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Latest Cases & Developments
Date:
Idaho Federation of Teachers v. Labrador (D. Idaho July 2, 2024)
Memorandum Decision and Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, individual university professors and teachers’ unions with members in the state of Idaho, brought free speech and vagueness challenges to Idaho’s No Public Funds for Abortion Act, which provides that no public funds may be used to “promote abortion” or “counsel in favor of abortion” and imposes criminal penalties for public employees who violate the prohibition. The Attorney General of Idaho, however, issued an opinion letter stating that academic speech does not fall under the Act and would not be prosecuted. In denying preliminary injunction and granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court found that without a risk of prosecution plaintiffs failed to demonstrate injury or redressability to establish standing.
Topics:
Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Constitutional Issues | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free SpeechDate:
Whipper v. Green (D. Conn. July 1, 2024)
Order denying Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff, an inmate and student in the Wesleyan University Center for Prison Education (CPE) Program at Cheshire Correctional Institution, represented by court-appointed pro bono counsel, brought First Amendment retaliation claims against Department of Correction (DOC) officials and conspiracy to commit First Amendment retaliation claims against DOC officials and the University’s administrator for the CPE Program after he was removed from the program for refusing to sign a form related to rules of conduct for inmates. He alleged that the form was a way to implement “punitive practices against inmates in response to restrictions placed on DOC personnel by the passage of the Connecticut Protect Act” and that University volunteers disapproved of the requirement. Plaintiff also alleged that his transfer to a different facility for security concerns was pretextual to avoid a possible injunction. In permitting the First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed against the DOC defendants, the court found that (1) refusal to sign the form may be protected expressive activity and (2) plaintiff had also sufficiently alleged adverse actions and causal connection. In permitting the conspiracy claim to proceed against the University’s program administrator, it held that allegations that the administrator was aware of the plan to pressure inmates to sign the form and subsequently participated in removing plaintiff from the program were sufficient to allege that he had agreed to act in concert with the DOC Defendants, notwithstanding the University’s MOU granting the DOC unilateral authority to remove inmates from the program.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | RetaliationDate:
Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo (U.S. May 30, 2024)
Opinion vacating the judgment of the Second Circuit and remanding. In 2017, New York Department of Financial Services superintendent Maria Vullo began investigating affinity insurance programs offered by the National Rifle Association (NRA), finding that the “Carry Guard” program insured, among other things, intentional criminal acts and that the NRA offered the program without an insurance producer license. In addition to criticism of the NRA in press releases and contemporaneous statements from then-Governor Cuomo, Vullo entered into consent decrees with the companies administering and underwriting the program, issued guidance encouraging insurance and financial companies to reevaluate their business “with the NRA or similar gun promotions organizations,” and told one company in a meeting that it could avoid further enforcement action if it “would scale back its NRA-related business.” The NRA brought First Amendment censorship and retaliation claims against Vullo, alleging that she targeted the NRA for its pro-gun advocacy. The district court denied Vullo’s motion to dismiss, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding neither the guidance nor the meeting with the company were individually unconstitutional. The Supreme Court unanimously vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, finding that the allegations, if true, were sufficient to state a First Amendment claim and that “[t]he Second Circuit could only reach [its] conclusion by taking the allegations in isolation and failing to draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor.”
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | RetaliationDate:
Local 8027, AFT-N.H. v. Edelblut (D. N.H. May 28, 2024)
Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs, the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association, brought First Amendment and unconstitutional vagueness challenges against State officials after New Hampshire amended its education and discrimination laws to provide “that public primary and secondary school students may not be ‘taught, instructed, inculcated or compelled to express belief in, or support for’” four concepts sometimes categorized as “divisive concepts” in public debates surrounding diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. At an earlier stage, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims asserting a constitutional right to control primary and secondary school curricular speech. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding the amendments “fatally vague in three ways: (1) they do not provide fair notice as to the concepts that teachers may not teach, (2) they do not sufficiently explain when classroom discussion of a banned concept qualifies as impermissible teaching, and (3) they do not give teachers enough guidance to know when their extracurricular communications are within the amendments’ reach.” The court further found the vagueness was compounded by allowing teachers to be disciplined absent a finding that they acted with scienter.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free SpeechDate:
Stannard v. State Ctr. Cmty. Coll. Dist. (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2024)
Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, two professors at the State Center Community College District, brought First Amendment claims against the District after officials investigated complaints that they had made insensitive or offensive comments in faculty training sessions. In the first instance, District officials determined that a comment made in a “Justice and Healing Circle” during a race-sensitivity training that “children do better if they are raised with both biological parents” did not violate District policy. The second plaintiff received a written reprimand after he (1) entered “do-re-mi” by his name is a Zoom training after the presenter announced a preference for “they/them” nonbinary pronouns and then (2) when the presenter subsequently emailed saying that the apparent joke was perceived as offensive, used “Do,” “mi,” and “they” as pronouns in his reply accusing them of similarly disregarding his of choice of personal pronouns. In granting the District’s motion to dismiss, the court held that plaintiffs’ allegations of self-censorship were conclusory and insufficient to establish Article III standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Neither plaintiff sufficiently alleged that he had a concrete plan to violate District policy that was chilled. Though the second plaintiff’s reprimand was sufficient to show that the District might engage in future enforcement, his allegations failed to show how he had self-censored or that the District’s alleged unwritten pronoun policy remained in effect.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free SpeechDate:
Reges v. Cauce (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2024)
Order granting-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, an economics professor at the University of Washington, included in his syllabus and emails and posted on his office door a statement touting the “labor theory of property” that he “intended to make fun of land acknowledgements” and that he knew doing so would be upsetting to others. In response to multiple complaints, the University investigated, warned him against including the statement in his syllabus again, and told him he was otherwise free to express his political views. He then brought First Amendment retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, overbreadth, and vagueness claims against multiple University officials. The court dismissed his overbreadth and vagueness challenges, finding that the words “unacceptable” and “inappropriate” in the University’s Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action policy are focused only on conduct that resembles discrimination, harassment, or retaliation and penalizes only a limited range of expressive conduct that is not impossible for members of the University community to predict. On cross motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of the University on plaintiff’s retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims, finding that although his statement was on a matter of public concern relating to his scholarship or teaching, under the Pickering balancing test the University had a legitimate administrative interest in limiting disruptions to staff and students caused by inclusion of the statement in his syllabus.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | RetaliationDate:
ACE Issue Brief on the Respecting the First Amendment on Campus Act (Apr. 18, 2024)
Issue Brief from the American Council on Education (ACE) on the Respecting the First Amendment on Campus Act. The brief identifies key concerns with the “Respecting the First Amendment on Campus Act” (H.R. 7683) introduced on March 5, 2024. Those concerns include increased litigation resulting from the Act’s proposed private right of action and waiver of public institutions’ sovereign immunity rights based on receipt of Title IV funding; the potential loss of Title IV aid resulting from noncompliance with even minor reporting or disclosure requirements; administrative and safety concerns related to the designation of all publicly accessible areas at public institutions as “traditional public forums;” safety concerns related to proposed limits to assess security fees for campus events involving controversial speakers; a prohibition on “all-comers” policies for religious student organizations; constraints on recruitment and academic pursuits entailed in the proposed prohibition on “political litmus tests;” and potential equal protection and Title IX concerns related to the proposed prohibition on actions to “limit or deny” students’ ability to form or participate in single-sex social organizations. ACE also released a Bill Summary detailing the Act’s provisions.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free SpeechDate:
Settlement Agreement between Speech First, Inc. and Okla. State Univ. (Apr. 15, 2024)
Settlement Agreement between Speech First, Inc. and Oklahoma State University. Speech First, a nationwide free speech watchdog group, sued Oklahoma State University alleging that the University’s harassment policy, computer use policy (with respect to transmission of political campaign messages), and the University’s Bias Incident Response Team chilled protected speech. Through the Agreement, the University agreed to maintain changes it had made to its harassment and computer use policies and to disband its Bias Incident Response Team. The Agreement also provides that Speech First will not challenge the University’s definition of sexual harassment in its Title IX policy so long as it mirrors “the governing definition promulgated by the United States Department of Education via notice-and-comment rulemaking under Title IX or the Violence Against Women Act.”
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free SpeechDate:
Wood v. Fla. Dep’t of Educ. (N.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2024)
Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The lead Plaintiff, a public high school teacher who is a transgender woman and prefers (but ceased using) she/her pronouns, sought preliminary injunction, on the basis of Title VII and the First Amendment, against a Florida Department of Education policy providing for every K-12 institution that “a person’s sex is an immutable biological trait and that it is false to ascribe to a person a pronoun that does not correspond to such person’s sex.” The court found plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her Title VII claim, as the requirement that she be referred to as “Teacher,” rather than “Ms.,” was not an adverse employment action, and the record was insufficient to demonstrate the likelihood of success on a hostile work environment theory. Turing to her First Amendment claim, the court enjoined enforcement of the policy against plaintiff, finding that (1) plaintiff’s statement of preference of pronouns was the highly personal, self-referential speech of a citizen that could not be confused with a government-created message (following the U.S. Supreme Court’s “practical inquiry” regarding the religious expression in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District); (2) even though highly personal, the preference of pronouns is a publicly-oriented expression on a matter of “undisputed ‘passionate political and social debate;’” and (3) the State provided no evidence that the use of plaintiff’s pronouns would impede her official duties or adversely impact school operations to justify enforcing the viewpoint discriminatory prohibition in favor of the State’s preferred opinion on pronouns.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation DiscriminationDate:
Zow v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. (E.D. N.C. Mar. 26, 2024)
Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former Chief of Staff to the Chancellor and Assistant Secretary to the Board at North Carolina Central University, brought First Amendment retaliation and other claims against the University after he was terminated in October 2021 for failure to comply with a requirement that unvaccinated employees who travel domestically self-quarantine and test negative for COVID-19 before returning to work. Plaintiff alleged that his termination was in retaliation for his participation on the University’s COVID-19 Operations Continuity Committee where he opposed the mandatory vaccination policy that was eventually adopted. In dismissing his First Amendment retaliation claim, the court found that plaintiff’s opposition to the proposed policy, which included his belief that the policy would violate federal and state laws, was not protected activity because it occurred during the normal course of his ordinary duties; and moreover, plaintiff claimed that in response to his concerns his supervisor paused adoption of the policy to seek further legal review. The court dismissed his ADA retaliation claim as untimely and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.
Topics:
Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | Constitutional Issues | Coronavirus | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation
NACUA Annual Conference
Join us in the Music City June 29 – July 2 to connect, learn, and lead alongside higher education attorneys shaping policy, practice, and impact nationwide together.