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  • Date:

    Louisiana v. U.S. Dep’t of Education (W.D. La. June 13, 2024)

    Memorandum Ruling granting Plaintiffs’ Motions for Preliminary Injunction. The States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, and Idaho, sued the U.S. Department of Education and sought preliminary injunction of the Department’s new Title IX Final Rule, asserting violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First Amendment, and the Spending Clause. In finding the Final Rule is contrary to law, the court first held that Bostock v. Clayton County does not extend beyond Title VII to reach Title IX, noting the split among the courts and lack of binding federal jurisprudence on the question. Then, finding “nothing in the text or history of Title IX indicating that the law was meant to apply to anyone other than biological men and/or women,” it found that the Department exceeded its authority by extending the definition of “sex discrimination” to include discrimination based on gender identity, sex stereotypes, sexual orientation, or sex characteristics. It found that the Final Rule’s “severe or pervasive” standard likely violates the First Amendment because it “allows for one political ideology to dominate the educational landscape.” It then found that the Final Rule attempted to decide a “major question” without congressional authorization and violated the Spending Clause because it contains ambiguous provisions and violates constitutional provisions. Finally, it found the Final Rule arbitrary and capricious for inadequately addressing relevant factors or aspects of the problem such as the effect of the expanded definition of harassment on cisgender students. The injunction is limited to the plaintiff States.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Texas v. Cardona (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In June 2021, the U.S. Department of Education issued a Notice of Interpretation, Dear Educator Letter, and Fact Sheet (the “Guidance Documents”), citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County and interpreting the nondiscrimination protections of Title IX to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. The State of Texas sued, seeking vacatur of the Guidance Documents and permanent injunction on their enforcement or implementation. In granting summary judgment in favor of the State and awarding the requested relief, the court first held that the Guidance Documents are contrary to law and exceed the Department’s authority, finding that (1) the statutory text uses “sex” to mean biological sex and “identifies many situations in which differential treatment and separation is permissible;” (2) the Guidance Documents conflict with or undermine provisions of Title IX; and (3) the Department exceeded the clear-statement requirement of the Spending Clause to give the States congressional notice of their obligations and attempted to decide a major question properly left to Congress. It rejected the Department’s application of the underlying reasoning of Bostock to Title IX, noting that “Bostock stated without equivocation that it’s holding only applies to Title VII.” It further held that the Guidance Documents “constitute a substantive rule—rather than interpretive statements—subject to the APA’s notice and comment rulemaking process.”   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Hecox v. Little (9th Cir. June 7, 2024)

    Amended Opinion partially affirming and partially vacating the preliminary injunction and remanding. In March 2020, Idaho enacted the “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act” banning transgender females from participating on female sports teams from primary school through college and providing for a “sex dispute verification process whereby any individual can ‘dispute’ the sex of any female student athlete … and require her to undergo intrusive medical procedures to verify her sex.” Plaintiff, a transgender woman who wanted to try out for the track and cross-country teams at Boise State University and who feared her sex would be “disputed,” sought declaratory judgment that the Act violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause and injunctive relief barring its enforcement. The district court granted preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Act likely violated the Equal Protection Clause because it “subjects only students who wish to participate in female athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender girls and women from competing on ‘female, women, or girls’ teams” and because the State “failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes.” After the Supreme Court decided Labrador v. Poe (U.S. Apr. 15, 2024), staying except as to plaintiffs an injunction on enforcement of Idaho’s ban on gender-affirming care for minors, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its withdrew its opinion. In this amended opinion, it again affirmed but remanded for “the district court to reconsider the appropriate scope of injunctive relief in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Labrador.” 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination

  • Date:

    Wynn v. Univ. of Toledo (N.D. Ohio June 7, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former Director of Labor/Employee Relations and HR Compliance at the University of Toledo who is African American, brought discrimination and retaliation claims against the University after he was denied promotion, terminated for performance issues, and arrested when he ignored multiple demands that he return his University-owned laptop. In granting summary judgment in favor of the University on his failure to promote claim, it held that plaintiff’s assertion that he had more “progressive experience” was insufficient to overcome the University’s stated preference for a candidate with a law degree and broader experience at a higher level of responsibility. Regarding his claims related to his termination, the court held that conclusory allegations of a “purge” and factual allegations of protected activity raised only in opposition to the Motion were insufficient to overcome his undisputed performance deficiencies. Turning to his retaliatory arrest claim, the court found that (1) he failed to show that the University ever requested that his proposed comparator, who was terminated but kept her work laptop, actually return the device and (2) his assertion that the University ensured a felony warrant by choosing not to depreciate the value of his older laptop was insufficient to overcome the fact that “the investigation and subsequent arrest were conducted by the [University’s] Police Department and based on documented policy and investigative procedures.”   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Am. All. for Equal Rights v. Fearless Fund Mgmt. (11th Cir. Jun 3, 2024)

    Opinion reversing denial of preliminary injunction and remanding.  Plaintiff, the American Alliance for Equal Rights, a membership organization dedicated to “ending racial classifications and racial preferences in America,” sued Fearless Fund, its Foundation, and related entities, alleging that the Foundation’s “Fearless Strivers Grant Contest” violates the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibition on racial discrimination by private parties in contracts.  The contest awards monetary grants and other assistance to four winners, who must be black females or businesses that are at least 51% black woman owned, and contestants must agree to the contest’s rules to enter.  The district court found the Alliance had standing based on declarations from three anonymous members who alleged they were excluded from the contest.  Though it agreed that §1981 applied to the contest, it denied a preliminary injunction, finding that (1) the Alliance was not likely to succeed on the merits because the First Amendment may bar the §1981 claim and (2) the Alliance had not demonstrated an irreparable injury.  A divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed the denial of preliminary injunction.  Invoking 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (U.S. 2023), it held the Alliance was likely to succeed in showing that the Contest crossed the line from an expressive commitment to the Black women-owned business community into discriminatory acts.  It further held that “each lost opportunity to enter Fearless’s contest works an irreparable injury’ with respect to the cash prize, mentorship, and other ensuing business opportunities.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination

  • Date:

    Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo (U.S. May 30, 2024)

    Opinion vacating the judgment of the Second Circuit and remanding. In 2017, New York Department of Financial Services superintendent Maria Vullo began investigating affinity insurance programs offered by the National Rifle Association (NRA), finding that the “Carry Guard” program insured, among other things, intentional criminal acts and that the NRA offered the program without an insurance producer license. In addition to criticism of the NRA in press releases and contemporaneous statements from then-Governor Cuomo, Vullo entered into consent decrees with the companies administering and underwriting the program, issued guidance encouraging insurance and financial companies to reevaluate their business “with the NRA or similar gun promotions organizations,” and told one company in a meeting that it could avoid further enforcement action if it “would scale back its NRA-related business.” The NRA brought First Amendment censorship and retaliation claims against Vullo, alleging that she targeted the NRA for its pro-gun advocacy. The district court denied Vullo’s motion to dismiss, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding neither the guidance nor the meeting with the company were individually unconstitutional. The Supreme Court unanimously vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, finding that the allegations, if true, were sufficient to state a First Amendment claim and that “[t]he Second Circuit could only reach [its] conclusion by taking the allegations in isolation and failing to draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor.”  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Doe v. N.Y. Univ. (S.D. N.Y. May 30, 2024)

    Opinion & Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a rising second-year law student at New York University who describes himself as a heterosexual white male who plans to apply to the NYU Law Review, brought Title VI and Title IX claims against the University challenging the Law Review’s selection process in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Students for Fair Admissions cases. While the Law Review previously designated 12 of its 50 positions to be filled by a process through its Diversity Committee, it does not currently mention the alleged “diversity set-aside” and instead requires each applicant to submit a statement of interest that it describes as “an opportunity for applicants to provide the Selection Committee a more comprehensive view of who [they] are as an individual.” In granting the University’s motion to dismiss, the court found plaintiff’s assertion that the Law Review could glean information by which it might discriminate from the statements of interest was insufficient to show an injury. It also determined plaintiff failed to state a claim, finding his allegation of a discriminatory selection process both conclusory and unsupported by the facially neutral policy, which did not identify a preference for students from a protected class. Finally, the court noted that absent factual allegations as to what role the institution played in the operations of the student-run Law Review, the complaint failed to allege intentional discrimination by the University.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Ostrowski v. Ind. Univ. (Ind. App. May 28, 2024)

    Memorandum Decision affirming denial of worker’s compensation benefits. Appellant, a former employee of the Kinsey Institute at Indiana University who experienced atrial fibrillation and hip arthritis, filed a work injury claim and a federal Rehabilitation Act claim against the University after she found it too difficult to walk from the closest parking area to the campus building housing the Institute. After the parties settled the federal case, the Worker’s Compensation Board of Indiana affirmed the University’s denial of her work injury claim, finding that her symptoms did not constitute a compensable injury because they were “temporary and could have occurred anywhere.” In affirming the denial, the Court of Appeals of Indiana held that neither the Board’s factual conclusion that the walk on the hilly campus was routine and everyday, nor its legal conclusion that her symptoms were temporary and did not worsen her pre-existing medical conditions were clearly erroneous.  

    Topics:

    Accessible Facilities | Compliance & Risk Management | Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Indemnity & Insurance

  • Date:

    Denham v. Ala. State Univ. (11th Cir. May 16, 2024) (unpub.)

    Opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the University. Plaintiff, who is a white female and a former professor of Occupational Therapy at Alabama State University, brought discrimination claims against the University after she was not hired for an Associate Dean position. The position required qualifications appropriate for the rank of associate professor, and though the successful candidate had only one year of teaching experience, the provost deemed him qualified by virtue of his clinical experience. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the University, the Eleventh Circuit found plaintiff’s assertion that she was more qualified for the position by virtue of her teaching experience insufficient to raise a question of pretext regarding the University’s explanation that it valued the successful candidate’s clinical experience and strong performance in his interview. 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Sex Discrimination | Sex Discrimination in Employment

  • Date:

    Stannard v. State Ctr. Cmty. Coll. Dist. (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2024)

    Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, two professors at the State Center Community College District, brought First Amendment claims against the District after officials investigated complaints that they had made insensitive or offensive comments in faculty training sessions. In the first instance, District officials determined that a comment made in a “Justice and Healing Circle” during a race-sensitivity training that “children do better if they are raised with both biological parents” did not violate District policy. The second plaintiff received a written reprimand after he (1) entered “do-re-mi” by his name is a Zoom training after the presenter announced a preference for “they/them” nonbinary pronouns and then (2) when the presenter subsequently emailed saying that the apparent joke was perceived as offensive, used “Do,” “mi,” and “they” as pronouns in his reply accusing them of similarly disregarding his of choice of personal pronouns. In granting the District’s motion to dismiss, the court held that plaintiffs’ allegations of self-censorship were conclusory and insufficient to establish Article III standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Neither plaintiff sufficiently alleged that he had a concrete plan to violate District policy that was chilled. Though the second plaintiff’s reprimand was sufficient to show that the District might engage in future enforcement, his allegations failed to show how he had self-censored or that the District’s alleged unwritten pronoun policy remained in effect.  

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech