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  • Date:

    Goldstein v. Prof’l Staff Congress/CUNY (2nd Cir. Mar. 18, 2024)

    Opinion affirming dismissal. Plaintiffs are six full-time instructional staff members at the City University of New York (CUNY) who resigned from the Professional Staff Congress (PSC) of CUNY (their state-mandated exclusive bargaining representative) as they “vehemently disagree” with its political activity related to Israel and Palestine and believe it unfairly prioritizes the interest of part-time instructors over theirs. Plaintiffs brought First Amendment claims against PSC, CUNY, and the City of New York, challenging provisions of a New York state law (1) requiring that a union certified as the exclusive bargaining unit of public employees be the exclusive bargaining representative even for non-union employees and (2) limiting that union’s duty of fair representation to collective bargaining, thus permitting it to decline to represent non-members in individual disciplinary proceedings. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the challenge to the exclusive bargaining provision, finding “the First Amendment does not guarantee public employees the right to engage in collective bargaining with their employer.” The court also upheld the limitation on the union’s duty of fair representation to collective bargaining, reasoning that while Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (U.S. 2018) rejected mandatory payment of union fees by non-members, it allowed that unions could choose to offset financial burdens by declining to represent non-union employees in collateral proceedings.   

    Topics:

    Collective Bargaining | Constitutional Issues | Faculty & Staff | First Amendment & Free Speech

  • Date:

    Ware v. The Univ. of Vt. & State Agric. Coll. (D. Vt. Mar. 7, 2024)

    Opinion and Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, four current and former students at the University of Vermont brought Title IX, due process, contract, and negligence claims against the University and multiple officials, alleging both pre-assault and post-assault deliberate indifference. The court permitted plaintiffs to proceed in their campus-wide pre-assault deliberate indifference claim, finding they had sufficiently alleged that the University improperly relied on informal procedures, was insufficiently transparent, and regularly saw delays in case resolution. Though it dismissed their pre-assault claims related to specific team and club sports, Greek life in general, and repeat offenders, it found allegations that the University did not adequately supervise or deter students from attending parties hosted by derecognized fraternities sufficient for plaintiffs to proceed on deliberate indifference, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Turning to their post-assault claims, the court found various allegations of inadequate responses to reports of sexual assault, including assertions that (1) a mandatory reporter did not report an alleged assault to the Title IX office and (2) officials coordinated to encourage a complainant to choose an informal resolution process, were sufficient for plaintiffs to proceed on their post-assault deliberate indifference, due process, and contract claims. The court also found that assertions of pressure to forego a formal investigation, criticism in the athletics community, and withheld references and professional support were sufficient to allege Title IX retaliation.   

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Contracts | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | Retaliation | Student Organizations | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct

  • Date:

    Speech First, Inc. v. Sands (U.S. Mar. 4, 2024)

    Order granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding with instructions to dismiss as moot. Plaintiff-Appellant, Speech First, a national free speech watchdog group, sued Virginia Tech, alleging that the University’s Bias Intervention and Response Team (BIRT) Policy (Bias Policy) violates the First Amendment. In affirming denial of a preliminary injunction, the Fourth Circuit held that Speech First failed to show injury in fact, noting that the BIRT lacks the authority to punish students and that its process is not “so burdensome that an objectively reasonable student would self-censure to avoid encountering it.” Instead, it found that through the Bias Policy the University permissibly “devised a way to educate its student body about both protected speech and the role of tolerance in the campus community.” In a declaration accompanying the brief in response to Speech First’s petition for certiorari, Virginia Tech President Timothy Sands noted that the bias-incident response protocol and BIRT were discontinued in 2023 after a review undertaken by a new Dean of Students and a new Vice President of Student Affairs. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment below as to the Bias Policy, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims as moot. Justice Thomas filed a dissent, in which Justice Alito joined. 

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech

  • Date:

    Honeyfund.com, Inc. v. DeSantis (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2024)

    Opinion affirming preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs, employers, and consultants in Florida who conduct or seek to conduct diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) trainings in the workplace, bought a First Amendment challenge to Florida’s “Individual Freedom Act” (also called the “Stop W.O.K.E. Act”), which prohibits mandatory workplace trainings that endorse any of a range of statutorily enumerated concepts related to DEI. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction and found that the Act discriminated on the basis of both content and viewpoint and failed strict scrutiny. The court rejected the State’s argument that it regulates only conduct associated with holding certain meetings, noting that under the Act “the disfavored ‘conduct’ cannot be identified apart from the disfavored speech.” It also rejected the State’s assertion that the Act functions like Title VII, finding that under the Act “speech is not regulated incidentally as a means of restricting discriminatory conduct—restricting speech is the point of the law.”   

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech

  • Date:

    Doe v. The Univ. of N.C. Sys. (W.D. N.C. Mar. 4, 2024)

    Memorandum of Decision and Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff, a former student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and recipient of an independently funded full scholarship, brought Title IX, due process, contract, and tort claims against the University and numerous officials after he was expelled for alleged sexual misconduct. Plaintiff alleged that he did not receive proper notification of the accusations, that he was not allowed to cross-examine his four accusers, that evidence was withheld from him and exculpatory evidence was not considered, and that investigators and members of hearing panels showed gender bias. The court found the factual allegations sufficient for plaintiff to proceed on his Title IX erroneous outcome, due process, and contract claims. The court also found the alleged procedural flaws sufficient to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, but it found no allegation that the flaws were intended to inflict emotional distress. The court also permitted plaintiff to proceed on his tortious interference with a contract claim, finding that he had sufficiently alleged that the University had communicated information about the flawed disciplinary proceedings to the foundation funding his scholarship.   

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Due Process | Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration | Students | Title IX & Student Sexual Misconduct | Tort Litigation

  • Date:

    Bhattacharya v. Murray (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 2024)

    Opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. Plaintiff, a former medical student at the University of Virginia who was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychosis, brought First Amendment retaliation and due process claims against the University after he was suspended for failures of professionalism and then issued a four-year no trespass order (NTO) for online harassment and threats against faculty members. In Fall 2018, a faculty member submitted a Professionalism Concern Card regarding a series of questions plaintiff posed to an American Medical Women’s Association panel on microaggressions. Plaintiff was then involuntarily hospitalized, first, for concerning behavior on the afternoon he received notice of the professionalism concern and, two days later, for threatening behavior directed against his mother. Subsequently, he posted pictures of members of the school’s Academic Standards and Achievement Committee online along with harassing messages. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the University on plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit found that the evidence overwhelmingly pointed to his confrontational and threatening behavior, rather than his protected academic speech on microaggressions, as the basis of his suspension and disqualification as a medical student. The court also affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s due process claims, noting that professionalism is an academic rather than disciplinary standard for the medical school and that plaintiff himself did not timely appeal the NTO.   

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | Due Process | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation

  • Date:

    Niman v. Mont. Univ. Sys. (D. Mont. Feb. 23, 2024)

    Opinion and Order granting-in-part and denying-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs, current and former students in professional degree programs at the University of Montana who were classified as nonresidents for tuition and fees at the time of their enrollment, brought due process and equal protection challenges to several features of the University’s residency policy, alleging that they were unconstitutionally denied reclassification to in-state residency status. The court permitted plaintiffs to proceed, first, on their facial challenge to a provision that denies reclassification to professional degree students who cannot show that they were residents for at least 12 consecutive months for a purpose other than postsecondary education prior to their first semester of the professional degree program. Next, the court permitted plaintiffs to proceed in their as applied, but not their facial challenge to the policy’s general but rebuttable presumption that students enrolled in at least half of a full-time credit load cannot establish residency on the grounds that the policy provides students in professional degree programs fewer bases for rebutting that presumption. Finally, the court also permitted plaintiffs to proceed on their challenges to the policy’s requirement that a student wait 12 months before seeking reclassification and demonstrate less than 50% dependence on out-of-state sources of income and financial support, as well as on their claim that the policy requires them to pay tuition at rates disproportionate to the funding provided by Montana taxpayers.   

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | Due Process | Equal Protection

  • Date:

    Children’s Health Def. Inc. v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J. (3rd Cir. Feb. 15, 2024)

    Opinion affirming dismissal. Appellants, thirteen students at Rutgers University during Spring 2021, brought statutory and constitutional challenges to the University’s announced COVID-19 vaccine policy requiring that unvaccinated students either take all their classes online or mask and test weekly. In affirming dismissal, the Third Circuit held that the policy was not preempted by the federal Emergency Use Authorization Act because it preserved the students’ right to refuse the vaccine. Turning to their substantive due process claim, the court found no fundamental right to refuse a vaccination and held that the policy was rationally related to the University’s interest in maintaining a healthy student body. It similarly held that their equal protection claim failed because the University had a rational basis for treating vaccinated and unvaccinated students differently.   

    Topics:

    Campus Police, Safety, & Crisis Management | Constitutional Issues | Coronavirus | Due Process | Equal Protection

  • Date:

    Speech First, Inc. v. Shrum (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 2024)

    Opinion reversing and remanding for further proceedings. Plaintiff, Speech First, a national free speech watchdog group, sued Oklahoma State University alleging that three schoolwide policies chilled protected speech, offering in support pseudonymous declarations from three students asserting that their constitutionally protected expression had been inhibited. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding plaintiff had not identified by name at least one member who would have standing to bring the claim personally. In reversing and remanding, the Tenth Circuit found that a pseudonym is sufficient to identify a particular person asserting an injury for the purpose of establishing Article III standing.   

    Topics:

    Constitutional Issues | First Amendment & Free Speech

  • Date:

    Dai v. Le (5th Cir. Feb. 5, 2024)

    Opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff, a former graduate student and graduate assistant at Louisiana Tech University, brought constitutional and contract claims against multiple University officials after she received negative feedback on a public presentation and a low grade in a related class, was terminated from her assistantship, and resigned from the program when she was unable to form a dissertation committee. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants on her First Amendment retaliation claim, the Fifth Circuit rejected her assertion that an email she sent to those who had attended her presentation attempting to clarify her research methodology was a matter of public concern, finding that she offered no evidence of a widespread debate in the community on the topic. Turning to her due process claim, the court found that (1) her property interest in her assistantship was not unqualified because her offer letter provided it could be terminated early for unsatisfactory performance and (2) the dean provided sufficient process on her complaint over the termination by reviewing the materials she submitted, her paper, and presentation materials, and by speaking with faculty members before upholding the termination. In affirming the lower court’s decision on her contract claim, the court noted that the decision that plaintiff was not making satisfactory progress was an academic decision to be reviewed deferentially.   

    Topics:

    Academic Performance and Misconduct | Constitutional Issues | Discrimination, Accommodation, & Diversity | First Amendment & Free Speech | Retaliation | Students