that her allegations regarding the job performance email and assignment of tasks to complete during FMLA leave, were “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience” and considering the purported proximity to plaintiff’s FMLA request, could evidence causation in support of a claim of retaliation for taking protected leave. Thus, while noting that the allegations were sparse, the court found them adequate to proceed under a retaliation theory.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Sabic-El-Rayess v. Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ. (S.D. N.Y. Dec. 5, 2024)

    Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a Muslim migrant from Bosnia who is over the age of 40 and a non-tenure track faculty member at Teachers College, Columbia University, brought claims against the College for religious discrimination under Title VII and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and NYCHRL, and retaliation under Title VII, the ADEA, and NYCHRL alleging the College rejected her efforts to obtain tenure due to her religion and age, and because of her prior complaints of discrimination on those bases. Plaintiff contends she has been employed by the College for over a decade, published on numerous issues, and obtained multi-million-dollar grants for the College. She claims that although the College’s president and other leaders agreed that she is qualified for a tenure-track role, her applications have repeatedly been rejected, and that she unsuccessfully applied for a tenure-track position in 2012, 2013, and twice in 2024. She claims she communicated with colleagues about applying for positions in 2021 and 2022 but was discouraged from applying after hearing disparaging remarks about her age. Plaintiff alleges that while her 2012 application was pending, her supervisor asked around about her Muslim faith, and the position was ultimately awarded to a candidate who is not Muslim. She avers that the Department Chair told her that her Muslim background “doomed” her chances of ever obtaining tenure, and that overall, the College has a culture of anti-Muslim bias. Plaintiff alleges that after she filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the College retaliated against her by (1) disinviting her from a symposium at which she was scheduled to speak, (2) lowering her wages, and (3) denying her tenure-track request. The court found plaintiff’s allegation that her supervisor said she was “not a spring chicken” and her subjective belief that the supervisor “preferred to hire someone ‘young’ who had ‘youth’ and ‘energy’” were insufficient to maintain claims for age discrimination since plaintiff did not actually apply for the position. On the other hand, it allowed the religious discrimination claims to proceed, reasoning that being disinvited and excluded from a prominent speaking role at a symposium was a materially adverse employment action when paired with plaintiff’s allegations that College leaders made anti-Muslim remarks. The court permitted the retaliation claims to move forward based on plaintiff’s allegations that (1) mere months elapsed between her religious discrimination complaint and the rejection of her dual requests for tenure-track and tenured positions, (2) although she was eligible for a salary increase, her wages were reduced, and (3) her invitation to speak at the symposium was revoked a week after she filed litigation.  

    Topics:

    Age Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Religious Discrimination & Accommodation | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Terrell v. Ala. State Univ. (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024) (unpub.)

    Per Curium opinion affirming in part and vacating and remanding in part. Plaintiff, a female former Senior Associate Athletic Director of Internal Operations at Alabama State University, brought pay discrimination and retaliation claims against the University after a new Athletic Director eliminated her position in favor of a new Senior Associate Athletic Director/Chief of Staff role for which one of the AD’s former direct reports was hired. Plaintiff was also designated as the Senior Woman Administrator, though she did not receive the additional compensation the University had earmarked in its budget for the role. The district court granted summary judgment to the University finding that plaintiff failed to identify proper comparators regarding her Equal Pay Act (EPA) claim, and further found her challenges to the wisdom of the University’s proposed reorganization and budget process fell short of raising questions of pretext regarding her retaliation and Title IX discrimination claims. The Eleventh Circuit conducted a de novo review and affirmed the district court’s judgment regarding plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claims but vacated and remanded the EPA and Clarke-Figures Equal Pay Act (CFEPA) sex discrimination claims in light of its recent clarification of the analytical framework for EPA claims in Baker v. Upson Reg’l Med. Ctr., (11th Cir. 2024). In Baker, the Eleventh Circuit held that claims of sex discrimination under the EPA are analyzed under a two-step framework, requiring plaintiff to demonstrate “that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’” The burden then shifts to the employer, to demonstrate that the difference in pay is justified by one of the EPA’s four exceptions: “(1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) a differential based on any factor other than sex” (internal quotes omitted). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit remanded plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims under the EPA and CFEPA requiring the district court to apply the Baker test.

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employee Sexual Misconduct | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Zhornitsky v. Yale Sch. of Med. (D. Conn. Nov. 25, 2024)

    Granting in part and denying in part Defendant Yale’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a male former doctor for Yale University School of Medicine, brought claims of gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, as well as a Title IX due process violation against the University, alleging it discriminated against him on the basis of sex. Plaintiff also initially asserted but later abandoned claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. While jointly employed by the University and working at the Connecticut Mental Health Center (the Center), plaintiff sent multiple private messages to a colleague via Instagram, which she did not respond to. When the colleague complained and requested that plaintiff be advised not to contact her again, Yale initiated a Title IX investigation into the communications but found no violation, and plaintiff ceased communicating with her directly. Subsequently, the female coworker filed a second Title IX complaint, which Yale also investigated, and again, found no violation. Later, the female colleague saw plaintiff – whose job duties included taking blood and urine samples from patients – waiting outside a patient room on the same floor of the Center where she worked, which prompted her to file a third complaint. While Yale investigated the third complaint, the Center banned plaintiff from entering its facilities despite confirmation from plaintiff’s supervisor that he had been present on the second floor of the Center pursuant to his job duties. Eventually, the Center lifted its ban, and plaintiff returned to work. The female colleague was notified of plaintiff’s return to the Center and expressed concern about potential future interactions with plaintiff. Yale took no immediate action in response to this new expression of concern from the colleague. Two months later, and allegedly one day after Yale was notified that plaintiff had filed a charge of discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO), Yale initiated a fourth Title IX investigation. Plaintiff claims he sought to file a cross complaint against the female coworker, but Yale declined to permit him to do so since she was neither a University employee nor student. Plaintiff claims that the fourth investigation exceeded the scope of the female colleague’s most recent articulation of concern, disregarded the conclusions of the trio of prior of Title IX investigations, and improperly considered his initial direct messages to the coworker. Since the fourth investigation found he engaged in sexually harassing conduct, plaintiff was “suspended, banned from his work location and forced out of his employment with Yale.” The court allowed his discrimination claims to proceed, reasoning that “[a] Title IX proceeding could not have been properly brought against [p]laintiff because all prior complaints against him had been found either to be unsubstantiated or not rising to the level of sexual harassment or stalking.” It also permitted the retaliation claims to move forward based upon the alleged procedural irregularity of Yale’s disallowance of a crossclaim by plaintiff, and the temporal proximity between plaintiff’s filing of a CHRO complaint and initiation of Yale’s fourth Title IX investigation into plaintiff. Plaintiff’s due process claims were dismissed as duplicative of his claims of discrimination. 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Retaliation | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    LiVolsi v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (W.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2024)

    Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a female former Academic Advisor for the University of Texas at Austin School of Music brought Title VII discrimination claims against the University alleging she experienced sex discrimination and harassment as well as retaliation from one of her supervisors. Specifically, plaintiff alleged her supervisor made several unwelcome comments about her sex such as “oh all three women are here. I’m scared!” When plaintiff requested her supervisor contact a different employee instead of reaching out to her when she was off work he purportedly responded with “But I prefer talking to you…” and in a conversation about her supervisor’s pull up bar on his door, plaintiff contends he told her “you don’t have to [do pullups]. Just let your body hang there. It’s great for your body and it feels good!” Plaintiff alleged she went to the Title IX office to make a complaint but was informed that office was for students only. After students made similar complaints, plaintiff returned to the Title IX office but was told that it “could not guarantee confidentiality or protection from retaliation” and plaintiff then closed her case out of fear of retaliation. Plaintiff eventually took FMLA leave for her mental health after alleged continued mocking and demanding requests from her supervisor. Upon her return from leave, she alleged the remarks did not abate, and she then resigned her position and filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In allowing plaintiff’s claims to proceed, the court found that she sufficiently pled harassment as she gave numerus examples of unwelcome comments, finding it possible that her supervisor’s alleged behavior was frequent enough to be severe, and given that some of the communication directly affected her work performance the court further found it plausible that the behavior could rise to the level of offensive and hostile conduct. It also found that plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim of discrimination via alleged demands of additional work and tasks plausibly considered “reassignment to menial or degrading work” and further, after reporting her concerns, she was told “she should probably leave the office due to the continued implosion” therefore encouraging her to resign. Because these alleged actions were directed solely toward plaintiff and not her male peers, the court found it sufficient at this stage that the actions could plausibly have been taken due to plaintiff’s sex. Finally, the court found that plaintiff sufficiently pled retaliation as she demonstrated constructive discharge through her resignation due to the difficulty from working with her supervisor.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Frowner v. Fayetteville State Univ (E.D. N.C. Nov. 19, 2024)

    Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, an African American woman and former librarian for the Fayetteville State University brought Title VII retaliation claims against the University following her termination. Plaintiff alleged that her white male supervisor wrote inaccurate performance evaluations about her, and that after she filed a complaint about the supervisor with the University’s Human Resources Department, he further retaliated against her by drafting a second negative evaluation, placing her on a three-day suspension amidst a mediation between the two, and then subsequently terminated plaintiff following her filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The court found the claim was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss given the alleged temporal proximity between plaintiff’s filing of a retaliation complaint with the EEOC and her suspension from work, which fell within the three-month window recognized by the Fourth Circuit. It reasoned that plaintiff adequately pled that her supervisor was aware of her protected activity of filing an EEOC complaint at the time of her termination, and the “closeness in temporal proximity” was enough to infer causation, sending the case to discovery.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Hodge v. Spalding Univ. (W.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 2024)

    Memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, former members of the women’s volleyball team at Spalding University brought claims of negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, willful and wanton disregard for player safety and well-being, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages alleging they experienced bullying from their teammates while on the volleyball team, and their coach contributed toward the bullying and retaliated against plaintiffs when they complained of the bullying. One plaintiff also brought claims of disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiffs allege they were both kicked off the team following concerns for their mental health due to the alleged bullying from other members on the team. In finding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged claims of negligence, the court found that based on the allegations that a coach (1) disclosed plaintiff’s confidential, personal information by sharing that she took time off for her mental health, and (2) forced the student to perform sprints despite her known hip injury, plausibly breached the duty of ordinary care. In allowing plaintiffs’ NIED claims to proceed, the court credited plaintiffs’ allegations that they experienced “emotional distress, anxiety, embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish” from the claimed bullying by their teammates, which the coach purportedly disregarded. Based on its finding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged gross negligence and NIED claims, the court determined that a jury could award punitive damages at a trial. However, the court dismissed the claims of negligent hiring and supervision finding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how the coach was unfit for the job at the time of hire or how her supervisors were aware of the alleged wrongdoing when it transpired. It also dismissed claims for willful and wanton disregard finding there was not an “entire absence of care” and that plaintiffs were unable to establish intentional, reckless, outrageous, or intolerable actions by the coach necessary to sustain a claim for IIED. Finally, the court allowed the single plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination and retaliation to proceed finding the coach’s alleged decision to prohibit the student from playing for an entire season after being informed of her mental health diagnosis constitutes a “denial of [plaintiff one’s] opportunity … to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of [the university]” on the basis of her diagnosed anxiety. 

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Retaliation | Student Athlete Issues | Students

  • Date:

    Kammerer v. Univ. of Kan. (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 2024)

    Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former professor at the University of Kansas brought FMLA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the University and his former supervisors alleging they unlawfully interfered with his right to use his FMLA leave and discriminated and retaliated against him for using that leave. Plaintiff also claimed the University discriminated and retaliated against him because of his disability. Previously, plaintiff suffered a back injury that required accommodation. He agreed to change his work responsibilities per the suggestion of the Executive Associate Dean who was responsible for considering his request. Although plaintiff alleged he was assured that the change was not a new contract, he alleged that the University required him to accept a pay reduction of $19,000 as a condition of the accommodation. Later, he sought FMLA leave for needed surgery. Following his return to work, plaintiff alleged his supervisors declined him the opportunity to apply for a promotion and promoted another less-qualified employee. He further alleged he faced a course load that was three times the load of his colleagues and was refused additional compensation for that higher course load. Finally, he claimed that he was prohibited from inviting guest speakers or being awarded monetary grants. After filing a conciliation notice with the University, he was placed on administrative leave until his contract expired and then, notified that his contract would not be renewed. The court granted the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA claims as they were brought against his supervisors in their individual capacities, and as such, they are not “employers” governed by FMLA, declining to follow the rule of the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. In permitting plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claims to proceed, the court reasoned that plaintiff alleged several injuries that would support an award of economic damages, even though they may not arise from breach of contract, per se.  

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Hight v. Univ. of Chi. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2024)

    Memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former medical student at the University of Chicago brought disability discrimination claims against the University alleging violations of the ADA and refusal to accommodate under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He also brought claims for breach of tuition contract under Illinois law. Plaintiff had multiple disabilities that were recognized by the University for which he received reasonable accommodations, such as extra time and breaks when he took exams. During the program, he took a one-year medical leave following a professionalism concern report due to his absences and being placed on academic probation. Upon his return, he was moved from academic probation to monitored academic status and remained on that status until he was dismissed from the program. Prior to his dismissal, plaintiff alleged he began taking a new medication that inhibited his ability to control his actions, which included creating an email account under the name of another student and using the account to send evaluations and feedback to one of his professors. In response, a disciplinary proceeding was conducted that dismissed plaintiff for (1) repeated unprofessional behavior; (2) the egregious nature of the final professionalism complaint; (3) unprofessional behavior while on monitored academic status; and (4) significant and sustained academic performance deficiencies. Plaintiff appealed the decision in a timely manner, but allegedly was not given the ten-day response time outlined in the University’s policy. Plaintiff claimed that the incidents leading to his dismissal resulted from or were exacerbated by his disability and that there was no evidence supporting a finding of academic problems following his return from his leave of absence. In finding that plaintiff plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title III of the ADA, the court found (1) there was no dispute as to whether plaintiff had a disability as he was already receiving accommodations; (2) plaintiff sufficiently alleged he is able to complete his studies and comply with the requirements of the program with reasonable accommodations through his move from academic probation to monitored academic status; and (3) the events that the University characterized as “unprofessional conduct” leading to his dismissal, could be traceable to his disability and might have been accommodated. However, the court found that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead all three elements of a refusal to accommodate claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act and dismissed the claims, without prejudice. Further, the court dismissed part of plaintiff’s breach of contract claim because Illinois law does not recognize a contractual obligation arising from a party’s preexisting legal obligations. However, the court held that plaintiff did plead sufficient facts to establish an implied contract through the procedural protections articulated in the University’s guidelines regarding disciplinary proceedings, specifically how the University did not abide by the ten-day appeal timeline. 

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Thiry v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich. (E.D. Mich. Sep. 27, 2024)

    Opinion & Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former employee of the University of Michigan with a substance-use disorder brought claims of discrimination and retaliation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act) and unlawful restrictions of protected activity and retaliation under the First Amendment against the University and three of its employees. Plaintiff sought in-patient treatment for substance-use disorder and alleged that upon his return to work his supervisor created a hostile work environment by making derogatory comments about his disorder, publicly berating him, and disclosing confidential information about his treatment. Plaintiff sent a series of communications to his supervisor, including some texts and emails outside of working hours, and the University held an internal mediation between the parties in which plaintiff was admonished to constrain future communications to work related topics sent during working hours. The communications continued and plaintiff received a two-day disciplinary layoff for “Negligent Careless Work Performance” about which he filed a grievance. Plaintiff was placed on paid suspension pending an investigation into his conduct, the University held a Disciplinary Review Conference (DRC), and plaintiff was terminated. Thereafter, plaintiff sought and was granted the opportunity to retire in lieu of termination, and signed a Settlement Agreement and Release of Liability stating among other things that he would forgo “further claims, demands, or actions related to the DRC” and his grievance about the two-day layoff. Despite signing the Agreement, plaintiff filed suit. The court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress damages related to the Rehab Act claim, as well as the Rehab Act claims against the individual defendants, and for the University on plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for money damages, but denied the motion as to individual defendants, reasoning that “official-capacity claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment where a plaintiff seeks only prospective equitable relief.” The court found that while the plain language of the Agreement precluded claims pertaining to the DRC and suspension, a material factual dispute remained regarding whether the Agreement prohibited plaintiff’s broader claims related to discrimination under the Rehab Act, as well as Section 1983 claims for money damages from individual defendants, and for declaratory and injunctive relief.   

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation