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  • Date:

    Barringer-Brown v. Southside Va. Cmty. Coll. (E.D. Va. Sep. 24, 2025)

    Opinion Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former professor and dean at Southside Virginia Community College proceeding pro se, sued the college for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and defamation under state law following her termination after receiving negative feedback from her supervisor, which she maintained was “bogus and defective.” The court dismissed the college as it was not a proper party under Virginia law, and instructed the plaintiff to proceed instead against the Virginia Community College System. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s discriminatory discharge claim, finding she had failed to provide a “valid comparator” or any evidence to the contrary beyond her own “lengthy self-evaluation, and her defamation claim, finding the college had sovereign immunity. In allowing her retaliation claim to proceed, the court found that plaintiff’s filing of an EEOC charge falls under Title VII protected activity and may be pretext as she was terminated two weeks thereafter.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employment Separation, RIFs, ERIPs & Retrenchment | Faculty & Staff | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Patterson v. Kent State Univ. (6th Cir. Sep. 12, 2025)

    Opinion Affirming Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a transgender professor at Kent State, sued the university alleging Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation, First Amendment retaliation, and disability discrimination under the Rehab Act following the university’s response to plaintiff’s “weeks-long, profanity-laden Twitter tirade insulting colleagues and the university.” The Sixth Circuit concluded that, while the district court erred in finding the university had not taken any adverse employment action, plaintiff’s Title VII claims failed nonetheless because plaintiff failed to show that the university’s justification for taking the action was pretextual. The Sixth Circuit also rejected plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, holding that “speech about internal personal disputes or management” which included “run-of-the mill ‘employee beef’” does not constitute speech on a matter of public concern. Moreover, the court reasoned, even if the tweets had involved a matter of public concern, they still wouldn’t receive protection because the university’s interest in effective administration of its services “[outweigh[ed] [plaintiff’s] interest in this kind of trash talk.” 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Jorjani v. New Jersey Institute of Technology (3rd Cir. Sep. 8, 2025)

    Opinion Vacating and Remanding. Plaintiff, a philosophy lecturer at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, brought claims of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment against the university after it declined to renew his contract based on the disruption caused by inflammatory statements made by plaintiff in his private capacity that were included in a New York Times article. The District Court granted summary judgement for the university holding that plaintiff’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment because the university’s interest in “mitigating the disruption caused by [p]laintiff’s speech . . . outweighs [p]laintiff’s interest in its expression.” On appeal, the Third Circuit disagreed, finding the “minimal evidence of disruption” cited by the university “differ[ed] little from the ordinary operation of a public university” and therefore could not outweigh interest in plaintiff’s speech. The court found the university provided insufficient evidence that student disapproval of plaintiff’s speech resulted in a disruption, noting the university “never identified the exact number of calls or complaints . . . nor any details about the students’ concerns” nor “any evidence of specific student protests, upheaval, or unwillingness to abide by university policies.” The court also rejected the university’s claim that letters in the school paper from faculty members denouncing plaintiff were evidence of a disruption, instead finding they reflected “precisely the sort of reasoned debate that distinguishes speech from distraction.” As to the university’s claimed interest in “providing a non-denigrating environment” and concern that plaintiff’s views could “undermine the pedagogical relationship between teacher and student,” the court found that the university failed to point to anything in the record supporting its determination. In conclusion, the court held that “[on] balance, the disruption the university described does not outweigh even minimal interest in [plaintiff’s] speech” and therefore, the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Bowei Xi v. The Trs. of Purdue Univ. (N.D. Ind. Sep. 8, 2025)

    Opinion Granting Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a tenured professor at Purdue University, brought claims of discrimination and retaliation based on sex, race, and national origin after she was denied a promotion from associate to full professor. The university reasoned that plaintiff’s research record was not sufficient for a promotion and that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of inconsistent treatment throughout the promotion application process. While plaintiff satisfied the first, third, and fourth prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test, the court agreed with the university that plaintiff was unable to satisfy the second prong of the test – i.e., that she was qualified for the promotion. Further, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she was engaged in Title VII protected activity with regard to her retaliation claim, as her appeal of her application for promotion did not mention any form of discrimination. Finally, the court found that plaintiff did not show any evidence of an adverse action or causation.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination | Tenure

  • Date:

    Sailer v. Emporia State Univ. (D. Kan. Jun. 17, 2025)

    Memorandum and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, the former head coach of the women’s soccer team at Emporia State University, brought claims of retaliation and violation of the First Amendment against the University and the University’s Athletic Director after his employment was terminated. While plaintiff was employed at the University, he helped draft and supported a letter delivered by the captains of the women’s soccer team to University administrators, consisting of complaints on the diminishing soccer field, dissatisfaction with the strength training sessions and film access, and expressing frustration that the “men’s athletic teams are treated more favorably by school administration” expressly referencing Title IX (hereinafter referred to as the Title IX complaint). Following the Title IX complaint, the Athletic Director informed the team that the University “planned an in-depth Title IX review of the athletic department that would be taking place in the next two months.” Following the Title IX complaint, Plaintiff was suspended following complaints from the assistant coach and graduate assistant coach of the team which alleged that the women’s soccer team “had been drinking on the bus following the conference championship game [and] . . . alleged that plaintiff was aware of the drinking and had participated in it.” Plaintiff subsequently filed an internal Title IX complaint with the University, where he alleged “that [the University] retaliated against him for complaining about sex discrimination on behalf of the women’s soccer team in violation of Title IX.” Regarding the retaliation claim, the Court denied the motion to dismiss based on statements in support of the Title IX complaint, recognizing that as protected activity, and granted the motion to dismiss regarding non-protected statements in support of other complaints. Regarding plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, he alleged that his support of the Title IX complaint was “a matter of public concern.” Furthermore, Plaintiff alleged that because “his official duties [do] not include supporting his team’s Title IX complaint, his speech is protected by the First Amendment.” The Court held in favor of defendants, agreeing that “plaintiff’s speech [] was made as part of his assigned responsibilities as head coach of the women’s soccer team.” The Court further reasoned that “[i]t is also significant that plaintiff’s speech, without exception, was directed at individuals within his chain of command . . . [which] further suggests that plaintiff was speaking pursuant to his official duties.” As such, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amendment claims.

    Topics:

    Athletics & Sports | Athletics Operations | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Gray v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ga. Military Coll. (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2025) (unpub.)

    Order affirming grants of Summary Judgment in favor of the Georgia Military College. Plaintiff, an African American woman and former administrative assistant in the human resources department of the Georgia Military College (the “College”) sued alleging Title VII discrimination and retaliation after her position was terminated during a reduction in force (“RIF”). Prior to her termination, plaintiff – who was the only African American employee in her department – was employed with the College for five years. Upon return from COVID-19 related remote work in June of 2020, employees were encouraged but not required to mask and social distance on campus; Plaintiff, who has heart disease expressed concern for her health when colleagues declined to do so. She also complained about another employee’s personal social media post urging law enforcement to “[b]ring back the hoses and release the dogs,” which was made on the heels of the death of George Floyd. On or about June 30, 2020, plaintiff was informed that she was one of ten College employees whose positions were eliminated pursuant to a RIF that obliged each department to eliminate at least one position. Plaintiff was the only person RIF’d in her department. All other RIF’d personnel were white. She applied but was not selected for two other positions with the College, one of which was filled by an African American applicant, and the other of which remained unfilled for more than a year. Thereafter, she filed a pro se EEOC charge challenging her termination as age and race-based discrimination. Subsequently, she retained counsel who filed a second charge of discrimination based on alleged disability discrimination and retaliation, and upon receipt of right to sue letters, filed litigation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dual grants of summary judgment in favor of the College, reasoning that (1) plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim failed due to her failure to exhaust that claim prior to filing suit, and (2) she failed to adduce sufficient evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that her termination was either race-based or retaliatory, in light of the College’s evidence that the decision to undertake a RIF due to budgetary shortfalls predated her complaints, and that plaintiff’s position was the easiest to absorb within her department.    

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Thiry v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich. (E.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2025)

    Opinion & Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Awarding Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, an employee at the University of Michigan filed suit against the University and three of its employees alleging discrimination and retaliation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well as First Amendment violations under §1983. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and denied summary judgment on claims seeking monetary relief. Defendants then sought partial reconsideration of the order. In granting Defendants’ motion, the court found that it erred in previously ruling that “official-capacity claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment where a plaintiff seeks only prospective equitable relief.” The court concluded that “the University and its governing Board of Regents are constitutionally-created instrumentalities of the State of Michigan and are not ‘persons’ for purposes of Section 1983.” Finally, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief because the Defendants could not be sued under §1983.  

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Szeto v. Univ. of Colo. (D. Colo. Feb 19, 2025)

    Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a student in the University of Colorado’s (“University”) Medical Scientist Training Program (“MSTP”), alleged Title IX retaliation based on her dismissal from the Graduate school, Title IX retaliation based on her dismissal from the Medical school and referral to the Colorado Physicians Health Program (“CPHP”), and violation of Title II of the ADA. Plaintiff also alleged a §1983 claim against her lab professor for violation of her First Amendment rights. Plaintiff’s claims are centered around her failure to complete certain standards and examinations for the MSTP program. The court concluded that the University was entitled to summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. For Plaintiff’s retaliation claim centered around her dismissal from the Graduate School, the court found that Plaintiff “failed to demonstrate a causal connection between protected activity and her dismissal from the Graduate School.” Additionally, the court found that Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim based on the CPHP referral and subsequent dismissal from the Medical School must also fail because Plaintiff failed to show that the CPHP referral was a materially adverse action. The court noted that even if Plaintiff had been able to show a materially adverse action, she was unable to demonstrate a causal connection between “her protected activity and her dismissal from the Medical School.” Turning to Plaintiff’s ADA claim, the court found that she was unable to demonstrate a “triable issue as to whether the University regarded her as disabled or referred her to the CPHP because of a perceived disability….” Finally, the court found that Plaintiff’s lab professor was also entitled to summary judgment on her §1983 claim. The court further noted that at no point did Plaintiff demonstrate an issue of material fact as to whether her professor was “substantially motivated” to resign as Plaintiff’s thesis advisor and subsequently remove her from the lab because of Plaintiff’s allegations against the MSTP director or Plaintiff’s complaints about the professor’s authorship practices. 

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Kalia v. City Coll. of N.Y. (S.D. N.Y. Feb 18, 2025)

    Order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff, a tenured professor of History at the City College of New York (CCNY), alleged race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII and the analogous New York law against CCNY, the City University of New York (CUNY), and three employees. Plaintiff’s claims surround his longstanding effort to become a “Distinguished Professor” at CCNY. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment claim, and parts of the retaliation claim are precluded. Turning to plaintiff’s Title VII disparate treatment claim, the court concluded that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege discriminatory motive. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action when he was denied the Distinguished Professor appointment. The court noted that Plaintiff’s claim that his application “was much stronger” than other professors who were considered for the  appointment was “insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination” and that plaintiff did not allege any factual allegations that he did not receive the appointment because of “his race, color, or national origin.” Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims that he was not allowed to take sabbatical and that he was denied the opportunity to teach a historiography course also failed. Turning to the remaining parts of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the court found that the claim “fail[ed] because he d[id] not establish a causal connection between any of his protected activity and the denial of his Distinguished Professor appointment.” It also noted that Plaintiff did not show that any person’s intent “was the proximate cause” of the Promotion and Benefits Committee’s decision to deny his appointment to Distinguished Professor. 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Rageh v. Univ. of N.C. (M.D. N.C. Dec. 10, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a medical doctor, over the age of forty, and of Egyptian national origin alleged that during his ophthalmology fellowship at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University discriminated against him and retaliated against him based on his national origin and age, under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Plaintiff also brought claims for defamation per se, breach of contract, negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (hereinafter referred to as state law claims). Plaintiff was in a two-year fellowship at the University to receive training in ophthalmology. During his time in the program, he alleged one of his supervising physicians mocked his accent, criticized him for mispronunciation, and frequently allowed younger residents to participate in operations more than him. Plaintiff alleges the same supervising physician refused to work with him after expressing unjustified concerns about plaintiff’s skills and issues with patient safety, and after plaintiff brought his concerns to a supervisor, he alleges he was retaliated against when the University shortened his fellowship to one year. Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and alleges the University subsequently terminated his fellowship. Plaintiff contends that he was informed by the University’s fellowship director that he was terminated because he filed the EEOC complaint, and the fellowship director informed plaintiff’s potential employers and state licensing boards that plaintiff was relieved from seeing patients due to safety concerns. The court allowed the ADEA claim, and Title VII claim based on denial of training opportunities to proceed, based on plaintiff’s allegations that (1) he was over forty years old during the fellowship, (2) the supervising physician provided him with fewer training opportunities than younger residents, (3) the supervising physician expressed concerns about plaintiff’s age to the fellowship director before plaintiff’s fellowship had even started, and (4) plaintiff’s position as a protected class member. However, the court found plaintiff failed to allege facts supporting his claim that his fellowship was shortened and then terminated due to either his age or his national origin, and as such, it dismissed the ADEA and Title VII claims related to the addended length and subsequent termination of the fellowship. It denied the University’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claims, finding plaintiff’s claim that the fellowship director informed him that he was terminated because of his EEOC filing was sufficient to give rise to a plausible inference of retaliation. The court dismissed plaintiff’s state law claims against the University, but allowed the defamation per se claim to proceed against the fellowship director based on the allegation that the director informed plaintiff’s prospective employers that he was terminated due to patient safety concerns. For the same reason, the court permitted the interference with prospective economic advantage claim to proceed. Finally, the court allowed plaintiff to proceed with his wrongful interference with employment contract based on both the fellowship director and supervising physician’s purported knowledge of his employment contract, alleged false allegations made by the supervising physician about plaintiff’s skills with intent to induce the University to breach the contract, and the fellowship director’s steps to allegedly induce the University to breach it’s employment contract with plaintiff based on his filing with the EEOC.  

    Topics:

    Compliance & Risk Management | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation