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Date:
8/14/2025
American Federation of Teachers v. Department of Education (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2025)
Memorandum Opinion Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), AFT Maryland Chapter, the American Sociological Association (ASA), and the Eugene, Oregon School District 4J brought suit against the federal government in February 2025 alleging that the Department of Education’s (the Department) February 14 Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) principles and the associated certification requirement are procedurally and substantively improper under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), First Amendment, and Fifth Amendment. Upon seeking leave to amend their complaint, plaintiffs now allege that the DCL and the certification requirement encompass limitations that are “unclear and highly suggestive”, forcing plaintiffs to “choose between chilling their constitutionally protected speech and association or risk losing federal funds and being subject to prosecution.” The court found that the government did not follow notice and comment procedures in issuing the DCL and did not comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act. The court reasoned that because both the DCL and the certification requirement “fail[ed] to account for facts, law, baseline conditions, or reliance interests” they acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the APA. The Department maintains that the DCL was a reminder for schools that discrimination is illegal, however, the court disagreed, finding instead that the guidance “initiated a sea change in how the Department of Education regulates educational practices and classroom conduct, causing millions of educators to reasonably fear that their lawful, and even beneficial, speech might cause them or their schools to be punished.” Regarding the certification requirement, the court agreed with plaintiffs that it violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process protections against unreasonably vague laws because the requirement “attach[ed] serious consequences to compliance with standardless terms.” Finally, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion in part related to their claim that the certification requirement is facially overbroad, finding that it does not unambiguously punish protected speech, because it has limiting factors, though the court noted that the factors were not clear. As such, the court held that the DCL and the certification requirement are both unlawful and vacated, pursuant to the APA.
Topics:
Admissions | Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Diversity in Employment | Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Financial Aid, Scholarships, & Student Loans | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Students
Date:
8/13/2025
Simon v. Ivey (N.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2025)
Memorandum Opinion Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs, several professors at the University of Alabama, students from the University of Alabama at Birmingham, and the Alabama State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. filed a motion to enjoin defendants, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama and the Governor of Alabama from enforcing Alabama Senate Bill 129 (hereinafter referred to as SB 129). Plaintiffs alleged that SB 129 is unconstitutional under the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. SB 129 “prohibits public schools from finding or sponsoring ‘any diversity, equity, and inclusion programs . . . [and] prohibits teachers from requiring students in public schools, including colleges and universities, to assent to eight “divisive concepts.”’ In denying plaintiffs’ motion, the court found that plaintiffs’ free speech claims failed and reasoned that “our Circuit’s precedent [strongly suggests] that the Professors’ in-classroom instruction constitutes government speech” and that “that balancing weighs in favor of the interests of [defendant] the Board. The Board clearly has an interest in regulating the type of classroom indoctrination forbidden by SB 129.” While plaintiffs alleged that SB 129 chilled their speech as they made changes to their course curriculum, the court noted that plaintiffs’ changes in course materials were made “due to [] fear, rather than any discipline, direction from a University administrator, or requirement of the Board.” While plaintiffs alleged SB 129 is vague and challenged the bill based on a lack of explicit standards and minimum guidelines, the court was not convinced, reasoning that SB 129 “includes objective terms about what is prohibited (such as requiring student assent to a divisive concept), and noting that there is a scienter requirement (which is frequently upheld in civil and criminal laws) and a safe harbor that permits teaching about these concepts in an objective manner and in a historically accurate context.”
Topics:
Academic Performance and Misconduct | Constitutional Issues | Due Process | First Amendment & Free Speech | Students
Date:
7/22/2025
Mississippi Association of Educators v. Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning (S.D. Miss. Jul. 22, 2025)
Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiffs, a group of educators, students, parents, the Mississippi Association of Educators, and other civil rights organizations, challenged the constitutionality of Mississippi HB 1993, a state law prohibiting public schools and universities from teaching, promoting, or requiring participation in diversity, equity, and inclusion programs. Plaintiffs alleged that the law violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments by imposing both content and viewpoint-based restrictions on protected speech, infringed students’ right to receive information, and was unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs sought both a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to enjoin HB 1193 from being enforced. The law at issue, HB 1193, bans educational engagement with “divisive concepts” and prohibits mandatory DEI-related training or programming. Plaintiffs alleged that the law’s vague and broad language fosters an environment where administrators censor their speech out of fear of punishment or canceled programming and claimed that the sweeping language makes it impossible for institutions to ascertain what conduct is permissible. The court granted the temporary restraining order, finding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits. The court further concluded that HB 1193 violated the Due Process Clause by failing to clearly define what concepts are prohibited and also failed strict scrutiny by restricting protected speech without a compelling or narrowly tailored justification. The court’s reasoning turned on the law’s vagueness, the demonstrated chilling effect on constitutionally protected expression, and the risk of arbitrary enforcement. The TRO will remain in effect through August 17, 2025, pending a ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Due Process | First Amendment & Free Speech
Date:
4/11/2025
American Association of University Professors v. United States Department of Justice (D. Mass. Apr. 11, 2025)
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. Plaintiffs, the Harvard Faculty Chapter of the American Association of University Professors, as well as the American Association of University Professors allege that defendants, the United States Department of Justice, Pamela Bondi, Leo Terrell, U.S. Department of Education, Linda McMahon, Craig Trainor, Thomas Wheeler, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Sean R. Keveney, National Institutes of Health, Jayanta Bhattacharya, U.S. General Services Administration, Stephen Ehikian, and Josh Gruenbaum have acted unlawfully and misused federal funding and civil rights enforcement authority to undermine academic freedom and free speech on a university campus. Plaintiffs sued after defendants announced an investigation of Harvard University for alleged failures to address Antisemitism and demanded that the University adopt a list of programmatic and structural changes to university management, operations, and curriculum. Plaintiffs allege that defendants described these changes as “non-exhaustive” preconditions for Harvard “to remain a responsible recipient of federal taxpayer dollars” valued at approximately $9 billion. Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by acting contrary to law and being arbitrary and capricious, violating the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, violating Separation of Powers and the Spending Clause, and violating the First Amendment Freedom of Speech protection. Plaintiffs ask the court to (1) declare unlawful and set aside the pending investigation and review of the University’s federal funds; (2) preliminarily and permanently enjoin any further investigation or review of the University’s federal funding, using the withdrawal of federal funds or the threat of withdrawal of federal funds to coerce the University to suppress viewpoints or speech of plaintiffs and their members; and (3) preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants from using the power of the government to target and punish the University for the viewpoints and speech of plaintiffs and their members.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination
Date:
4/1/2025
Williams v. Pa. State Univ. (3rd Cir. Apr. 1, 2025) (unpub.)
Order and Opinion affirming Grant of Summary Judgment for Defendants. Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brought claims against Pennsylvania State University (Penn State) alleging Title VI retaliation and discrimination based on issues with her professors, due process violations regarding her suspension hearing, and First Amendment retaliation based on her suspension and denial of her Title IX claim. Plaintiffs’ claims stem from three separate incidents: (1) a Title IX investigation where the alleged perpetrator was found not responsible; (2) plaintiff’s allegation that her professor retaliated against her by giving her a failing grade after she filed a complaint of racism against him; and (3) her suspension from Penn State following allegations of harassment against her former roommate and a Lyft driver. Turning first to plaintiff’s claims of Title VI discrimination and retaliation, the Court found that plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation as no casual connection was shown between her complaint and the failing grade she received. The Court also found that plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated as she was given sufficient written notice of the charges and proposed sanctions against her prior to the hearing, had an advisor present at the hearing, and declined breaks to speak with her advisor present at the hearing, or privately. Although neither witness was present at the hearing, plaintiff was able to testify about her experience and provide her own evidence. Finally, the Court found plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim must also fail because she could not establish a causal link between her posts on Twitter about the Title IX investigation and the outcome of her Title IX claim.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Social Media | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct
Date:
7/19/2024
Doe v. Univ. of N. Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. (5th Cir. July 16, 2024)
Opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff, a former medical student at the Texas College of Osteopathic Medicine at the University of North Texas Health Science Center who was permitted to take a medical leave of absence, brought due process and equal protection claims against multiple officials in their individual capacities after he was dismissed from the program for failure to meet the conditions of his return. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University. In affirming on his due process claim, the Fifth Circuit held that three separate emails were constitutionally sufficient notice of his academic dismissal, notwithstanding plaintiff’s assertion that the University should have known that he was not checking his email. In affirming summary judgment on his equal protection claim, it held that because he failed to identify a similarly situated student who was treated differently, he was unable to show that the officials discriminated against him based on a perception of a mental disability.
Topics:
Academic Performance and Misconduct | Constitutional Issues | Due Process | Students
Date:
5/10/2024
Dudley v. Boise State Univ. (D. Idaho May 3, 2024)
Memorandum Decision and Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a graduate of Boise State University, brought due process claims against the University after her degree was revoked for misconduct during a required internship. After she graduated with a B.A. in Social Work, passed a licensing exam, and became a licensed social worker, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare informed the University that plaintiff had accessed without authorization confidential records pertaining to child protection cases involving individuals she knew personally. As a result, the University changed her internship grade from Pass to Fail, updated her transcripts, cancelled her degree, and sent a revised transcript to the state Board of Social Work Examiners. After the court declined to extend a temporary restraining order, the University proceeded to a Student Conduct Hearing that found plaintiff responsible for the misconduct and sanctioned her with degree revocation and expulsion. In granting the University’s motion to dismiss, the court held that plaintiff failed to allege a property interest in her University education because she cited no state law conferring such a right. It further held that even assuming both a property interest and that the actions were disciplinary in nature, the University’s conduct hearing and subsequent appeal process afforded her sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard.
Topics:
Academic Performance and Misconduct | Constitutional Issues | Due Process | Internships, Externships, & Clinical Work | Students
Date:
4/12/2024
Royan v. Chi. State Univ. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2024)
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting summary judgment in favor it the University. Plaintiff, a former Doctor of Pharmacy Student at Chicago State University who had been diagnosed with clinical depression and an eating disorder, brought discrimination and due process claims against the University after she abandoned her first attempt at her clinical rotation following a dispute with her supervisors over her progress and subsequently failed a remedial rotation. Plaintiff further alleged that the then acting dean violated her due process rights by moving slowly in adjudicating her appeal. The acting dean, whose responsibilities concluded at the end of the month in which plaintiff submitted her appeal letter through counsel, forwarded the letter to university counsel, and the new dean denied the appeal, finding the program had followed its policies. In granting summary judgment to the University on her disability discrimination claim, the court found that she failed to establish that she was a qualified individual due to her failed rotations and that she would otherwise be unable to demonstrate pretext. In granting summary judgment in favor of the former dean on plaintiff’s due process claim, the court found that the former dean was not obligated to resolve her appeal before he left the role and was not responsible for the adjudication thereafter.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Internships, Externships, & Clinical Work | Students
Date:
4/5/2024
Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. (W.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2024)
Memorandum Opinion granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former graduate student in physics at Virginia Tech who is Iranian, brought Title IX, due process, and retaliation claims against the University after he was expelled for sexual misconduct. Plaintiff also alleged that (1) his graduate advisor received a large grant based on research plaintiff had performed in the lab and that his advisor used the funds instead to support a female student with whom he had an inappropriate relationship, and (2) after he reported the behavior, his advisor withheld certification of his master’s degree and made conditions in the lab harsh in an effort to get him to resign from the program. In permitting his due process claim to proceed, the court found that by citing specific provisions of the University’s Code of Conduct and departures from those procedures plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a deprivation of a property interest without due process. Turning to his allegations regarding the conduct of his graduate advisor, the court found plaintiff’s assertions of rude behavior in the lab insufficient to allege a hostile educational environment, but it found assertions regarding the allocation of the grant funds sufficient to him to proceed on his Title IX discrimination and retaliation claims.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Retaliation | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct
Date:
3/15/2024
Ware v. The Univ. of Vt. & State Agric. Coll. (D. Vt. Mar. 7, 2024)
Opinion and Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, four current and former students at the University of Vermont brought Title IX, due process, contract, and negligence claims against the University and multiple officials, alleging both pre-assault and post-assault deliberate indifference. The court permitted plaintiffs to proceed in their campus-wide pre-assault deliberate indifference claim, finding they had sufficiently alleged that the University improperly relied on informal procedures, was insufficiently transparent, and regularly saw delays in case resolution. Though it dismissed their pre-assault claims related to specific team and club sports, Greek life in general, and repeat offenders, it found allegations that the University did not adequately supervise or deter students from attending parties hosted by derecognized fraternities sufficient for plaintiffs to proceed on deliberate indifference, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Turning to their post-assault claims, the court found various allegations of inadequate responses to reports of sexual assault, including assertions that (1) a mandatory reporter did not report an alleged assault to the Title IX office and (2) officials coordinated to encourage a complainant to choose an informal resolution process, were sufficient for plaintiffs to proceed on their post-assault deliberate indifference, due process, and contract claims. The court also found that assertions of pressure to forego a formal investigation, criticism in the athletics community, and withheld references and professional support were sufficient to allege Title IX retaliation.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Contracts | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Retaliation | Student Organizations | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

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