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  • Date:

    Kansas v. U.S. Dep’t of Education (D. Kan. July 2, 2024)

    Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs, the states of Kansas, Alaska, Utah, and Wyoming, three organizations with student members in the plaintiff states and beyond, and one female middle school student from Oklahoma, sought to enjoin the Title IX Final Rule, alleging that the Department impermissibly defined “sex discrimination” to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity. The court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their claims that (1) the definition is inconsistent with the meaning of “sex” in the statute; (2) the Department violated the major questions doctrine by attempting to regulate on an issue of vast economic and political significance without clear statutory authority; (3) it violated the Spending Clause because Congress had not put recipients on notice that sex discrimination includes gender identity; (4) the Final Rule is impermissibly vague and overboard because it subjects the plaintiff organizations’ members to potential investigation and discipline for expressing their beliefs about gender identity and transgender issues, thereby likely chilling their speech; and (5) the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious.  The court enjoined the entire rule as to the plaintiff States, the individual plaintiff, and all schools attended by individual members of the plaintiff organizations or their minor children. The plaintiff organizations have until July 15, 2024, to file notice in the record of the schools their members attend.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Texas v. United States (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting-in-part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  Plaintiffs, the state of Texas and two professors, challenged the Department of Education’s new Title IX Final Rule and sought preliminary injunction, alleging that it exceeds the statutory authority of Title IX, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates the First Amendment. In granting the injunction, the court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that (1) the Department’s extension of the definition of sex-based discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity exceeds statutory authority under Title IX and is arbitrary and capricious; (2) the Final Rule’s ambiguity as to whether “misgendering” creates a hostile environment or is sex-based harassment would chill the professors’ protected speech in violation of the First Amendment; (3) the requirement that Texas provide insurance coverage for abortions in violation of its own law is arbitrary and capricious; and (4) several provisions on grievance procedures are arbitrary and capricious in their departure from due process, including permitting a single-investigator model, ambiguity as to whether schools must give parties access to evidence, and making live hearings and questioning optional.  The injunction is limited to the state of Texas and the two individual plaintiffs.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Tennessee v. Dep’t of Education (6th Cir. June 14, 2024)

    Opinion affirming preliminary injunction. In June 2021, the Department of Education issued a Notice of Interpretation, Dear Educator Letter, and Fact Sheet (the “Documents”), citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County and extending the nondiscrimination protections of Title IX to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. Plaintiffs, twenty states with policies treating students differently based on biological sex, sued and sought preliminary injunction, alleging that the Documents are unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Title IX, and the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted the injunction as to the plaintiff States. In affirming, the Sixth Circuit first found that the States were likely to establish standing by showing injury to their (1) proprietary interest as operators of educational institutions that must now address new forms of discrimination or risk loss of federal funds if they continue to enforce current policies; (2) sovereign interest in enforcement of their own laws that will not be preempted; and (3) procedural rights to attempt to influence the Department through notice and comment rulemaking. In holding that the States are likely to succeed on the merits on their claim that the Documents are legislative rules requiring notice and comment rulemaking, the court found that the Documents carry out an express delegation of authority of Congress, impose new duties on the States, and the Fact Sheet indicates a change in the Department’s position about providing different facilities for students based on their biological sex.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Tennessee v. Cardona (E.D. Ky. June 17, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and West Virginia sought to enjoin the new Title IX Final Rule, asserting that because it extends nondiscrimination protections to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity it contravenes Title IX, violates government employees’ First Amendment rights, and is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Christian Educators Association International and a fifteen-year-old girl, A.C., were permitted to join the States as intervenors. In granting the injunction, the court found plaintiffs and intervenors were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, among others, that (1) the Final Rule’s requirements regarding gender identity are inconsistent with the unambiguous meaning of “sex” in Title IX and its expectation that students should receive separate treatment based on biological sex; (2) given “the ‘pervasive’ nature of pronoun usage in everyday life, educators likely would be required to use students’ preferred pronouns regardless of whether doing so conflicts with the educator’s religious or moral beliefs;” and (3) the Department did not “provide a reasoned explanation for departing from its longstanding interpretations regarding the meaning of sex and provided virtually no answers to many of the difficult questions that arose during the public comment phase.” The court found that it lacks jurisdiction to review the proposed Title IX athletics rule because it is not yet final agency action. The injunction is limited to the plaintiff States and intervenors. (N.B.: A.C., a track and field athlete from West Virginia, complains that she was asked to use the same locker room in middle school with B.P.J, the plaintiff in B.P.J. v. Bd. of Educ. (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 2024), and expects to face the same situation next year when B.P.J. starts high school.)   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Texas v. Cardona (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In June 2021, the U.S. Department of Education issued a Notice of Interpretation, Dear Educator Letter, and Fact Sheet (the “Guidance Documents”), citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County and interpreting the nondiscrimination protections of Title IX to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. The State of Texas sued, seeking vacatur of the Guidance Documents and permanent injunction on their enforcement or implementation. In granting summary judgment in favor of the State and awarding the requested relief, the court first held that the Guidance Documents are contrary to law and exceed the Department’s authority, finding that (1) the statutory text uses “sex” to mean biological sex and “identifies many situations in which differential treatment and separation is permissible;” (2) the Guidance Documents conflict with or undermine provisions of Title IX; and (3) the Department exceeded the clear-statement requirement of the Spending Clause to give the States congressional notice of their obligations and attempted to decide a major question properly left to Congress. It rejected the Department’s application of the underlying reasoning of Bostock to Title IX, noting that “Bostock stated without equivocation that it’s holding only applies to Title VII.” It further held that the Guidance Documents “constitute a substantive rule—rather than interpretive statements—subject to the APA’s notice and comment rulemaking process.”   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Louisiana v. U.S. Dep’t of Education (W.D. La. June 13, 2024)

    Memorandum Ruling granting Plaintiffs’ Motions for Preliminary Injunction. The States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, and Idaho, sued the U.S. Department of Education and sought preliminary injunction of the Department’s new Title IX Final Rule, asserting violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First Amendment, and the Spending Clause. In finding the Final Rule is contrary to law, the court first held that Bostock v. Clayton County does not extend beyond Title VII to reach Title IX, noting the split among the courts and lack of binding federal jurisprudence on the question. Then, finding “nothing in the text or history of Title IX indicating that the law was meant to apply to anyone other than biological men and/or women,” it found that the Department exceeded its authority by extending the definition of “sex discrimination” to include discrimination based on gender identity, sex stereotypes, sexual orientation, or sex characteristics. It found that the Final Rule’s “severe or pervasive” standard likely violates the First Amendment because it “allows for one political ideology to dominate the educational landscape.” It then found that the Final Rule attempted to decide a “major question” without congressional authorization and violated the Spending Clause because it contains ambiguous provisions and violates constitutional provisions. Finally, it found the Final Rule arbitrary and capricious for inadequately addressing relevant factors or aspects of the problem such as the effect of the expanded definition of harassment on cisgender students. The injunction is limited to the plaintiff States.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Hecox v. Little (9th Cir. June 7, 2024)

    Amended Opinion partially affirming and partially vacating the preliminary injunction and remanding. In March 2020, Idaho enacted the “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act” banning transgender females from participating on female sports teams from primary school through college and providing for a “sex dispute verification process whereby any individual can ‘dispute’ the sex of any female student athlete … and require her to undergo intrusive medical procedures to verify her sex.” Plaintiff, a transgender woman who wanted to try out for the track and cross-country teams at Boise State University and who feared her sex would be “disputed,” sought declaratory judgment that the Act violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause and injunctive relief barring its enforcement. The district court granted preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Act likely violated the Equal Protection Clause because it “subjects only students who wish to participate in female athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender girls and women from competing on ‘female, women, or girls’ teams” and because the State “failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes.” After the Supreme Court decided Labrador v. Poe (U.S. Apr. 15, 2024), staying except as to plaintiffs an injunction on enforcement of Idaho’s ban on gender-affirming care for minors, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its withdrew its opinion. In this amended opinion, it again affirmed but remanded for “the district court to reconsider the appropriate scope of injunctive relief in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Labrador.” 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination

  • Date:

    Doe v. N.Y. Univ. (S.D. N.Y. May 30, 2024)

    Opinion & Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a rising second-year law student at New York University who describes himself as a heterosexual white male who plans to apply to the NYU Law Review, brought Title VI and Title IX claims against the University challenging the Law Review’s selection process in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Students for Fair Admissions cases. While the Law Review previously designated 12 of its 50 positions to be filled by a process through its Diversity Committee, it does not currently mention the alleged “diversity set-aside” and instead requires each applicant to submit a statement of interest that it describes as “an opportunity for applicants to provide the Selection Committee a more comprehensive view of who [they] are as an individual.” In granting the University’s motion to dismiss, the court found plaintiff’s assertion that the Law Review could glean information by which it might discriminate from the statements of interest was insufficient to show an injury. It also determined plaintiff failed to state a claim, finding his allegation of a discriminatory selection process both conclusory and unsupported by the facially neutral policy, which did not identify a preference for students from a protected class. Finally, the court noted that absent factual allegations as to what role the institution played in the operations of the student-run Law Review, the complaint failed to allege intentional discrimination by the University.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High Sch. (4th Cir. May 8, 2024)

    Opinion reversing summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Appellee, a teacher of English and drama at Charlotte Catholic High School, brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim against the School after it terminated him for his plans to marry his same-sex partner. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee. In reviewing that judgment, the Fourth Circuit first relieved the School of its waiver of the ministerial exception below, noting that the district court had nevertheless ruled upon it, and found it preferrable to begin with that constitutional defense, rather than the School’s statutory defenses. The Fourth Circuit then held that the ministerial exception requires summary judgment in favor of the School, citing that (1) the School’s “educational mission is driven by the Catholic faith” and faith was expected to infuse even classes that are not expressly religious; (2) appellee did on some occasions fill in for teachers of expressly religious classes; and (3) the School was permitted to expect appellee, as a teacher, to model its religious values, even if that expectation might not extend to all employees.

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination

  • Date:

    Kadel v. Well (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2024)

    Opinion affirming judgments of the district courts. Appellees in cases consolidated on appeal, transgender individuals who are beneficiaries of either the North Carolina State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees (NCSHP) or the Medicaid program in West Virginia, brought equal protection and Medicaid Act and ACA claims against their respective States and relevant officials, challenging the exclusion of coverage for medically necessary services for treatment of gender dysphoria. The district courts granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees and enjoined enforcement of the coverage exclusions. In affirming summary judgment in favor of appellees on their equal protection claims, the Fourth Circuit found that the exclusions of treatments for gender dysphoria, though they target only a subset of transgender individuals, discriminate on the basis of a proxy for gender identity and do so facially. Further, because some patients are eliminated from coverage of certain types of treatments (e.g., mastectomies or chest-reconstruction surgeries) based on their sex assigned at birth and gender stereotypes about how men and women should present, the court found this was also sex discrimination. The court then found that this treatment could not survive intermediate scrutiny because the States’ anecdotal evidence challenging only some of appellees’ contentions was insufficient to show that the treatments in this developing area of medicine are ineffective. The court also held that these exclusions violate the Medicaid Act’s availability and comparability provisions and the ACA’s anti-discrimination provision.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employee Benefits | Faculty & Staff | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Health Care & Insurance