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Latest Cases & Developments
Date:
Beuca v. Wash. State Univ. (9th Cir. July 18, 2024) (unpub.)
Memorandum reversing dismissal with prejudice. Plaintiff, a former medical student employed by Washington State University and completing a residency at Providence Regional Medical Center, brought discrimination claims against the University after it declined to grant him a religious exemption to its COVID-19 vaccination requirement and terminated him, even though the Center had granted the exemption. In dismissing plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, the district court held that (1) plaintiff’s allegations were conclusory because he alleged no facts as to the nature of his sincerely held religious belief or when or how he had requested the exemption from the University and (2) the University successfully asserted undue hardship because permitting plaintiff to work in a hospital without a vaccination posed an increased risk to patients of COVID-19 exposure. After the case was dismissed, the Supreme Court decided Groff v. DeJoy, holding “that showing ‘more than a de minimis coast,’ as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffice to establish ‘undue hardship’ under Title VII.” In reversing dismissal with prejudice, the Ninth Circuit held, “[o]n this record at this stage, we cannot take into account ‘all relevant factors’ as Groff requires, and, therefore, cannot rule as a matter of law that Beuca’s request constituted an undue hardship.”
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Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | Coronavirus | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Religious Discrimination & AccommodationDate:
Yodice v. Touro Coll. & Univ. Sys. (2nd Cir. July 19, 2024) (unpub.)
Summary Order partially affirming dismissal, partially vacating, and remanding. Plaintiff, a graduate student at Touro College and University System’s College of Dental Medicine during Spring 2020, on behalf of himself and a putative class, brought contract, unjust enrichment, and deceptive practices and false advertising claims against the University related to tuition and fees after it ceased in-person instruction and closed campus facilities due to the coronavirus pandemic. The district court dismissed the claims. In reversing on plaintiff’s tuition claims, the panel of the Second Circuit held that because his claims were similar to the claims in Rynasko v. New York Univ. (2nd Cir. 2023), in which another panel of the court “outlined criteria to evaluate the sufficiency of allegations of breach of an implied contract under New York law between a student and university for in-person instruction and services,” plaintiff had plausibly stated an implied contract claim. Because dismissal of the deceptive practices and false advertising claim was based on the analysis of the contract claim, the court vacated and remanded on that claim as well. The court affirmed dismissal of the implied contract claim as to fees for lack of allegations as to what services the University owed plaintiff. It affirmed dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim as duplicative of the contract claim.
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Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | CoronavirusDate:
Gur-Ravantab v. Georgetown Univ. (D. D.C. July 16, 2024)
Memorandum Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. Plaintiffs, students at Georgetown University during Spring 2020, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, brought contract and unjust enrichment claims against the University related to tuition and fees after it ceased in-person instruction and closed campus facilities due to the coronavirus pandemic. In granting preliminary approval of the proposed settlement, the court noted as “potential concerns” in the fairness evaluation questions as to (1) whether the proposed allocation of $137 to each member of the class out of the total of $1.5 million “is an adequate award for the class members in light of comparable class actions” and (2) whether there is a basis for awarding a service award to an individual who is not a member of the proposed settlement class.
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Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | CoronavirusDate:
Koerner v. Mercer Univ. (M.D. Ga. June 21, 2024)
Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a student at Mercer University in Spring 2020, on behalf of herself and a putative class, brought contract and unjust enrichment claims against the University after it ceased in-person instruction and closed campus facilities due to the coronavirus pandemic. In dismissing plaintiff’s implied contract claim, the court found that the University catalog’s reservation of rights clause, which included the right “to change its rules affecting … the granting of credit or degrees,” together with its detailed emergency response plan, which provided for “academic or administrative space adjustments,” were sufficient to prevent the University from being held liable for the shift to remote instruction. It dismissed her unjust enrichment claim as precluded by her implied contract claim.
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Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | CoronavirusDate:
Stoffel v. The Regents of Univ. of Cal. (Cal. App. June 25, 2024) (unpub.)
Opinion vacating dismissal. Plaintiffs, students at various campuses of the University of California in Spring 2020, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, brought contract and related claims related to tuition and fees against the University after it ceased in-person instruction and closed campus facilities in March 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege a “specific promise” of an in-person, on-campus education. In vacating dismissal, the California Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs’ assertions about statements in various marketing materials was sufficient to allege an implied promise of in-person, on-campus education over the expected duration of a full degree, which was affirmed each academic session. It then found that the relevant time for determining if the implied promise had been accepted was at the time in February 2020 when students registered and paid tuition for Spring 2020, rather than the deadline to withdraw and receive a refund. It also found that the Regents’ express reservation of rights to set tuition levels was not sufficient to give the Regents authority to change the terms of an implied contract retroactively.
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Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | CoronavirusDate:
Hofmann v. Long Island Univ. (2nd Cir. July 2, 2024) (unpub.)
Summary Order affirming dismissal. Plaintiff, a student at Long Island University during Spring 2020, brought contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and deceptive business practices and false advertising claims against the University after it ceased in-person instruction and closed campus facilities due to the coronavirus pandemic. The district court dismissed his claims. In affirming, the Second Circuit held that his contract claim failed because the University’s bulletin contained an express force majeure clause and his unjust enrichment claim failed as duplicative of his contract claim. His conversion claim failed because he had not alleged a specific portion of his tuition and fees that had been directed to remote instruction and because it relied on the same factual allegations as his contract claim. His deceptive business practices and false advertising claims failed because he had not identified any materially misleading statement suggesting that an “on-campus experience would remain indefinitely in place, even if burdened by events … such as a global pandemic,” particularly in light of the LIU bulletin’s force majeure clause.
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Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | CoronavirusDate:
Tapinekis v. Pace Univ. (2nd Cir. May 30, 2024) (unpub.)
Summary Order affirming judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff, a student at Pace University during spring 2020, on behalf of herself and a putative class, brought contract, unjust enrichment, deceptive acts or practices, and false advertising claims against the University after it ceased in-person instruction and closed campus facilities due to the coronavirus pandemic. In affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s implied contract claim as to tuition, the Second Circuit held that the “Emergency Closings” provision in the University’s Academic Catalog “served as a valid force majeure clause.” It similarly held that plaintiff’s claim that she was forced to vacate campus housing failed because she did not dispute that the University permitted students to remain in its residence halls if needed. It affirmed dismissal of the unjust enrichment claims as duplicative of the contract claims. Finally, it affirmed dismissal of her claims under the New York Business Law, noting that she failed to allege a materially misleading act or omission.
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Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | CoronavirusDate:
Does v. The Bd. of Regents of Colo. (10th Cir. May 7, 2024)
Opinion reversing denial of preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs, current and former employees and students at the University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus whose religious exemptions from the University’s COVID-19 vaccination policy were denied in-part, brought a Free Exercise challenge. The initial policy limited religious exemptions to those opposing “all” immunizations but was revised within three weeks to accord any religious belief. The district court denied two preliminary injunctions, finding the first challenge to the repealed policy moot, and the second unlikely to succeed on the merits. In denying the latter, the court found that under the amended policy (1) different personnel reviewed exemptions, (2) religious beliefs were accepted unquestioningly as sincere, and (3) individualized duties-focused review yielded remote or isolated on-campus work exemptions for multiple plaintiffs, while undue hardship was sustained for students and employees with patient-care duties. On consolidated appeal, a divided Tenth Circuit panel reversed in favor of employee plaintiffs after making novel appellate factual findings and applying strict scrutiny to the rescinded policy. It found that since officials asked “why” rather than “whether” plaintiffs sought religious exemption under the first policy that neither policy was “considered with the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires” (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado) and bare violation of Free Exercise can demonstrate animus even absent actual hostility. The Circuit also found while not an express basis of appeal, plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that the initial policy impermissibly involved the University in evaluating religious doctrine under the Establishment Clause. Finally, it found the first appeal of the original policy, and all student claims under both policies moot.
Topics:
Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | Coronavirus | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Religious Discrimination & AccommodationDate:
Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ. (Texas Apr. 26, 2024)
Opinion answering a certified question. Plaintiff, a former student at Southern Methodist University, on behalf of himself and a putative class, brought contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment claims against the University after it ceased in-person instruction and closed campus facilities due to the coronavirus pandemic. The district court dismissed his claims, finding, as relevant here, recovering on his contract claim barred by the Texas Pandemic Liability Protection Act. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified to the Texas Supreme Court the question, “Does the application of the Pandemic Liability Protection Act to [plaintiff] breach-on-contract claim violate the retroactivity clause in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution?” In holding that “the answer to the certified question is No,” the Supreme Court of Texas found that plaintiff failed to “show he had a reasonable and settled expectation that he could recover money damages from SMU if the government forcibly shut down the campus and gave the school only the option of completing [his] degree program on the internet.”
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Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | Coronavirus
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