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  • Date:

    Agreement with University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign re: Title VI Compliance (Sep. 3, 2024)

    Resolution Agreement between the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights  
    (OCR) and the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign resolving a complaint that it responded inadequately to alleged discrimination based on shared Jewish ancestry. The associated Resolution Letter noted that although 139 incidents of alleged Antisemitic or Islamophobic discrimination were processed by the University between March 2015 and December 2023, the “the [] files associated with the [] incidents contained no information demonstrating that the University considered whether a hostile environment potentially existed.” Through the Agreement, the University agreed to review and revise its policies and procedures; provide improved training to University law enforcement personnel and provide training to all faculty, staff, and students; conduct a review of the University’s response to complaints and reports of any Antisemitic and other shared ancestry discrimination during the 2023-2024 academic year; administer a climate survey and create an action plan in response to any concerns raised in the survey; and provide OCR with documentation of the University’s response to any report of discrimination and/or harassment on the basis of shared ancestry during the 2024-2025 academic year.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Religious Discrimination & Accommodation

  • Date:

    Huang v. The Ohio State Univ. (6th Cir. Aug 28, 2024)

    Opinion vacating the trial verdict and remanding. Plaintiff, a former Ph.D. engineering student at the Ohio State University brought claims of Title VII quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation, and a claim for unwanted sexual touching in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to bodily integrity against the University and her former advisor. Plaintiff alleged the former advisor sexually harassed and assaulted her throughout her Ph.D. candidacy and retaliated against her by failing her candidacy exam. The Sixth Circuit found that the district court “mishandled” plaintiff’s claims against both the University and her former advisor and abused its discretion. Initially, the Circuit held that (1) plaintiff’s status as a student and as an employee are not mutually exclusive, (2) application of the 13-factor common law agency test showed a dispute of material fact as to if plaintiff was an “employee” of the University for Title VII purposes, and (3) a jury must resolve the factual discrepancies over “where and when” plaintiff worked before the district could decide as a matter of law whether she was an employee when subjected to alleged harassment. Next, the Court adopted the majority view that plaintiff pushing her former advisor away to resist his alleged advances is a form of opposition to improper touching (even if she did not vocalize her objection), which meets the “protected activity” prong of a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim, and thus, on remand the district must proceed with the “nondiscriminatory reason” and “pretext” steps of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Finally, the Circuit found that the district erred and violated plaintiff’s “substantial rights” by applying an overly narrow view of relevancy to exclude multiple categories of evidence at trial including circumstantial evidence of harassment, entitling plaintiff to a new trial.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employee Sexual Misconduct | Retaliation | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Hoffman v. City Univ. of N.Y. (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 26, 2024)

    Order adopting Report and Recommendation to deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a former Instructor librarian at the City College of New York, which is a constituent of the City University of New York (CUNY) brought a disability discrimination claim against CUNY after it denied him accommodations and terminated his employment. Plaintiff alleged that he had requested a one-year extension to complete his second Masters degree to accommodate for his depression but was denied because he previously was granted a one-year extension and “instructors who do not reach prescribed academic goals are no longer eligible for employment after their fifth year in an Instructorship position.” In adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and denying CUNY’s motion for summary judgment, the court found that there is genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the five-year term is an essential part of the Instructor librarian position. The court agreed that the prior grant of a one-year extension demonstrates that the five-year limit may not be as essential as CUNY alleged. Further, the court found that plaintiff’s accommodation request is “facially reasonable” and permits him to perform the job at the same level as a non-disabled employee.  

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity

  • Date:

    Zhang v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. (M.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2024)

    Order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former tenured faculty member at the University of Georgia, who identifies her race as Asian and her national origin as Chinese, brought discrimination and retaliation claims against the University based on race, national origin, and disability. Plaintiff alleged she received biased treatment based on her race and national origin and was frequently dismissed after reporting a discriminatory work environment. Plaintiff further alleged she was denied reasonable accommodations and was terminated after her accommodation requests were denied. In dismissing the University’s Motion to Dismiss, the court found plaintiff’s allegations that University officials treated her less favorably than her white instructor counterparts and replaced her with a white man who was unqualified for the position were sufficient to support an inference of intentional race or national origin discrimination. Additionally, the court found that plaintiff’s continued complaints about alleged bias treatment (disparate discipline, denial of a teaching assistant, and denial of the opportunity to vote on a tenure candidate) from 2020 until her termination in 2023 were sufficient to support an inference of intentional retaliation from her department superiors.  

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Alabama v. Cardona (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2024)

    Order granting Plaintiff-Appellants’ Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal. Plaintiffs, the States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina and four membership associations, sued the U.S. Department of Education and sought preliminary injunction related to the Department’s 2024 Title IX Final Rule, challenging the Department’s inclusion of discrimination on the basis of gender identity within the definition of sex discrimination, expansion of the definition of sexual harassment, and changes to the procedures schools are required to follow in response to complaints of sexual harassment. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, finding plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of establishing a substantial likelihood of success on each of these claims. After issuing an administrative injunction, a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit granted injunction pending appeal, finding that the Final Rule’s expanded definition of sex discrimination contravened the Eleventh Circuit’s “holding in [Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty. (11th Cir. 2022)] that ‘sex’ in Title IX ‘unambiguously,’ refers to ‘biological sex’ and not ‘gender identity’” and that its expanded definition of sexual harassment both “flies in the face of” the U.S. Supreme Court’s standard for finding sexual harassment in Davis and “runs headlong into the First Amendment concerns animating decisions like Davis and [Speech First, Inc. v. Cartwright (11th Cir. 2022)].” The injunction applies “rule-wide” and enjoins the Department from enforcing the Final Rule in the plaintiff states.   

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Reddy v. Univ. of Pa. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2024)

    Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a South Asian woman and former student at the University of Pennsylvania, brought retaliation and contract claims against the University after she was suspended for violation of academic integrity when her Lab Report seemed substantially similar to that of another student. Plaintiff alleged that she previously emailed her professor raising concerns of racial bias against her, but such concerns were not addressed. After receiving notice that she was accused of violating the Code of Academic Integrity, plaintiff filed a formal bias report against the professor and met with the University’s Vice Provost. Plaintiff alleged the cheating accusation was retaliation for her pointing out the discrimination in her professor’s classroom. Plaintiff further alleged that throughout the hearing process for her academic violation, the University mishandled the hearing by failing to provide adequate time to review evidence; denying her request to present a forensic expert; and denying her appeal request. In permitting her Title VI retaliation claim to proceed, the court found plaintiff’s discussion with the Vice Provost about the alleged discrimination and differential treatment was enough to constitute protected activity. Turning to her contract claims under the Student Disciplinary System Charter (the Charter), the court found that plaintiff plausibly alleged that the University violated its duty to exchange evidence when it allowed only 48 hours for plaintiff to review new exhibits. Further, the University’s purported refusal to postpone the hearing and denial of plaintiff’s opportunity to present a forensic expert was sufficient to constitute a breach of contract of the Charter. On the other hand, the court found that the Human Resources Policy Manual exclusively applies to employees, not students, and dismissed the breach claims flowing from that document. 

    Topics:

    Academic Performance and Misconduct | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Retaliation | Students

  • Date:

    Crawford v. Bronx Cmty. Coll. (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 21, 2024)

    Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former office assistant at Bronx Community College of the City University of New York brought Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) interference and retaliation claims and claims of disability discrimination against the College after she took extended leave for a broken ankle. Plaintiff alleged she communicated to her superiors that she was unable to work and worked with the College’s HR department to apply for FMLA, however, she was informed that her absence from work was “unauthorized.” In denying the College’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim, the court found that plaintiff sufficiently alleged she was denied benefits to which she was entitled under the FMLA. Further, the court found that plaintiff made “diligent, good faith efforts” to timely submit her necessary FMLA forms. The court dismissed plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims because she was unable to demonstrate how a broken ankle qualified as a disability under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, and further, did not demonstrate her injury to be “sufficiently severe” to warrant protection. Finally, in denying the College’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the court found that plaintiff’s termination shortly after her request for FMLA leave was sufficient to support an inference of retaliatory intent.  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) | Retaliation

  • Date:

    U.S. Dep’t of Ed. v. Louisiana, 603 U.S. ____ (2024).

    U.S. Supreme Court per curium denial of applications for stay in Department of Education v. Louisianna, No. 24A78 and Cardona v. Tennessee, No. 24A79. Multiple states filed suit against the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (OCR) challenging the Final Rule on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, on multiple grounds, including arguing that the Rule exceeds the four corners of the Congressionally implemented statutory text, and sought preliminary injunction. The U.S. Districts of Louisiana and Kentucky granted plaintiffs’ preliminary relief against enforcement of the Rule in the plaintiff states. The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits declined to stay the respective injunctions. Subsequently, the Department made emergency application to the Supreme Court seeking partial stays of the PIs pending resolution of the appeals before the Circuits. The Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief on a trio of provisions of the Rule regarding the scope of the definition of sex discrimination, which includes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, rejected the Department’s request to sever those provisions and implement the remainder of the Rule, and thus, denied the emergency applications. 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employee Sexual Misconduct | Sex Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Manco v. St. Joseph’s Univ. Et, al. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2024).

    Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former St. Joseph’s University professor sued the University and several students under multiple theories following termination his of employment. The University placed Plaintiff on administrative leave, investigated, and ultimately removed from his visiting faculty role for “violations of University policies” after screenshots of his anonymous tweets circulated online, were sent to the University’s Title IX Coordinator, and a student tweeted at the University “are you gonna fire [Plaintiff] who has done nothing but contribute to a hostile learning environment with his racism, sexism, and transphobia??????” Various defendant groups filed motions to dismiss, including the student who posted the tweet who argued that she was entitled to absolute privilege “as she conveyed information that commenced an investigation pursuant to federal statute or regulations.” The court declined to dismiss claims of defamation, false light, and tortious interference, reasoning that although the student’s emails and direct correspondence with the University during the pendency of the investigation were entitled to immunity, her “general tweet” towards a private institution lacked intent to commence an investigation. The court also found that her tweet was potentially defamatory as it may be read to imply that the professor is “a racist, sexist and/or is transphobic.” The Court granted the student’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Employee Discipline & Due Process | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation | Social Media

  • Date:

    Alabama v. Cardona (11th Cir. July 31, 2024)

    Order granting Plaintiff-Appellants’ Motion for Administrative Injunction. Plaintiffs, the States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina and four membership associations, sued the U.S. Department of Education and sought preliminary injunction related to the Department’s 2024 Title IX Final Rule, challenging the Department’s inclusion of discrimination on the basis of gender identity within the definition of sex discrimination, expansion of the definition of sexual harassment, and changes to the procedures schools are required to follow in response to complaints of sexual harassment. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, finding plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of establishing a substantial likelihood of success on each of these claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit granted plaintiff-appellants’ motion for administrative injunction and sua sponte set a briefing schedule. The administrative injunction will remain in effect pending further order of the court.

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct