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  • Date:

    Fellowship of Christian Univ. Students at the Univ. of Texas at Dallas, et al., v. Eltife, et al., (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2025)

    Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs, several student organizations at the University of Texas Austin and Dallas campuses, sued the university  claiming that its implementation of the Texas “Campus Protection Act” which requires public universities to adopt (1) an overnight expression ban; (2) an end-of-term invited speaker ban; (3) an end-of-term amplified sound ban; and (4) an end-of-term drum ban, violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In granting plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, the court held that plaintiffs had demonstrated they were likely to succeed on their First Amendment claims, finding that the Texas law was “content-based both on its face and by looking to the purpose and justification for the law.” Moreover, the court found the university had failed to demonstrate that its actions were narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest, writing “[t]he First Amendment does not have a bedtime of 10:00 p.m.” The court also found that because the Texas law likely violated the First Amendment, plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if denied a preliminary injunction.  The court enjoined the university from enforcing the speech bans against the plaintiffs, against any expressive activities at the Austin or Dallas campuses, or at any other within the University of Texas System.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech | Student Speech & Campus Unrest | Students

  • Date:

    American Association of University Professors, et al., v. Marco Rubio, et al., (D. Mass. Sep. 30, 2025)

    Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Plaintiffs, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and several individual chapters and organizational plaintiffs, sued the federal government for violations of the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the government’s actions against noncitizen students and faculty who participated in pro-Palestinian protests amounted to an “ideological-deportation policy” in violation of their rights. Following a two-week trial, the court issued a 161-page ruling, holding that that the administration’s actions were an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment and also arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. On plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the court found that the government had “engaged in a mode of enforcement leading to detaining, deporting, and revoking noncitizens’ visas solely on the basis of political speech, and with the intent of chilling such speech and that of others similarly situated.” The court held that these actions were unconstitutional and noted “the effect of these targeted deportation[s] [] continues [] to chill freedom of speech to this day.” In considering relief for the plaintiffs, the court concluded that “it will not do simply to order the Public Officials to cease and desist in the future,” but also outlined a number of “concerns” and “constraints” that will govern the upcoming remedy hearing. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Religious Discrimination & Accommodation

  • Date:

    Presidential Memorandum Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence (Sep. 25, 2025)

    The White House issued a Presidential Memorandum, “Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence,” directing the creation of a “national strategy to investigate and disrupt networks, entities and organizations that
    foment political violence.” The Memorandum orders multiple federal agencies and their components to take specified actions, including:

    • requiring the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to investigate federal crimes relating to acts of recruiting or radicalizing persons for the purpose of political violence, terrorism, or conspiracy against rights, as well as “institutional
      and individual funders, and officers and employees of organizations, that are responsible for, sponsor, or otherwise aid and abet” the principal actors engaging in these acts;
    • directing the Attorney General to issue specific guidance ensuring that domestic terrorism priorities include “politically motivated terrorist acts such as organized doxing campaigns, swatting, rioting, looting, trespass, assault, destruction
      of property, threats of violence, and civil disorder”; and
    • instructing the Commissioner of the IRS “to take action to ensure that no tax-exempt entities are directly or indirectly financing political violence or domestic terrorism.

    The White House also released a Fact Sheet, providing additional information on the Memorandum.  

     

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech

  • Date:

    Hook v. Rav, et al., (D.S.D. Sep. 24, 2025)

    Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiff, a tenured professor at the University of South Dakota, brought a First Amendment retaliation claim against the President of the Board of Regents and other individual defendants after he received notice of an intent to terminate his contract following his online comments about the death of Charlie Kirk. The court found that because plaintiff was at home, off work, and on his private Facebook page, he “spoke as a citizen and his speech was on a matter of public concern.” Additionally, the court found that “defendants [] failed to put on evidence that [plaintiff’s] speech had an adverse impact on the efficiency of the [university’s] operations.” In granting a temporary restraining order, the court held that plaintiff had a fair chance of prevailing on his claim, because “the change in his employment status would ‘chill a person of ordinary fitness’ from continuing to engage in First Amendment activity.” The court ordered the university to reinstate plaintiff’s position retroactive to the date he received the notice and required plaintiff’s position to remain in effect until the preliminary injunction hearing. 

    Topics:

    Academic Freedom & Employee Speech | Constitutional Issues | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Social Media

  • Date:

    Campos v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents (D. Ariz. Sep. 22, 2025)

    Opinion and Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. Plaintiffs, a group of former students at Arizona State University, brought (1) a federal First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the university’s president, and (2) a state law free speech claim under A.R.S. § 151864 against both the university and its president, after plaintiffs’ arrest and suspension for participation in a pro-Palestinian campus protest. Following the court’s denial of the university’s motion to dismiss the state law claim on sovereign immunity grounds, the university appealed to the Ninth Circuit and requested a blanket stay of the matter pending the outcome. Analyzing the “competing interests” of the parties under Landis, the court granted defendant’s request for a stay of the state law claim, holding the university had demonstrated a clear case of hardship or inequity and further noting that “[i]f [the university] was subject to discovery on claims it should be immune from, it would be denied the benefit of its immunity.” However, the court denied the stay with respect to plaintiffs’ federal claim, reasoning, in part, that it would be unaffected by the outcome of the appeal. In allowing discovery and pretrial motions to proceed on plaintiffs’ federal claim, the court noted several factors that weighed in plaintiffs’ favor, including (1) the potential that plaintiffs’ claims could require significant discovery, which had yet to begin; (2) the risk that evidence may become more elusive with time; and (3) plaintiffs’ allegations that “they have been deprived of their First Amendment freedoms and continue to experience harm to their academic standing and future career prospects because of the ongoing suspension.”   

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech | Student Organizations | Student Speech & Campus Unrest | Students

  • Date:

    Spectrum WT v. Wendler (N.D. Tex. Sep. 23, 2025)

    Opinion Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, an LGBT+ student organization and two former student group leaders at West Texas A&M University, were granted a preliminary injunction after the university president canceled a drag show that plaintiffs organized and which they maintained was a violation of their First Amendment rights. On defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court granted defendants’ motion with respect to the two individual plaintiffs, finding they no longer had Article III standing for any alleged injury, since one had left the university and the other had graduated. However, the court rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss the organizational plaintiff, holding (1) an unincorporated association holds the capacity to sue or be sued in Texas; and (2) the student organization has standing because it was able to demonstrate “ongoing harm” based on the substantial likelihood of the university president canceling future drag shows that plaintiffs wished to organize. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Student Organizations | Students

  • Date:

    Patterson v. Kent State Univ. (6th Cir. Sep. 12, 2025)

    Opinion Affirming Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a transgender professor at Kent State, sued the university alleging Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation, First Amendment retaliation, and disability discrimination under the Rehab Act following the university’s response to plaintiff’s “weeks-long, profanity-laden Twitter tirade insulting colleagues and the university.” The Sixth Circuit concluded that, while the district court erred in finding the university had not taken any adverse employment action, plaintiff’s Title VII claims failed nonetheless because plaintiff failed to show that the university’s justification for taking the action was pretextual. The Sixth Circuit also rejected plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, holding that “speech about internal personal disputes or management” which included “run-of-the mill ‘employee beef’” does not constitute speech on a matter of public concern. Moreover, the court reasoned, even if the tweets had involved a matter of public concern, they still wouldn’t receive protection because the university’s interest in effective administration of its services “[outweigh[ed] [plaintiff’s] interest in this kind of trash talk.” 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Jorjani v. New Jersey Institute of Technology (3rd Cir. Sep. 8, 2025)

    Opinion Vacating and Remanding. Plaintiff, a philosophy lecturer at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, brought claims of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment against the university after it declined to renew his contract based on the disruption caused by inflammatory statements made by plaintiff in his private capacity that were included in a New York Times article. The District Court granted summary judgement for the university holding that plaintiff’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment because the university’s interest in “mitigating the disruption caused by [p]laintiff’s speech . . . outweighs [p]laintiff’s interest in its expression.” On appeal, the Third Circuit disagreed, finding the “minimal evidence of disruption” cited by the university “differ[ed] little from the ordinary operation of a public university” and therefore could not outweigh interest in plaintiff’s speech. The court found the university provided insufficient evidence that student disapproval of plaintiff’s speech resulted in a disruption, noting the university “never identified the exact number of calls or complaints . . . nor any details about the students’ concerns” nor “any evidence of specific student protests, upheaval, or unwillingness to abide by university policies.” The court also rejected the university’s claim that letters in the school paper from faculty members denouncing plaintiff were evidence of a disruption, instead finding they reflected “precisely the sort of reasoned debate that distinguishes speech from distraction.” As to the university’s claimed interest in “providing a non-denigrating environment” and concern that plaintiff’s views could “undermine the pedagogical relationship between teacher and student,” the court found that the university failed to point to anything in the record supporting its determination. In conclusion, the court held that “[on] balance, the disruption the university described does not outweigh even minimal interest in [plaintiff’s] speech” and therefore, the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment.

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation

  • Date:

    President and Fellows of Harvard College v. United States Department of Health and Human Services (D. Mass. Sep. 3, 2025)

    Memorandum and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs, the President and Fellows of Harvard College, filed suit against defendants, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other federal agencies, challenging the defendants’ termination of $2.2 billion in multiyear grants and contracts after plaintiffs refused to comply with the demands outlined in defendants’ April 3 and 11, 2025 letters. Plaintiffs argued that defendants’ termination of grants was unlawful because (1) it was in violation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights; (2) defendants’ terminations failed to comply with Title VI procedural requirements; and (3) defendants’ actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  Defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claims, which they contended were the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. Defendants also argued that they were permitted under 2 C.F.R. section 200.340(a)(4) to terminate awards that “no longer effectuate [] the program goals or agency priorities.” The court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their First Amendment and Title VI claims and on part of their APA claims. The court found that the defendants had violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by “impermissibly retaliat[ing] against Harvard for refusing to capitulate to the government’s demands.” The court further found that defendants had violated Title VI by failing to follow the statutory procedures for terminating funding. The court reasoned that defendants’ Freeze Orders were arbitrary and capricious because they failed to provide an explanation for how the freeze would help combat antisemitism and concluded that “in reality, [there is] little connection between the research affected by the grant terminations and antisemitism” and called defendants’ use of antisemitism a “smokescreen” for “a targeted ideologically-motivated assault on this country’s premier universities.” Finally, the court granted plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction, preventing defendants from reimposing conditions that have been deemed unconstitutional, and further enjoined defendants from issuing any other terminations, freezing of funds, or refusal to award future grants, contracts, or other federal funding “on the purported grounds of discrimination without compliance with the requirements of Title VI.” 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Contracts | First Amendment & Free Speech | Grants, Contracts, & Sponsored Research

  • Date:

    Spectrum WT v. Wendler (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2025)

    Opinion Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding. Plaintiffs, an LGBT+ student organization and individual members at West Texas A&M University organized a drag show to be hosted on campus, but the show was canceled by the University President. The University President “believed that drag shows discriminated against women” and sent a campus wide email announcing the cancellation and made several remarks criticizing the event.  Plaintiffs subsequently sought a preliminary injunction so they could proceed with the show, alleging that their free speech rights were violated. The district court denied the injunction, determining that the venue where the show was set to take place was a limited public forum and found that “it was not clearly established that all drag shows are inherently expressive and therefore implicate the First Amendment, and President Wendler’s cancellation of the drag show was not objectively unreasonable given the show’s ‘potential lewdness.’” The district court further determined that “conduct that does not communicate a specific message must amount to a ‘work [] of fine art’ to gain First Amendment protection.” On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s “fine art” standard, and found that the drag show was communicating a specific message of support for the LGBT+ community. The court further held that “theatrical performances plainly involve expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment, and because we find the plaintiffs’ drag show is protected expression, discrimination among such shows must pass strict scrutiny.” The court determined the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction and remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Student Organizations | Students