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  • Date:

    Wells v. Tex. Tech Univ. (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2025) (unpub.)

    Order affirming the District Court’s Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Lawsuit. Plaintiff, an unpaid mentor who was removed from the Texas Tech University (“TTU”) Innovation Hub, filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on sex. After receiving a Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC, plaintiff sued TTU and two university employees under Title VII, Title IX, and state law. Focusing first on plaintiff’s Title VII claims, the court found that plaintiff’s Title VII claims were untimely because she was not an “employee” for Title VII purposes while serving as a mentor for the TTU Innovation Hub. The court also concluded that plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim failed because “retaliatory conduct that occurred in January 2022, or later, [was] too attenuated from her last employment in 2017.” Turning to plaintiff’s Title IX claims, the court affirmed the district court’s findings that plaintiff’s pre-2019 Title IX claims were untimely because her “2017 graduation from TTU and the 2019 dissolution of her first company that had ties with TTU [were] sufficient intervening actions….” Additionally, plaintiff did not allege a plausible Title IX claim for relief because she failed to establish sufficient facts to satisfy the two-prong test: “(1) a person authorized to address the harassment had actual notice of the behavior; and (2) even with this notice, the program’s response to the harassment amounted to ‘deliberate indifference.’” At no point did plaintiff allege facts to show that “the dean was a person who could address the harassment.” Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s holding related to plaintiff’s state law claims and also noted that it properly denied her request to amend her complaint. 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity

  • Date:

    National Education Association v. U.S. Department of Education (D.N.H. Mar. 3, 2025)

    Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. Plaintiffs, the National Education Association and the National Education Association–New Hampshire, challenge the Dear Colleague Letter (Feb. 14, 2025) (DCL) and request that the Court declare that the DCL violates the First and Fifth Amendments; that it is in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, contrary to constitutional right, in excess of statutory jurisdiction, and without observance of procedure required by law; hold it to be unlawful, vacate, and set aside the “End DEI” portal and the FAQ; and restrain the U.S. Department of Education (the Department) from enforcing the DCL. Plaintiffs allege that the DCL radically resets the Department’s longstanding positions on civil rights laws, which guarantee equality and inclusion and impermissibly infringes on the authority of states and school districts over public education, as well as the First Amendment rights of educators and students. Due to the DCL’s allegedly vague and viewpoint-discriminatory prohibitions, Plaintiffs further contend that “the [DCL’s] fundamental contradiction of Title VI in prohibiting equity and inclusion programs, its violations of due process in failing to set clear standards and in opening educators to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, as well as its chill to First Amendment protected speech and expression could not stand no matter the process followed.” Plaintiffs also allege that the open-ended and subjective nature of the DCL’s prohibitions allow for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the uncertainty in what educators can teach, how they can teach, and what educational programs may or may not operate moving forward has an immediate impact on their ability to do their jobs and as such, causes substantial and irreparable harm.

    Topics:

    Admissions | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Diversity in Employment | Faculty & Staff | Financial Aid, Scholarships, & Student Loans | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Students

  • Date:

    U.S. Department of Education Releases Frequently Asked Questions on Dear Colleague Letter About Racial Preferencing (Mar. 1, 2025)

    U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) Press Release announcing issuance of its Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 28, 2025) (“FAQ”) pertaining to the February 14 Dear Colleague Letter. The FAQ reiterates OCR’s broad interpretation of the scope of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, 600 U.S. 181 (2023), including its view that “school-sponsored or school-endorsed racially segregated aspects of student, academic, and campus life, such as programming, graduation ceremonies, and housing, are legally indefensible.” The FAQ allows that “educational, cultural, or historical observances … or similar events – that celebrate or recognize historical events and contributions and promote awareness” would not violate Title VI but asserts that “extreme practices at a university—such as requiring students to participate in privilege walks, segregating them by race for presentations and discussions with guest speakers, pressuring them to participate in protests or take certain positions on racially charged issues, investigating or sanctioning them for dissenting on racially charged issues through DEI or similar university offices, mandating courses, orientation programs, or trainings that are designed to emphasize and focus on racial stereotypes, and assigning them coursework that requires them to identify by race and then complete tasks differentiated by race—are all forms of school-on-student harassment that could create a hostile environment under Title VI.” It also states that OCR may rely on the three-part McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) Title VII employment discrimination burden shifting test to “assess indirect evidence of individual discrimination” against students. 

    Topics:

    Accreditation, Authorizations, & Higher Education Act | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination

  • Date:

    Federal Task Force to Combat Antisemitism Announces Visits to 10 College Campuses that Experienced Incidents of Antisemitism (Feb. 28, 2025)

    The U.S. Department of Justice announced its “Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism” established by Executive Order, “Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism,” which intends to prioritize “root[ing] out anti-Semitic harassment in schools and on college campuses,” will “be visiting 10 university campuses that have experienced antisemitic incidents since October 2023,” including “Columbia University; George Washington University; Harvard University; Johns Hopkins University; New York University; Northwestern University; the University of California, Los Angeles; the University of California, Berkeley; the University of Minnesota; and the University of Southern California.” 

    Topics:

    Accreditation, Authorizations, & Higher Education Act | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination

  • Date:

    ACE Letter Requesting the Department of Education to Rescind Dear Colleague Letter (Feb. 25, 2025)

    The American Council on Education (ACE) sent a letter (the Letter) to the U.S. Department of Education (the Department) in response to the Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) published on February 14, 2025, requesting that the Department rescind the DCL. The Letter states that the DCL contains ambiguous language that has led to confusion on campuses about their compliance responsibilities. The Letter further states that it is unreasonable for the Department to require institutions to appropriately respond to the extremely broad reinterpretation of federal law in two weeks and in the absence of additional and necessary guidance.

    Topics:

    Accreditation, Authorizations, & Higher Education Act | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination

  • Date:

    Zinski v. Liberty Univ. (W.D. Va. Feb. 21, 2025)

    Memorandum Opinion denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a transgender female and former Liberty University information technology services employee, sued the University alleging sex-based employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. when she was terminated after her male to female transition. The University moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint based on: (1) Sections 702 and 703 of Title VII; (2) the Religion Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”); (3) the ministerial exception; (4) the First Amendment freedom of expressive association; and (5) the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. First, the court found that the University’s termination of Plaintiff did not qualify as an employment decision made on the basis “of a particular religion” that is exempted from Title VII under Sections 702 and 703 and concluded that alleged discrimination on the basis of transgender status is sex discrimination, even if religiously motivated. Second, the court adopted the majority rule that the plain language of RFRA applies to conduct by a governmental authority, and the EEOC’s issuance of a right to sue letter to Plaintiff does not otherwise convert a private party lawsuit into government action. Third, the court reasoned that although religious employers enjoy wide latitude as to “employees who[] hold a spiritual role and whose religious beliefs may press upon the faithful” the evidence at this stage of litigation did not support that Plaintiff’s role as an IT professional qualified for application of the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense. Fourth, the court agreed that “Liberty engages in protected First Amendment activity,” but found “any burden imposed by Title VII on Liberty’s expressive interest is minimal, such that rational basis review is satisfied, … Title VII stands constitutionally sound … [and] at this stage of litigation, Liberty cannot claim any expressive association defense to Title VII liability.” Finally, the court found the ecclesiastical doctrine inapplicable, rejecting the University’s position that Plaintiff’s complaint raises questions “concerning Liberty University’s interpretation and application of Scripture,” reasoning that the court was narrowly tasked with considering if Title VII “prohibits a religious institution from firing a transgender person, not whether a religious institution … has properly interpreted its religious doctrine when determining that a transgender person violates religious law.”  

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Sex Discrimination

  • Date:

    Gray v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ga. Military Coll. (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2025) (unpub.)

    Order affirming grants of Summary Judgment in favor of the Georgia Military College. Plaintiff, an African American woman and former administrative assistant in the human resources department of the Georgia Military College (the “College”) sued alleging Title VII discrimination and retaliation after her position was terminated during a reduction in force (“RIF”). Prior to her termination, plaintiff – who was the only African American employee in her department – was employed with the College for five years. Upon return from COVID-19 related remote work in June of 2020, employees were encouraged but not required to mask and social distance on campus; Plaintiff, who has heart disease expressed concern for her health when colleagues declined to do so. She also complained about another employee’s personal social media post urging law enforcement to “[b]ring back the hoses and release the dogs,” which was made on the heels of the death of George Floyd. On or about June 30, 2020, plaintiff was informed that she was one of ten College employees whose positions were eliminated pursuant to a RIF that obliged each department to eliminate at least one position. Plaintiff was the only person RIF’d in her department. All other RIF’d personnel were white. She applied but was not selected for two other positions with the College, one of which was filled by an African American applicant, and the other of which remained unfilled for more than a year. Thereafter, she filed a pro se EEOC charge challenging her termination as age and race-based discrimination. Subsequently, she retained counsel who filed a second charge of discrimination based on alleged disability discrimination and retaliation, and upon receipt of right to sue letters, filed litigation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dual grants of summary judgment in favor of the College, reasoning that (1) plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim failed due to her failure to exhaust that claim prior to filing suit, and (2) she failed to adduce sufficient evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that her termination was either race-based or retaliatory, in light of the College’s evidence that the decision to undertake a RIF due to budgetary shortfalls predated her complaints, and that plaintiff’s position was the easiest to absorb within her department.    

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Roland v. Donnelly Coll. (D. Kan. Feb. 20, 2025)

    Order granting in part and denying in part Donnelly College’s (“the College”) partial motion to dismiss. Plaintiff is a former nursing student at the College who asserts claims for alleged violations of Title IX, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, equal protection, and due process, as well as a state law claim for tortious interference with a contract against an individually named College professor. Plaintiff alleges that an unnamed professor referred to her test anxiety as “dumb” and sues the second professor who she claims “grabbed, [] squeezed, … and rubbed his hand up and down her leg” and “placed his hand on her thigh” on one occasion and rubbed his body against hers on another. She also alleges the second professor made threatening remarks in class, including that “if anyone wanted to report him, it would not go well because of his status” with the College, that he could make complaints against him “go away,” and that “[i]f anyone wants to do anything to me, I have guns,” as well as disparaging remarks, such as“[w]omen don’t learn well, and learn better if I piss them off.” She asserts that she tried to meet with the College’s Director of Nursing to discuss her concerns but was rebuffed. Then, during final exams, the second professor allegedly sat behind Plaintiff, “leaned forward, and whispered, ‘You gonna wish you gave me some of that pussy,’” and then, failed her on the exam, which she asserts she would have otherwise passed had it been graded fairly. Subsequently, the College placed Plaintiff on academic probation and suspension, which delayed her graduation and required that she attend an extra semester during which she was once more placed into the second professor’s class and subjected to additional alleged harassment, including commenting on her hair, nearly grazing her breast, and repeatedly touching her leg. Ultimately, she withdrew from the nursing program. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims except her §1983 claims. The court declined to dismiss the Title IX sex discrimination claim, reasoning Plaintiff had provided sufficient allegations to maintain a claim that she was subject to sex-based harassment, including by receiving lowered grades based on her refusal of a professor’s advances. It rejected as irrelevant the College’s concern that Plaintiff failed to identify a male student who was treated more favorably, “particularly when it is not at all clear that plaintiff intends to pursue a ‘selective enforcement’ theory of liability.” However, it granted the motion to dismiss her sexual harassment and retaliation claims against the College since beyond seeking an unspecified meeting with the Director of Nursing, Plaintiff failed to allege that she “engaged in protected activity or, even assuming that she did, that any College official had knowledge that plaintiff had engaged in protected activity” and correspondingly, College officials lacked knowledge regarding the professor’s alleged harassment. Finally, the court granted dismissal of the disability discrimination claim reasoning that her allegations supported that her exam grades were altered “not based on any perceived disability but in retribution for [her] response to defendant[’s] alleged sexual advance,” and because the sole comment regarding her test anxiety was made after she was advised that she was not meeting academic standards.  

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Sex Discrimination | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Rogers v. W. Governors Univ. (S.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2025)

    Order granting summary judgment in favor of Western Governors University (“WGU”). Plaintiff, a White veteran, who suffers from service-connected disabilities, brings Title VI race discrimination, Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”) Act claims, and related state law claims against WGU. Shortly after beginning his studies, Plaintiff suffered a heart attack, which prompted him to request accommodations from his “mentor,” including taking courses with more reading requirements than his active courses, taking a larger semester courseload than the maximum limit, obtaining syllabi from courses for which he was not enrolled, and extending the semester by one month, some of which were granted. He neither responded to nor took any action on communications from the Student Accessibility Services office, which provided official accommodations forms to begin the formal process outlined in WGU’s policy for securing disability accommodations. Plaintiff experienced additional medical and mental health challenges before filing litigation. In granting the motion for summary judgment on the ADA claims, the Court found no evidence that WGU engaged in disparate treatment of Plaintiff because of his disability and further found that WGU did not fail to provide reasonable accommodations. In ruling for WGU on the Title VI claim, the court reasoned that Plaintiff’s conclusory claim that he was harmed by general “‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ (“DEI”) activities, [which] created … a hostile educational environment” through a “‘subculture’ of treating students differently-based on race,” was unsupported by facts since he did not otherwise allege that he was treated differently because of his race and failed to adduce “evidence that [he] was so harassed by any person, by DEI activities or materials, or by anti-White messages that he could not access educational benefits like any other student.” Finally, the court exercised supplemental jurisdiction to grant summary judgment in favor of WGU on Plaintiff’s related state law claims. 

    Topics:

    Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity

  • Date:

    Thiry v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich. (E.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2025)

    Opinion & Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Awarding Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, an employee at the University of Michigan filed suit against the University and three of its employees alleging discrimination and retaliation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well as First Amendment violations under §1983. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and denied summary judgment on claims seeking monetary relief. Defendants then sought partial reconsideration of the order. In granting Defendants’ motion, the court found that it erred in previously ruling that “official-capacity claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment where a plaintiff seeks only prospective equitable relief.” The court concluded that “the University and its governing Board of Regents are constitutionally-created instrumentalities of the State of Michigan and are not ‘persons’ for purposes of Section 1983.” Finally, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief because the Defendants could not be sued under §1983.  

    Topics:

    Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Retaliation