Cases & Developments - National Association of College and University Attorneys

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Latest Cases & Developments

Date:
9/22/2025
Spectrum WT v. Wendler (N.D. Tex. Sep. 23, 2025)
Opinion Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, an LGBT+ student organization and two former student group leaders at West Texas A&M University, were granted a preliminary injunction after the university president canceled a drag show that plaintiffs organized and which they maintained was a violation of their First Amendment rights. On defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court granted defendants’ motion with respect to the two individual plaintiffs, finding they no longer had Article III standing for any alleged injury, since one had left the university and the other had graduated. However, the court rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss the organizational plaintiff, holding (1) an unincorporated association holds the capacity to sue or be sued in Texas; and (2) the student organization has standing because it was able to demonstrate “ongoing harm” based on the substantial likelihood of the university president canceling future drag shows that plaintiffs wished to organize.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Student Organizations | Students
Date:
9/12/2025
Patterson v. Kent State Univ. (6th Cir. Sep. 12, 2025)
Opinion Affirming Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, a transgender professor at Kent State, sued the university alleging Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation, First Amendment retaliation, and disability discrimination under the Rehab Act following the university’s response to plaintiff’s “weeks-long, profanity-laden Twitter tirade insulting colleagues and the university.” The Sixth Circuit concluded that, while the district court erred in finding the university had not taken any adverse employment action, plaintiff’s Title VII claims failed nonetheless because plaintiff failed to show that the university’s justification for taking the action was pretextual. The Sixth Circuit also rejected plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, holding that “speech about internal personal disputes or management” which included “run-of-the mill ‘employee beef’” does not constitute speech on a matter of public concern. Moreover, the court reasoned, even if the tweets had involved a matter of public concern, they still wouldn’t receive protection because the university’s interest in effective administration of its services “[outweigh[ed] [plaintiff’s] interest in this kind of trash talk.”
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Disability Discrimination | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Retaliation
Date:
9/8/2025
Jorjani v. New Jersey Institute of Technology (3rd Cir. Sep. 8, 2025)
Opinion Vacating and Remanding. Plaintiff, a philosophy lecturer at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, brought claims of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment against the university after it declined to renew his contract based on the disruption caused by inflammatory statements made by plaintiff in his private capacity that were included in a New York Times article. The District Court granted summary judgement for the university holding that plaintiff’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment because the university’s interest in “mitigating the disruption caused by [p]laintiff’s speech . . . outweighs [p]laintiff’s interest in its expression.” On appeal, the Third Circuit disagreed, finding the “minimal evidence of disruption” cited by the university “differ[ed] little from the ordinary operation of a public university” and therefore could not outweigh interest in plaintiff’s speech. The court found the university provided insufficient evidence that student disapproval of plaintiff’s speech resulted in a disruption, noting the university “never identified the exact number of calls or complaints . . . nor any details about the students’ concerns” nor “any evidence of specific student protests, upheaval, or unwillingness to abide by university policies.” The court also rejected the university’s claim that letters in the school paper from faculty members denouncing plaintiff were evidence of a disruption, instead finding they reflected “precisely the sort of reasoned debate that distinguishes speech from distraction.” As to the university’s claimed interest in “providing a non-denigrating environment” and concern that plaintiff’s views could “undermine the pedagogical relationship between teacher and student,” the court found that the university failed to point to anything in the record supporting its determination. In conclusion, the court held that “[on] balance, the disruption the university described does not outweigh even minimal interest in [plaintiff’s] speech” and therefore, the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation
Date:
9/3/2025
President and Fellows of Harvard College v. United States Department of Health and Human Services (D. Mass. Sep. 3, 2025)
Memorandum and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs, the President and Fellows of Harvard College, filed suit against defendants, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other federal agencies, challenging the defendants’ termination of $2.2 billion in multiyear grants and contracts after plaintiffs refused to comply with the demands outlined in defendants’ April 3 and 11, 2025 letters. Plaintiffs argued that defendants’ termination of grants was unlawful because (1) it was in violation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights; (2) defendants’ terminations failed to comply with Title VI procedural requirements; and (3) defendants’ actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claims, which they contended were the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. Defendants also argued that they were permitted under 2 C.F.R. section 200.340(a)(4) to terminate awards that “no longer effectuate [] the program goals or agency priorities.” The court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their First Amendment and Title VI claims and on part of their APA claims. The court found that the defendants had violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by “impermissibly retaliat[ing] against Harvard for refusing to capitulate to the government’s demands.” The court further found that defendants had violated Title VI by failing to follow the statutory procedures for terminating funding. The court reasoned that defendants’ Freeze Orders were arbitrary and capricious because they failed to provide an explanation for how the freeze would help combat antisemitism and concluded that “in reality, [there is] little connection between the research affected by the grant terminations and antisemitism” and called defendants’ use of antisemitism a “smokescreen” for “a targeted ideologically-motivated assault on this country’s premier universities.” Finally, the court granted plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction, preventing defendants from reimposing conditions that have been deemed unconstitutional, and further enjoined defendants from issuing any other terminations, freezing of funds, or refusal to award future grants, contracts, or other federal funding “on the purported grounds of discrimination without compliance with the requirements of Title VI.”
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Contracts | First Amendment & Free Speech | Grants, Contracts, & Sponsored Research
Date:
8/27/2025
Dudley v. Boise State University (9th Cir. Aug. 27th, 2025)
Opinion Reversing in Part and Affirming in Part. Plaintiff, a graduate of Boise State University, brought due process claims against the university after her degree was revoked for misconduct during a required internship. The District Court found in favor of the university, determining that plaintiff was afforded sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard and that she failed to allege a property interest in her university education. On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, reasoning that the university’s decision to revoke the degree was “not substantively arbitrary [or] lacking a rational basis.” However, the court reversed its dismissal of her procedural due process claim, calling the revocation “procedurally infirm.” The court held that because plaintiff had an ascertainable monetary value in her degree and further had “a legitimate claim of entitlement” to her degree under Idaho law, the university improperly denied her procedural due process rights when it revoked her degree without any notice or hearing.
Topics:
Academic Performance and Misconduct | Constitutional Issues | Due Process | Internships, Externships, & Clinical Work | Students
Date:
8/18/2025
Spectrum WT v. Wendler (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2025)
Opinion Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding. Plaintiffs, an LGBT+ student organization and individual members at West Texas A&M University organized a drag show to be hosted on campus, but the show was canceled by the University President. The University President “believed that drag shows discriminated against women” and sent a campus wide email announcing the cancellation and made several remarks criticizing the event. Plaintiffs subsequently sought a preliminary injunction so they could proceed with the show, alleging that their free speech rights were violated. The district court denied the injunction, determining that the venue where the show was set to take place was a limited public forum and found that “it was not clearly established that all drag shows are inherently expressive and therefore implicate the First Amendment, and President Wendler’s cancellation of the drag show was not objectively unreasonable given the show’s ‘potential lewdness.’” The district court further determined that “conduct that does not communicate a specific message must amount to a ‘work [] of fine art’ to gain First Amendment protection.” On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s “fine art” standard, and found that the drag show was communicating a specific message of support for the LGBT+ community. The court further held that “theatrical performances plainly involve expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment, and because we find the plaintiffs’ drag show is protected expression, discrimination among such shows must pass strict scrutiny.” The court determined the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction and remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Gender Identity & Sexual Orientation Discrimination | Student Organizations | Students
Date:
8/18/2025
Jackson Fed’n of Teachers v. Eitch (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 2025)
Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs, several individuals and organizations impacted by Mississippi House Bill 1193 (HB 1193), challenged the constitutionality of the law. The state law prohibits public schools and universities from teaching, promoting, or requiring participation in diversity, equity, and inclusion programs. HB 1193 bans educational engagement with “divisive concepts,” though it does not clearly define what concepts are prohibited. Defendants maintained that the law is not a violation of the First Amendment because it “seeks to regulate only government speech, and the speech of public employees (such as educators) in their official capacity.” The court previously granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the implementation of the law on July 22, 2025. The court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated the potential for irreparable harm. The court noted the “dearth of evidence” from defendants on the issue of irreparable harm and agreed with plaintiffs that HB 1193 is “unconstitutionally vague, fails to treat speech in a viewpoint-neutral manner, and carries [] serious risks of terrible consequences with respect to the chilling of expression and academic freedom.”
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Enforcement of Non-Discrimination Laws | First Amendment & Free Speech
Date:
8/14/2025
American Federation of Teachers v. Department of Education (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2025)
Memorandum Opinion Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), AFT Maryland Chapter, the American Sociological Association (ASA), and the Eugene, Oregon School District 4J brought suit against the federal government in February 2025 alleging that the Department of Education’s (the Department) February 14 Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) principles and the associated certification requirement are procedurally and substantively improper under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), First Amendment, and Fifth Amendment. Upon seeking leave to amend their complaint, plaintiffs now allege that the DCL and the certification requirement encompass limitations that are “unclear and highly suggestive”, forcing plaintiffs to “choose between chilling their constitutionally protected speech and association or risk losing federal funds and being subject to prosecution.” The court found that the government did not follow notice and comment procedures in issuing the DCL and did not comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act. The court reasoned that because both the DCL and the certification requirement “fail[ed] to account for facts, law, baseline conditions, or reliance interests” they acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the APA. The Department maintains that the DCL was a reminder for schools that discrimination is illegal, however, the court disagreed, finding instead that the guidance “initiated a sea change in how the Department of Education regulates educational practices and classroom conduct, causing millions of educators to reasonably fear that their lawful, and even beneficial, speech might cause them or their schools to be punished.” Regarding the certification requirement, the court agreed with plaintiffs that it violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process protections against unreasonably vague laws because the requirement “attach[ed] serious consequences to compliance with standardless terms.” Finally, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion in part related to their claim that the certification requirement is facially overbroad, finding that it does not unambiguously punish protected speech, because it has limiting factors, though the court noted that the factors were not clear. As such, the court held that the DCL and the certification requirement are both unlawful and vacated, pursuant to the APA.
Topics:
Admissions | Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Diversity in Employment | Due Process | Faculty & Staff | Financial Aid, Scholarships, & Student Loans | First Amendment & Free Speech | Race and National Origin Discrimination | Students
Date:
8/13/2025
Simon v. Ivey (N.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2025)
Memorandum Opinion Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs, several professors at the University of Alabama, students from the University of Alabama at Birmingham, and the Alabama State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. filed a motion to enjoin defendants, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama and the Governor of Alabama from enforcing Alabama Senate Bill 129 (hereinafter referred to as SB 129). Plaintiffs alleged that SB 129 is unconstitutional under the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. SB 129 “prohibits public schools from finding or sponsoring ‘any diversity, equity, and inclusion programs . . . [and] prohibits teachers from requiring students in public schools, including colleges and universities, to assent to eight “divisive concepts.”’ In denying plaintiffs’ motion, the court found that plaintiffs’ free speech claims failed and reasoned that “our Circuit’s precedent [strongly suggests] that the Professors’ in-classroom instruction constitutes government speech” and that “that balancing weighs in favor of the interests of [defendant] the Board. The Board clearly has an interest in regulating the type of classroom indoctrination forbidden by SB 129.” While plaintiffs alleged that SB 129 chilled their speech as they made changes to their course curriculum, the court noted that plaintiffs’ changes in course materials were made “due to [] fear, rather than any discipline, direction from a University administrator, or requirement of the Board.” While plaintiffs alleged SB 129 is vague and challenged the bill based on a lack of explicit standards and minimum guidelines, the court was not convinced, reasoning that SB 129 “includes objective terms about what is prohibited (such as requiring student assent to a divisive concept), and noting that there is a scienter requirement (which is frequently upheld in civil and criminal laws) and a safe harbor that permits teaching about these concepts in an objective manner and in a historically accurate context.”
Topics:
Academic Performance and Misconduct | Constitutional Issues | Due Process | First Amendment & Free Speech | Students
Date:
7/29/2025
U.S. Department of Justice Notice of Findings Regarding the University of California, Los Angeles (Jul. 29, 2025)
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights Division determined that the University of California, Los Angeles (the University) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to adequately address antisemitic harassment during and after a protest encampment on campus in spring 2024. The DOJ’s Notice of Violation outlined three key findings. First, the notice claimed that Jewish and Israeli students were subject to severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment, including assaults, verbal abuse, and physical exclusion from campus spaces, on the basis of their race, religion, or national origin. Second, notice claimed that the University had actual notice of this hostile environment, having received at least eleven formal complaints and issued public statements acknowledging Jewish students’ fears and physical exclusion. Third, the notice claimed that the University responded with deliberate indifference, taking no meaningful action to eliminate the hostile environment for nearly a week, despite having both legal and policy authority to dismantle the encampment earlier. The DOJ concluded that the University’s free speech concerns were misplaced because the conduct in question included physical assaults, intimidation, and denial of access, which are not protected by the First Amendment. DOJ officials condemned the inaction and warned that legal action will follow if the University does not enter into a voluntary resolution agreement by August 5, 2025.
Topics:
Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Enforcement of Non-Discrimination Laws | Equal Protection | External Counsel | First Amendment & Free Speech | General Counsel | Race and National Origin Discrimination

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